The ontology developed in this article is a version of the bundle theory of universals. These universals are dispositional in nature. To possess a powerful character and to be empirically existent, these universals require a material substratum. This substratum is conceived as physical ether or Plato’s chora, in which universals are like waves in the sea. The world is composed of basic dispositional universals, such as charge, mass, and spin. These basic dispositional universals bundle together to form elementary particles, which in turn compose more complex structures. An object is thus a composition of basic dispositional universals, whose sustained unity is explained by their mutual dispositional manifestations. The assembled whole already exhibits different manifestations than its parts and therefore constitutes a new kind of dispositional universal of a higher order. Hence, a graded hierarchy is present in the structure of dispositional universals. The article defends the view that dispositions are universals rather than tropes, since what we observe in the physical world are identical, numerically repeatable properties, not merely similar particulars. The proposed theory of dispositional universals stands in opposition to Humean conceptions, as the thesis that “whatever is conceivable is metaphysically possible” does not hold. The lawfulness of the world is conditioned by the dispositional nature of universals. Scientific models that aim to explain and predict events should therefore be adapted to this metaphysical framework.
Mechanistic explanations play an important role in the scientific understanding of the mind. Mechanistic explanations reflect the commitments of mechanistic philosophy. This philosophy stresses a methodology based on decomposition into constituent parts and the synergistic integration of their activities. The methodology provides the identity types required for the formulation of explanations targeting the explanandum phenomenon. The basic relationship between mechanisms and their target explananda is mereological. A system is in intrinsic compositional relation to the participation of its constituent parts in the system’s overall functionality. The compositional relation is primarily inter-level. The stability of the system requires also the existence of intra-level causation within the boundaries of minor sub-mechanisms. In combining the compositional relation with intra-level causation mechanistic explanations would track nonreductive relations. Intra-level causation and inter-level compositional effects are also reflective of a mereological relation. The mind-brain system is an example of a mereological relationship and so according to this logic, the mind would be rendered irreducible. Combining both intra-level causation and inter-level material constitution is nevertheless not sufficient to warrant mechanistic explanations being non-reductive. By emphasizing identity types as the bearers of the mereological relation, mechanists in general regard special-sciences and their kinds as actually reducible to the subsuming mechanisms. Applied to the mind-body relation this means the reduction of mind to brain states.
Epistemicism about vagueness is the position that bivalence holds for every instance of a vague predicate, even if truth or falsity is unknowable in borderline cases. Epistemicism is accused of rejecting the tolerance intuition, and committing itself to sharp borderlines. Mainstream Epistemicists, like Williamson and Sorensen, accept these accusations as costs of their view. I argue instead that both are myths. First, I argue our intuitions support only generic, dense tolerance principles, which are non-paradoxical. Epistemicists can affirm these principles, without inferring any paradoxical principle, and so can embrace the tolerance intuition. Second, bivalence is perfectly compatible with the denial of sharp borderlines, provided that we model the extension of vague predicates as scattered stochastically and non-monotonically across a gradient, just as we should expect if meaning depends on use. My revisionary form of epistemicism better balances our intuitions about vagueness with the conservation of bivalence.
This article argues for the pedagogical value of using literentryway into foundational concepts in feminist theory. It identifies three thematic clusters essential to feminist thought: (1) material conditions and gendered inequalities, (2) representation and discursive power, and (3) language, subjectivity, and gendered expression. Through close textual analysis, the article demonstrates how Woolf's narrative not only illuminates these themes but also renders abstract theoretical debates accessible to students encountering them for the first time. Integrating concrete classroom strategies, the study shows how Woolf's text can scaffold students' understanding of feminist concerns related to economic precarity, epistemic authority, gender construction, canonical exclusion, and the politics of language. Ultimately, the article contends that teaching feminist theory through literature enhances conceptual comprehension, strengthens critical and interpretive skills, and cultivates a nuanced awareness of how gender, power, and discourse intersect across both historical and contemporary contexts.
