
The number of incidents in modern SOCs creates high workload for the security experts involved especially due to overhead in the routing layer: once an incident is deemed relevant, it must be assigned to a domain expert responsible for the affected system. As enterprise system landscapes and ownership structures grow, manual ownership identification and ticket handoffs become a dominant source of delay, variance, and misrouting. We present a generalized process model that automatically connects SOCs to security systems. We apply this process to the connection between SOCs and IAM systems, arguing that IAM systems serve as the latest and most reliable source of truth for knowledge of people and their responsibilities. Our contributions include a formalized queuing and process model as well as a technical implementation that utilizes CTI data to identify a responsible domain expert via IAM, thereby enabling automated assignment. This approach reduces both workload and the mean time to resolve incidents. We evaluate the approach with model-level extraction accuracy and a discrete-event simulation of the routing stage, embedding the model in a real-world-data SOC use case.
While Bitcoin is fundamentally designed as a censorship-resistant payment network, its operational reality faces increasing jurisdictional pressure from state-level sanctions. Current academic research evaluates these vulnerabilities in isolation: analyzing base-layer mining, Layer 2 routing, and federated sidechains using incompatible metrics. This methodological fragmentation obscures how censorship risks cascade across the protocol stack. To bridge this gap, we present a Systematization of Knowledge that introduces a unified, 17-indicator framework to systematically quantify censorship resistance across the Bitcoin ecosystem. Synthesizing 43 academic sources and additional data from January 2026, we demonstrate that censorship resistance inherits hierarchically. We find that while higher-layer protocols offer internal privacy mitigations like onion routing, their ultimate systemic security depends on the unilateral exit-option to a neutral base layer, which federated sidechains currently lack. Furthermore, we identify a critical gap: while advanced cryptographic mitigations like Stratum V2 and trustless rollups exist, operational friction and the pursuit of liquidity efficiency might slow down their adoption. Consequently, transaction flow remains bottlenecked by highly identifiable, centralized corporate entities acting as single points of coercion. We conclude that systemic resilience is currently limited by intermediary vulnerabilities and requires both base-layer upgrades (e.g., covenants) and the broader economic adoption of trust-minimized technologies.
Covert channels enable stealthy data exfiltration inside otherwise legitimate traffic. In practice, a warden cannot block all covert exfiltration without harming legitimate traffic. The realistic goal is therefore to reduce leakage while preserving acceptable Quality of Service. We present WardenMind, a software warden designed to be deployable by resource-constrained operators. It relies only on standard IPFIX records and commodity software, without programmable hardware or network-stack changes. Only a small fraction of high-risk flows triggers costly interventions. For each flow, WardenMind computes a calibrated covert-risk estimate. It then selects among progressively stronger actions with a Bayesian cost model that balances residual leakage against QoS impact. The policy is updated online so that fixed thresholds do not have to be retuned every time traffic conditions change. On a controlled flow-level dataset built from MAWI traffic and CIC-Bell DNS exfiltration traces, WardenMind achieves strong detection performance, reaching 92.4% TPR with 0.47% FPR with two actions, and 81.2% TPR with 0.33% FPR with three actions, while capturing only 0.85% of legitimate traffic.
As governments increasingly regulate/restrict cryptocurrency mining due to financial, environmental, and policy concerns, detecting mining activity at the network level has become an important problem. In practice, miners can evade traditional deep packet inspection by tunneling pool communication through encrypted channels such as VPNs, Tor, or proxies. However, it is unclear whether these mechanisms meaningfully reduce the detectability of mining activity in network traffic. In this paper, we present the first systematic evaluation of whether pool-based cryptocurrency mining remains detectable at the network level under realistic deployment scenarios. Specifically, we investigate whether Stratum-based mining traffic—the de facto standard for pool mining—remains detectable when routed through anonymity-preserving channels such as VPNs and Tor. To answer this question, we design an evaluation methodology that operates exclusively on flow-level metadata and analyze mining traffic across 10 major cryptocurrencies and several widely used public mining pools. Our study includes plaintext traffic, VPN-tunneled traffic (OpenVPN TCP/UDP and WireGuard), and Tor-routed traffic in a realistic campus-gateway environment containing over 20 million background flows. Our results show that mining activity remains distinguishable from background traffic even when encrypted, achieving up to 0.85 precision and 0.88 recall under VPN tunneling, and 0.95 precision and 0.99 recall under Tor. Moreover, the underlying cryptocurrency can be identified with high accuracy under VPN encryption (0.96 precision and recall), though it becomes significantly more challenging under Tor. These findings suggest that encrypted tunneling does not eliminate detectability risk and may provide miners with a false sense of invisibility.
The widespread adoption of encryption has greatly enhanced user privacy but also complicated network security monitoring. Traditional intrusion detection systems (IDS) that rely on payload inspection have become ineffective as most communications are now secured using Transport Layer Security (TLS). This work proposes a privacy-preserving framework for detecting malware in TLS-encrypted traffic by combining JA4 and JA4S fingerprinting techniques with supervised machine learning algorithms on a large-scale dataset of 72,816 TLS flows spanning 19 malware families. The proposed approach extracts unique TLS handshake fingerprints and leverages classifiers such as Random Forest, XGBoost, and Logistic Regression to classify encrypted traffic. By analyzing metadata rather than payloads, the system maintains data confidentiality and regulatory compliance. A rigorous fingerprint-level splitting protocol ensures zero overlap between training and test fingerprint combinations, with all 20,815 test flows corresponding to entirely unseen fingerprints. To validate that ML classifiers contribute genuine generalization beyond fingerprint memorization, we introduce a non-ML majority-label baseline, which achieves only 26.09