Abstract Since 2020, Mali and Niger have experienced a resurgence of military coups, which were justified by claims of state failure and escalating security threats. This article investigates military populism and introduces a new analytical framework of ‘nested threat perceptions’ to explain these developments. Through qualitative comparative case-studies, we demonstrate how military leaders in Mali and Niger have framed internal and external threats as part of an interconnected, existential challenge to national sovereignty, which has enabled them to consolidate power and reorient foreign policy. We identify four conditions that facilitate military populism: societal othering, external threats, dysfunctional political institutions and the presence of alternative global patrons and alliances. By examining how these factors interact in the cases of Mali and Niger, this article contributes to the under-studied area of populism in Africa, and expands the conceptual tools available for analysing military populist resurgence and foreign policy realignment in post-colonial settings.
Abstract United States–China economic statecraft increasingly depends on choke points within supply chains, trade routes and cross-border payment infrastructures. The article contends that leverage concentrated in these choke points functions as depletable infrastructural capital. Such leverage is effective when dependence is concentrated and substitutes are scarce, but repeated activation can erode it. Each round of sanctions or export controls reveals where pressure can be applied, prompting firms and third-country intermediaries to invest in rerouting, alternative processing capacity and redundant settlement channels. As these adjustments become embedded in durable infrastructure, the marginal disruption caused by additional measures decreases, while the marginal enforcement effort required to maintain comparable pressure increases. The analysis examines episodes involving rare-earth processing, successive semiconductor export controls, south-east Asian trade diversion and origin governance, and emerging payment corridors. Across these cases, coercion reshapes interdependence by redirecting flows through intermediary jurisdictions without eliminating underlying dependencies. Erosion can arise without deliberate strategic intent, although the choices of allies, intermediary hubs and hedging middle powers influence its pace and form. Repeated coercion thus redistributes rather than eliminates hierarchy, and past effectiveness becomes an increasingly weak guide to future coercive capacity.
Abstract In June 2023, after five years of multilateral negotiations, governments adopted a new international legally binding instrument for the conservation and sustainable use of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ). Article 49 of the BBNJ Agreement establishes a Scientific and Technical Body (STB) to provide advice and expertise to the Conference of the Parties (COP). While there was agreement among governments on the need for an STB, there was no immediate consensus regarding the types of expertise to include or the capacity in which experts should serve. We use the BBNJ STB negotiations to analyse epistemic selectivities inherent in the current reshaping of global environmental knowledge. Our findings indicate, first, that the integration of traditional knowledge from Indigenous Peoples and local communities, despite being contested, has now also been established in the context of high seas governance. Second, the independence of experts, which aims to limit government control over scientific advice, is highly prioritized and represents a clear deviation from the structural set-up of similar bodies. Several aspects of the STB will need to be determined at the first COP, and it is essential that these decisions are made with an awareness of epistemic selectivities and functionality to ensure its effective operationalization.
Abstract Since the 1990s, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has expanded its mandate over new security concerns, including environmental issues. Most notably, its member states have devised a regional regime for tackling the problem of transboundary haze. This includes formal agreements and an intrusive regional monitoring mechanism, features that appear at odds with simplistic accounts of ASEAN informality and non-intervention. However, the regime remains limited in its effects. In this article, we draw on documentary and interview data to explore the complexity of the regime. We ask: how has ASEAN responded to the haze issue, and why does the regime look the way it does? To answer the first question, we trace the piecemeal development of the regime, highlighting tensions between interventionism and deeply-held practices that delineate ASEAN governance. To answer the second question, we show how the regime emerged broadly in line with ASEAN's established ways of governance, including its preferences for face-saving, informality and non-interference. We extend this argument by showing that, despite its ineffectiveness, regional elites turned to this way of governance as means of mediating domestic and economic interests, couching (in)action within the rhetoric and practice of the ‘ASEAN way’.
Abstract The use of the term ‘apartheid’ by social scientists, policy-makers and advocacy communities has increased considerably in recent years. Yet its meaning appears fuzzy, marked by inconsistent usage and the lack of a shared understanding. This article seeks to advance greater conceptual clarity by introducing a novel conceptual framework that specifies observable parameters and indicators of apartheid. We begin by tracing the term's historical and legal origins and identifying areas of conceptual confusion, including ambiguities in terminology and vague conceptual boundaries. We then propose a way forward by introducing a systematic framework that resolves many of the ambiguities identified and creates clearer conceptual boundaries. The framework identifies three core criteria of apartheid: 1) a codified regime of domination; 2) systematic oppression; and 3) the commission of specific inhumane acts. We demonstrate the framework's analytical utility through its application to the case of Myanmar, while also identifying forms of oppression and discrimination that fall outside the category. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the framework for future scholarly analysis and policy engagement.
