ABSTRACT Conversation is a shared activity that requires both people to stay engaged. If one person replies with unexpectedly short answers, that mutual engagement can break down, making the interaction feel less inclusive. We propose that receiving these short replies can be experienced as a form of partial ostracism and threaten basic psychological needs. Across three studies, short replies consistently reduced need satisfaction: even when delivered in a warm tone (Study 1, N = 441), even when they came from an acquaintance or a close other (Study 2, N = 444), and even when an external reason for brevity was available (Study 3, N = 740). This effect was mediated by perceived relational devaluation. These findings suggest that unexpectedly short replies can function as a subtle yet robustly hurtful form of ostracism and may be difficult to confront, given that sources can easily deny engaging in fully exclusionary behaviour.
ABSTRACT On the basis of two social‐affective frameworks, we posited that national football team performance (winning vs. losing) would impact spectators’ identities, affect and sociopolitical attitudes—including their intergroup attitudes (i.e., in‐group favouritism and multiculturalism) and societal perceptions (i.e., national optimism, perceived crisis severity, political trust and perceived racism). During the UEFA EURO 2024 tournament in Germany, we assessed residents ( N = 1012) from five participating countries before the tournament (baseline) and after each game. Confirming our preregistered hypotheses, national team wins led to stronger national identification, which, in turn, predicted more in‐group favouritism and less support for multiculturalism. Wins also predicted more positive affect, which then coincided with stronger national optimism. Contrary to our hypotheses, however, no direct effects emerged for spectators’ political trust, nor their perceptions of crisis severity and racism. These findings highlight ways in which national sports experiences can predict spectators’ collective identities, emotions and selected sociopolitical attitudes.
Objectification, treating others as mere instruments while denying their intrinsic humanness, is a harmful and pervasive phenomenon, yet interventions to address it remain underexplored. We proposed that awe can reduce objectification toward general others via self-transcendence. Six multi-method studies (N = 1248) supported our hypotheses. We found that awe was negatively associated with, or causally reduced, objectification at both state (Studies 1-3, 5-6) and dispositional levels (Study 4). Self-transcendence (rather than self-smallness) mediated this effect (Studies 3-6). Moreover, awe-induced reduction in objectification was linked to decreased exploitative intentions. These observed effects were distinct from nature exposure or general positive emotions (Studies 2-3) and were prevalent across cultures (Study 6). Overall, the present research comprehensively demonstrates awe's unique capacity to counteract objectification, highlighting its potential for fostering humane interpersonal interactions.
While prior research has primarily examined shared experiences of oppression as a mechanism to cultivate solidarity, this approach fails to contextualize intergroup dynamics in specific oppressive socio-political-economic systems. Incorporating historical materialism to advance allyship and solidarity, we examined the 2023 digital action 'I'm Not Palestinian But' where people globally on the social media platform X stated their motivations to stand in solidarity with the Palestinian people. A thematic analysis of 391 posts in this action revealed five themes of pro-Palestine solidarity motivations. The majority of participants expressed pro-Palestine solidarity because of their shared experience (with the Palestinian people) of hegemony and empire (subthemes: colonization and Western imperialism) and shared experience of systems of domination (subthemes: caste systems and state violence). In a dialectical relationship with these two themes, shared strengths emerged as another motivation. Individual critical consciousness and intrapersonal motivations (emotion and morality) were identified as two individual-level factors that motivated solidarity. Findings challenge the dominant approaches to allyship/solidarity and emphasize the role of historical materialism in cultivating emancipatory activism.
ABSTRACT This research examines how wrongdoers may use narration to ‘work through’ a transgression committed, towards self‐forgiveness and reconciliation. In Study 1 ( N = 30), reflexive thematic analysis was used to identify narrative types observable in wrongdoers’ storying of a recent interpersonal transgression, informing our conceptual framework. We developed a quantitative tool for assessing wrongdoers’ narration—the Interpersonal Offense Narration Scale (IONS) and, in Study 2 ( N = 349), used linear mixed modelling to examine how wrongdoers’ narrative processes develop over 72 h post‐transgression. Results indicate that past‐contextualization (contextual explanations) was related to genuine self‐forgiveness and willingness to reconcile; self‐contextualization (exploring identity (in)congruence) was related to self‐punishment and self‐exoneration; self‐distancing (big‐picture abstraction) was related to down‐regulating self‐punishment and self‐exoneration; and redemption (moral learning) was related to genuine self‐forgiveness and willingness to reconcile, and reduced self‐exoneration. The findings thus highlight the differential functions of distinct narrative processes for interpersonal wrongdoers working‐through their wrongdoing toward self‐forgiveness.
ABSTRACT Apart from their well‐established associations with individual characteristics, experiences of existential threats and either objective or perceived structural circumstances in which people live, conspiracy beliefs are now being increasingly recognised as a reflection of group‐related motivations, identity‐protective motives, prejudice and stereotypes. As conspiracy beliefs and intergroup attitudes share definitional characteristics as well as extensive networks of social, psychological and contextual correlates, their content and function allow us to see them as an intergroup phenomenon. To provide a more nuanced understanding of conspiracy beliefs, we situate them within the tripartite model of intergroup attitudes as an additional, metacognitive dimension. Drawing from their metacognitive character as often biased insights into outgroups’ intentions and actions, and expanding the socio‐functional model of prejudice, we propose an operational research roadmap that specifies when and for which conspiracy beliefs the intergroup‐based approach is likely to be effective.
Societal gender role norms play a crucial role in shaping men's and women's career aspirations. However, prior research documenting this key role of gendered norms has primarily focused on heterosexual women and men in the global North-West. Previous studies documenting differences in career interests by sexual orientation suggest that gender role norms might affect lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) women and men less strongly than heterosexuals. This large-scale, preregistered study sought to document group differences in norm perceptions, career interests and their relationship. To this end, 18,351 university students (n = 3318 LGB, n = 15,033 heterosexual) from 46 countries completed a self-report survey about their gender, sexual orientation, perceptions of societal gender role norms, as well as their personal gender role beliefs and career interests. Analyses revealed that, compared to heterosexual individuals, LGB individuals reported significantly less stereotypical career interests and endorsed less traditional gender role beliefs about careers. As predicted, perceptions of societal gender role norms predicted career interests for heterosexual but not for LGB participants. Moreover, LGB participants showed a weaker relationship between societal gender role norms and own gender role beliefs than straight participants did. Interestingly, we found no evidence that this effect was conditional on the level of LGBT acceptance in different countries sampled. We discuss implications of this new evidence for understanding occupational gender segregation from an intersectional perspective.
A recent adversarial collaboration on social evaluation has united a number of competing models under a bi-dimensional structure of social evaluation. This proposed structure posits that social evaluation is conducted using two independent dimensions: Horizontal and Vertical. In turn, each dimension is divided into two facets: The Horizontal dimension is composed of the Friendliness and Morality facets, and the Vertical dimension is composed of the Ability and Assertiveness facets. Although commendable, direct evidence for this proposed model remains scarce. Specifically, the literature fails to test for plausible competing models that separate Friendliness and Morality into independent dimensions. Across two preregistered studies (n = 681) and a re-analysis of six recently published datasets (Barbedor et al. 2024, n = 1265; Koch et al. 2024, n = 6368), we systematically compared theoretical models of social evaluation in the context of regional stereotypes (Study 1), cross-national stereotypes in Latin America (Study 2), arbitrary social groups (Studies 3-7 and 9) and individual targets (Studies 8 and 9). Preregistered results provide mixed evidence for bi-, tri- and four-dimensional models of social evaluation. We discuss the implications of these results for adversarial collaboration, specifically regarding potential moderators of the number of dimensions, such as the evaluated social target.
Traditional models of social categorisation focus on singular identity dimensions or shared identities between targets and perceivers. Intersectionality models, by contrast, emphasise how multiple stigmatised identities interact to produce unique forms of bias. Few efforts have systematically compared these approaches, and none have articulated how intersectionality advances beyond them. In this article, we argue that the key contribution of the intersectional approach lies in its attention to social category interactions and the broader normative context that shapes them. Unlike prior social categorisation models, which tend to treat identities additively or in isolation, intersectionality accounts for the distinct bias that emerges at the intersection of multiple marginalised identities. To demonstrate this added value, we present a comparative framework outlining each model's distinctive features and predictions regarding bias towards stigmatised individuals. This perspective offers new directions for understanding when intersectional versus traditional categorisation models may be most appropriate, guiding the development of interventions that target the unique biases emerging at the intersection of multiple stigmatised identities.
Using three-wave panel data from the United Kingdom (N = 604) and the United States (N = 512), we examined changes in system-legitimization across the 2024 electoral cycle and whether trajectories differed for electoral winners and losers. In both countries, system-legitimization increased after the election, suggesting that elections function as legitimacy-relevant events once outcomes become known. Winner-loser dynamics qualified these patterns. In both countries, electoral winners showed clear post-election increases in system legitimization. Among losers, responses depended on how political alignment was operationalized. In the United Kingdom, right-leaning losers increased in system legitimization when defined by ideology, but Conservative Party supporters showed no substantive post-election change. In the United States, left-leaning losers showed little ideological change overall, whereas Democratic Party supporters exhibited a short-term decline that was not sustained 1 month later. These findings suggest that elections shape system attitudes, but loser responses are contingent on political context and how electoral alignment is defined.
Sense of power and self-compassion both impact important intrapsychic and interpersonal outcomes. However, how powerholders treat themselves when experiencing failure or personal setbacks is unclear. We propose that powerholders are more apt than their lower-power counterparts to exhibit self-compassion when faced with difficulties. Across six main studies (and four supplemental studies) using experimental, correlational and real-world designs (N total = 3325), converging support was found for a positive link between power and self-compassion. This held for experimentally-induced, self- and peer-reported and structural power, and for direct and indirect self-compassion measures. Further, as power means reduced dependence and increased security, we theorized and found that power enhances authenticity, which explained powerholders' greater self-compassion. These findings advance theory in suggesting that power is linked to adaptively dealing with personal adversities, carry implications for organizational politics and HR practices and suggest that self-compassion interventions for low-power individuals may be useful.
Intergroup interactions are often fraught with fear of rejection and intergroup anxiety-emotional reactions that undermine efforts to build inclusive societies. The current research investigates how race-based rejection sensitivity and intergroup anxiety evolve across the adult lifespan. Drawing on 15 annual waves of longitudinal data from a national sample of 60,967 ethnic majority and minority adults, we used cohort-sequential latent growth modelling to examine age, period and cohort effects on race-based rejection sensitivity and intergroup anxiety. Results reveal that changes in race-based rejection sensitivity largely emerge as a result of normative ageing (i.e., age effects) among both ethnic majorities and minorities, whereas changes in intergroup anxiety among both ethnic majority and minority groups are best explained by specific societal events (i.e., period effects). Collectively, this study provides novel insights into how concerns over race-based rejection and intergroup anxiety change across the lifespan.
Previous research has focused on disadvantaged groups seeking social change, overlooking how dominant groups mobilize to preserve the status quo. Across three studies (two correlational, one experimental), we explored how collective grievance-the feeling of being or having been collectively wronged by an outgroup-drives system-preserving collective actions and aggressive intergroup tendencies. Additionally, we examined whether conservative orientations moderate and dehumanization mediates these effects. Study 1 found that grievance was linked to outgroup dehumanization, non-normative collective action intentions and aggressive inclinations more than other predictors, such as identity fusion and moral convictions. Studies 2 and 3 revealed that collective grievance increased outgroup dehumanization, strengthening non-normative collective action dispositions and aggressive tendencies, but only among conservative individuals. This research highlights how majority group members, particularly with conservative ideologies, can be motivated by collective grievances to mobilize in defence of the status quo and exhibit aggressive intentions towards outgroups through their dehumanization.
A substantial body of research has investigated the determinants of conspiratorial beliefs, yet little is known about different conspiracy theory endorsement profiles. The present study used cluster analysis on a set of 52 conspiratorial statements tapping into six conspiracy theory types to identify and validate conspiracy theory endorsement clusters in a randomly drawn sample of the Finnish population (N = 1077). The cluster solution was then further validated in a social media-based convenience sample (N = 772). Four conspiracy theory endorsement clusters with distinct profiles were identified and validated across the samples. Participants who belonged to more conspiracy theory-endorsing clusters held more pseudoscientific beliefs and had lower political trust than participants in the less conspiracy theory-endorsing clusters. Mixed results were found concerning demographic differences. The results provide strong evidence for the existence of four conspiracy theory endorsement profiles and support the notion of a general conspiracy mindset.
Affective polarisation, a growing hostility toward political outgroups, is a phenomenon rooted in social identity. Social identity threat-the expectation of experiencing some form of denigration based on a self-relevant group identity-is thought to be a major driver of affective polarisation. Using a six-wave longitudinal survey of 470 American liberals and conservatives, we investigated the impact of social identity threat on affective polarisation, perceived stress and self-rated health. Using random intercept cross-lagged panel models (RI-CLPMs), we found that higher-than-usual identity threat predicted subsequent increases in affective polarisation (beta = 0.09, p = 0.025). There were no direct cross-lagged effects of social identity threat on perceived stress or self-rated health. However social identity threat was correlated at the between-person level with stress (r = 0.25, p = < 0.001) and health (r = -0.17, p = 0.002). These findings replicate and expand on existing research by utilising a design suited for causal inference, to shed light on how identity threats and the expectation of prejudice influence intergroup relations and affective polarisation. While social identity threat plays a significant role in worsening affective polarisation, its effects on perceived stress and health are unclear. Further research is recommended to explore interventions aimed at mitigating social identity threats and polarisation, and further clarifying their potential health consequences.
Public opinion plays a central role in shaping conflict dynamics and influencing wartime policy. In this work, we examined which psychological intergroup interventions could increase public opposition to war. Building on research showing that instrumental reasoning and social identification are central, though not exhaustive, predictors of war-related attitudes, we designed seven theoretically grounded, social media-based interventions and tested their effectiveness in an intervention tournament conducted during the January 2025 ceasefire in the Israel-Gaza war, with a sample of Jewish Israelis (N = 1237). One intervention-emphasizing Israel's potential losses if the war continued (achievements-driven loss aversion)-increased support for ending the war across participants. A second intervention-grouping Jewish Israelis by war-related attitudes rather than political identification (attitude-based recategorization)-was effective primarily among left-leaning participants. These findings demonstrate that carefully designed brief message-based interventions can influence public opinion and promote de-escalation, even amid violent conflict.
Beliefs regarding meaning in life have not previously received much attention from researchers. In this article, we synthesised past theories and findings on Belief about Meaning in Life (BML) and developed the Belief about Meaning in Life Scale (BMLS) to measure these beliefs. Study 1 was a qualitative investigation. We conducted street interviews (N = 386) to gather information on the characteristics of meaning beliefs within Chinese culture, facilitating the identification and validation of the proposed framework of BML. In Study 2 (N = 436), we developed BMLS and administered it to Chinese participants. Factor analyses supported the dimensions we proposed. In Study 3, we further evaluated the validity of the BMLS in samples from China (N = 260) and the United States (N = 287). Moreover, latent profile analysis revealed four types of belief clusters. This research helps promote understanding of the individual differences in BML across groups.
Crises have the potential to transform social identities and foster collective action, yet little is known about how new identities emerge and how a sense of shared experience (SSE) sustains mobilisation beyond immediate group contexts. The present research investigated these processes among 495 displaced Ukrainians with 107 participants completing a follow-up 3 years later. It focused on identification and SSE with war-affected people and intentions to engage in collective action, including support for human rights and advocacy of refugees from other conflict-affected regions. Cross-sectional analyses indicated that identification indirectly predicted collective action intentions through an SSE. Longitudinal analyses confirmed that identification predicted an SSE over time, relating to refugee advocacy, whereas broader human rights intentions declined. The results suggest that fostering shared experiences and identification with affected groups can sustain collective mobilisation even under prolonged and discouraging conflict conditions.
This study tests a dual grievance model of populism by examining whether relative deprivation and external political inefficacy are linked to two core dimensions of populist beliefs (people sovereignty and anti-elitism) via aversive political emotions (anger, sadness and fear) and institutional distrust across six European countries (N = 5487). Multigroup structural equation modelling showed that relative deprivation was consistently positively associated with all three emotions. However, only anger and institutional distrust serially mediated its link to populist beliefs in every country, and this effect was larger for anti-elitism than for people sovereignty. Cross-country differences emerged in how external political inefficacy related to emotions and how emotions related to distrust. Although anger and distrust formed a stable pathway to populism, the mediation paths involving sadness and fear varied across contexts. Overall, these findings clarify when and how political affect and institutional evaluations help channel grievances into populism, highlighting both shared and context-dependent mechanisms.
