Abstract Do firm‐specific subsidies create local jobs, and do those jobs go to local residents? Linking Good Jobs First subsidy records to Longitudinal Employer‐Household Dynamics Origin‐Destination Employment Statistics employment data, we estimate stacked event studies using geocoded census‐tract awards in six states and national county‐level mega‐deals exceeding $100 million. At the tract level, workplace employment rises only for large awards, with gains concentrated in the subsidized tract and not offset nearby. At the county level, mega‐deals raise workplace but not resident employment; origin‐destination flows show gains accrue primarily to out‐of‐county commuters. Back‐of‐the‐envelope announced subsidy costs range from $18,233 to $69,749 per job.
Abstract This paper examines whether the 1993 Earned Income Tax Credit expansion affected children of single and married mothers differently, given their sharply different labor supply incentives. Using a difference‐in‐differences design, I find that the expansion reduced combined Peabody Individual Achievement Tests math and reading scores of single mothers' children by 0.14 standard deviations relative to married mothers' children. Mechanism analyses provide internally consistent evidence that increased maternal employment was accompanied by reduced cognitive stimulation and fewer time‐intensive parental inputs, suggesting that reduced caregiver–child interactions may have contributed to these effects and underscoring the potential need for complementary policies such as access to high‐quality child care.
Abstract The implementation and unwinding of the Families First Coronavirus Response Act's continuous coverage requirement generated historically large changes in Medicaid enrollment during the COVID‐19 pandemic. Using a combination of descriptive and causal analyses, we examine the substantial cross‐state differences in these changes, which remain little understood. We find that policies designed to ease unwinding frictions, as well as federal fiscal assistance to states, have little predictive power, suggesting limited roles for administrative design or liquidity constraints. Political preferences have modest predictive power during the unwinding period. Pandemic‐era Medicaid expansions and more generous baseline eligibility thresholds are strongly associated with larger net enrollment gains.
Abstract In the United States, state legislation prohibits automobile manufacturers from selling cars directly to consumers. Instead, they must rely on independently owned franchised dealerships to distribute cars, SUVs, and light trucks. The legislation enshrines a ban on vertical integration that allows dealers to profit at the consumer's expense. In Florida alone, a rough estimate of this adverse economic impact on consumers is around $2.5 billion annually. In this article, we examine the statutory language of the Florida Automobile Dealers Act to expose the legal protections provided to the dealer and the resulting costs they impose on consumers.
