Abstract Malaysia is a rapidly ageing country. Relative to the United Kingdom, its social protection systems are underdeveloped. What is more, its political structure and social practices are different from those of the United Kingdom. Accordingly, the political economy of ageing seems to suggest a stark contrast when the two countries are considered alongside one another. Nevertheless, when programmes concerning income for the retired and the provision of care services for the frail elderly are considered, there are more similarities than might have been expected. Both countries face problems with inadequate pension coverage, and the paper considers how more of the self-employed might be brought into savings plans. In both countries, there is debate on whether pension savings should be directed towards investments in the domestic economy. Both countries face a rapid increase in the number of the ‘oldest old’—those most likely to need support, and policymakers are asking themselves how provision for these people should be improved. This article points out how fiscal constraints have led policymakers in the United Kingdom as well as in Malaysia to encourage the family to increase the part they can play. But in both countries, family members, especially women, are no longer willing, or even able, to carry out ‘traditional’ roles. There are lessons to be learnt in both directions. Moreover, in both countries, more attention should be devoted to understanding and explaining the economic and societal consequences of demographic change.
Projections of health/social care spending highlight risks to future fiscal sustainability. This concern is based, in part, on six assumptions, which we argue are uncertain: (1). Populations will continue to age; (2). Health is a function of age; (3). Health/social care need is driven by health; (4). Health/social care spending is driven by need; (5). Inequalities are unimportant; (6). Increasing dependency ratios risk fiscal sustainability. We propose three hypotheses which reframe the debate: (1). Health/social care spending primarily results from political decisions on supply; (2). Prevention policies alone are unlikely to reduce fiscal pressures; (3). Fiscal sustainability is best achieved by combining prevention with decommodification and 'realistic medicine'.
We present simulation results of the macroeconomic effects of a green European Union (EU) public investment fund for the euro area using the macroeconometric simulation model National Institute Global Econometric Model. Our results show considerable negative gross domestic product (GDP) effects together with inflationary effects from CO2 taxation alone. Accounting for climate change and the corresponding long-term damage to GDP, however, our results show that not acting on climate change now causes far more severe damages in the future. An EU investment fund would significantly cushion the negative transitory GDP effects. Finally, our results highlight the importance of cooperation such that climate change policies are implemented on a global level.
The 2025 Budget exemplified the dysfunction in the UK's Budget process, with systematic and selective briefing of underlying forecast details-meant to be private between the Office for Budget Responsibility and the Treasury-to the media since the 2022 'mini-budget' crisis. In all documented occasions, this has come from the Treasury, with the OBR remaining silent allowing the Treasury to bed in a narrative based on partial information, with real costs in terms of prolonged uncertainty and market volatility. This article proposes a relatively narrow reform to the process that would see the OBR 'bookend' the Budget. The OBR would publish its pre-measures forecast three weeks before a fiscal statement-the same timing as it currently delivers it internally to the Treasury. The Treasury would then respond with its policy measures on Budget Day, with an OBR assessment following some days or a couple of weeks later. Key benefits of this reform are: increased transparency and democratic accountability; removing the OBR from politically contentious judgements about second-round effects of policies before they are announced and under pressure from the Treasury to hit particular fiscal rule targets; reducing the window for market uncertainty by providing a published baseline; and restricting speculation after OBR publication to policy decisions. This would be achieved while minimising the impact on the established forecast timetable. This design, adopting established practice from the Netherlands in publishing the pre-measures forecast to the UK's institutional setup, can help guard the OBR's independence while reducing the window for market volatility.
Public investment in the United Kingdom has been persistently low compared to both its post-war levels and other OECD countries, and this shortfall has been widely seen as one of the causes of weak UK productivity growth since the global financial crisis. Although the Labour government elected in 2024 prioritised growth via higher public and private investment, its self-imposed fiscal rules have limited public investment, sparking debate and research on the UK fiscal framework. This Special Issue brings together recent research examining fiscal frameworks and includes contributions from academic and policy-oriented researchers and leading experts on this issue.
