Sixty-six percent of the total U.S. jailed population (over 400,000 people) are being held in pretrial detention, not convicted of any crime. Most remain in jail simply because neither they nor their families can afford the bail that a judge has assigned to them. Previous research shows that the assignment of bail is both biased and that being detained in jail negatively impacts later justice outcomes. Women, in general, have been more adversely affected in this area due to their overall fewer social and economic resources compared to men. A sample of 150 women and 150 men was used to compare how gender impacted the length of time it took defendants to bail out of a rural county jail in the southeastern U.S. Using previous literature, pathways theory, and the theoretical lens of an architecture of gendered violence, the authors tested for gendered differences in how quickly women and men posted bail once in pretrial detention. A combination of a Kaplan-Meier survival analysis and Cox proportional multiple-regression analysis indicated that women took significantly longer than men to post bail, while controlling for bail amount, age, and race. Implications for policy and research are discussed.
This manuscript examines how federal appeals courts respond to precedent, in this case, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission. This account includes a comprehensive theory that examines attitudinal factors that relate to Central Hudson, specific relevant legal factors that relate to the case, as well as strategic considerations. We additionally argue that federal appeals courts may reasonably ignore Central Hudson in certain specific instances (most notably when other highly relevant cases are available for lower federal court judges to use). Our results show partial support for several portions of our theory, including a lower propensity for federal appeals courts to positively treat precedent when ideological distance is high. We also find support for one of our factual-based hypotheses (regarding cases that involve drugs and attorney advertising, where other U.S. Supreme Court precedents are readily available for appeals court judges to use).
Criminal defendants unable to afford an attorney are entitled to one for free in the United States, but how and when they obtain access to that lawyer is another question. We examine judicial attitudes and behavior in granting access to counsel in areas where logistics are particularly forbidding. Based on survey responses from 1,091 magistrate judges presiding in lower criminal courts in suburban and rural jurisdictions in upstate New York, we describe both the procedures used to determine defendants' financial eligibility for free counsel, and the logistical challenges that surround securing the physical presence of a lawyer at the first appearance in court. We find that judges strongly favor counsel's presence in order to maintain courtroom efficiency, and sometimes depart from strict interpretation of financial eligibility guidelines to ensure representation. We introduce the concept of the "procedurally precautious judge" to describe the way these respondents carefully preserve the appearance of integrity in court operations even while availability of counsel for defendants is limited.
Recognizing the negative impacts of collateral consequences, policy-makers and scholars have sought to implement formal and informal standards aimed at increasing defendant notice of such consequences before pleading guilty. However, very few studies have sought to explore the actual practices of court room actors regarding collateral consequence notice. The current study filled this gap in knowledge using a survey of South Carolina defense lawyers. Specifically, South Carolina defense attorneys were surveyed about their practices regarding collateral consequence notice as well as their observations of judicial practices regarding collateral consequences. Results indicate that while a large majority of defense attorneys felt that it was their responsibility to inform their clients of collateral consequences, only 36% of respondents agreed that attorneys do a good job informing clients about collateral consequences. In fact, few respondents noted that they always inform their clients about collateral consequences that ex-offenders, probation and parole officers, and social workers consistently identify as particularly impactful to a successful reentry (those related to employment, housing, civic rights, and public benefits) and many never or rarely do so. However, 94.3% of respondents noted that they commonly discuss other collateral consequences with clients. Further, respondents noted that few judges always or often discuss collateral consequences. These results suggest that some collateral consequences are being discussed with some defendants, but also that these practices are inconsistent. Informed by these findings, recommendations for increasing defendant notice of collateral consequences are discussed.
Court curbing, proposed policy that attempts to "restrict, remove or otherwise limit" the power of the judiciary, occurs regularly and with considerable variation throughout the US states. I deviate from past studies, which consider court curbing as an ex post control mechanism, by focusing on ex ante controls of state courts - judicial selection rules and processes. I argue that levels of political party influence over judicial selection (before a judge is seated) alter the motivation to engage in court curbing after a judge is seated. I test this novel ex ante explanation with an original data set of court curbing and judicial selection from 2015 to 2018. Mixed results offer some support for my theory while opening new opportunities for study, particularly among partisan election systems.
