
Geopolitical conflicts can generate substantial inflationary pressures by disrupting energy supplies, commodity markets, international trade, and global supply chains. However, the magnitude and persistence of these pressures depend not only on the initial external shock but also on how it is transmitted through domestic prices, wages, inflation expectations, and policy responses. This paper develops a conceptual framework for analyzing geopolitical inflation as a multistage transmission process and applies it to two contemporary episodes: the Russia–Ukraine war and the 2026 Iran-centered regional conflict. Drawing on the theoretical and empirical literature, the analysis distinguishes between the immediate inflationary effects of geopolitical shocks and the transmission mechanisms through which these effects may persist over time. The Russia–Ukraine war generated particularly strong inflationary pressures through disruptions to European natural gas, oil, food, and fertilizer markets, whereas the 2026 Iran-centered conflict affected inflation more directly through global oil markets, disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and risks to Gulf energy supplies. The comparative analysis, while not involving econometric estimation or establishing causal relationships, indicates that the inflationary effects of both shocks varied substantially across economies, depending on energy dependence, trade exposure, import concentration, domestic market structures, and available policy buffers. The analysis further emphasizes the importance of inflation expectations, wage and price-setting behavior, and monetary-policy credibility in determining whether temporary supply disruptions become embedded in broader inflation dynamics. The study suggests that geopolitical inflation is neither uniform across economies nor necessarily persistent. Rather, its persistence reflects the interaction between the characteristics and duration of the external shock and the institutional and macroeconomic conditions of the affected economy. The paper draws implications for monetary and fiscal policy and identifies priorities for future empirical research, contributing to a more integrated understanding of how geopolitical shocks propagate through domestic economies and shape inflationary dynamics.
Nigeria has vast economic potential, but this has not translated into significant poverty reduction. This paper examined foreign direct investment and household poverty reduction in Nigeria from 1990 to 2024. The model for this paper was the ARDL designed to capture both the long run and the short run dynamics The Granger causality test was used to trace the direction of causality between foreign direct investment and household poverty reduction in Nigeria. The findings showed that foreign direct investment had insignificant negative impact on household poverty while inflation rate, exchange rate, growth rate of GDP and institutional quality had significant roles in determining the level of household poverty in Nigeria. The result of the Granger causality test showed absence of direction of causality between FDI and household poverty. Based on the results, this paper recommended the need to invest more in infrastructure, education, and innovations.
Do investors price all climate risk disclosures in the same way? Using annual report texts and financial data for Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007 to 2024, this paper estimates the valuation effect of different types of climate risk disclosures on Tobin’s Q. We decompose aggregate climate risk into transition risk, acute physical risk, and chronic physical risk, and use within-firm changes in disclosure while controlling for firm and year fixed effects. Firms with higher climate risk disclosure have lower Tobin’s Q, but this valuation discount is not driven equally by all risk components. The most stable discount is concentrated in chronic physical risk; transition risk provides weaker auxiliary evidence, while acute physical risk does not exhibit stable negative pricing. Further evidence shows that chronic physical risk disclosure predicts higher subsequent R&D intensity and asset impairment ratio. Its negative valuation effect is stronger among firms with a higher fixed asset ratio, and weaker among firms with higher current asset and accounts receivable ratios. High-intensity chronic physical risk disclosure also generates a larger discount and predicts Tobin’s Q within the subsequent one‑to‑two‑year window. The fixed-effects evidence supports the interpretation that capital markets place greater weight on chronic physical risk, which captures persistent exposure, asset lock-in, and long-term adjustment costs.
Whether book-to-market characteristics influence long-memory dynamics remains an open question, particularly in emerging equity markets and during periods of systemic stress. This study investigates long-memory dynamics in Brazilian stock returns and volatility and examines whether persistence differs across book-to-market (BTM) portfolios before, during, and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Using daily data (roughly 2,500 observations per stock) for ten highly liquid IBOVESPA stocks from January 2016 to December 2025, we estimate the fractional integration parameter (d) using the semiparametric Geweke-Porter-Hudak (GPH) estimator for the full sample, three subperiods, and rolling windows. The sample comprises ten selected stocks and does not represent the entire Brazilian equity market. The subperiod and rolling-window estimates describe variation in persistence across regimes and over time. The results show little evidence of long memory in returns, which remain broadly consistent with weak-form market efficiency despite a temporary increase in persistence during the pandemic. In contrast, volatility exhibits strong and pervasive long-memory behavior, with persistence intensifying substantially during the COVID-19 crisis before declining only gradually afterward. No systematic differences are found between Low- and High-BTM portfolios in either returns or volatility, suggesting that persistence is driven primarily by firm-specific sources of uncertainty rather than by book-to-market classification. Overall, the evidence indicates that long memory in the Brazilian equity market is more evident in volatility than in returns.
Depreciation has been and remains a source of confusion and dispute amongst economists. Failure to use clear, valid and self-consistent definitions for output (GDP), depreciation (δ) and income (NDP) is one major cause. Definitions of depreciation are varied and imprecise with obsolescence being the exception. It is usually assumed, without evidence, to be the most important. It is, however, measurable but it has not, as far as I can find, previously been measured. I show that it accounts for only about one third of total US depreciation, and I expect this result to surprise economists. We have no data from which we can identify the causes of depreciation which do not result from obsolescence. However, in the absence of any other cause which can reasonably be assumed to have had such a major impact, climate change is, in my judgement, likely to be the single most important cause of depreciation and even more important than obsolescence. Investment is not just needed for growth. Historically the US has needed to invest between 3.5% and 4.5% of its national income (NDP) in new capital simply to prevent living standards from falling. Standard models assume that growth is determined by changes in technology and additions to the supply of labour and capital. This assumption is rendered invalid by the evidence of the importance of non-obsolescent depreciation. A major revision to US national accounting was made by the Bureau of Economic Analysis in 2013 by altering the definition of output. This was a mistake which should be rescinded. The errors made by the advocates of this change included a bad definition of income, which they conflated with rather than distinguishing it from depreciation, which is not part of income but is in fact the cost of maintaining the current level of output and income. Another major error involved a confusion between the cost of investment and its value. Climate change appears to be accelerating. As it seems already a major hindrance to growth, it poses a major but unknown threat to living standards. With the benefits to growth promised by AI being equally uncertain, economic forecasts resemble guesses even more than they have historically.