La doctrine de la métempsychose est généralement réprouvée en Islam, jusque dans la philosophie, en particulier à partir d’Avicenne (m. 1037). Si elle est réfutée en psychologie au nom de l’harmonie et de l’union de l’âme et du corps, elle apparaît sous d’autres formes, en eschatologie, comme la seule voie de salut des simples d’esprit, voire, nous en formons l’hypothèse, comme la condition de l’expérience spirituelle, prophétique ou mystique, du sage, objet de la reconfiguration « gnostique » de la philosophie dans les Išārāt . Notre article analyse, à partir de son commentaire des Išārāt et dans le reste de son œuvre, la position de Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (m. 1274) philosophe šīʿite avicennien, sur la question, qui revêt pour lui, et en tant que šīʿite, et en tant qu’avicennien, une importance particulière. Si notre penseur fait entrer la réfutation avicennienne de la métempsychose dans la dogmatique imāmite, il apparaît aussi qu’il s’oppose exceptionnellement à son maître, en révoquant de manière radicale toute forme de transmigration de l’âme. La correspondance avec le soufi akbarien Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī révèle que la question de la métempsychose divise les philosophes et les mystiques. Pourtant, nous croyons pouvoir montrer que la distance qui les sépare est moins grande qu’il y paraît : certaines audaces théoriques du dernier Avicenne laissent entrevoir la possibilité de pouvoirs étendus de l’âme humaine. Mais al-Ṭūsī, bien qu’il passe pour l’interprète « véridique » de son maître, se fait le gardien d’une doctrine plus « conservatrice ».
Little is known on Sahlagī (379-476/989-1083), who wrote the Book of Light [ Kitāb al-Nūr ] – one of the earliest extant sources on the ecstatic Sufism of the celebrated mystic, Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī (d. 234/848). In this study, we introduce four additional works on Sufism, theology, and traditionism, all penned by Sahlagī. We argue that the hallmark of these texts is a sober Ašʿarite piety firmly located in the scholarship of the transmitted sciences rather than the ecstatic mysticism associated with his spiritual progenitor, Abū Yazīd. Through a dialogical analysis of the manuscripts of the extant works and bio-bibliographical sources, we shed light on the reception and socio-aural dissemination of these works. All five of Sahlagī’s extant works that we analyze, including his hagiography of Abū Yazīd, the Book of Light , followed the pedagogy of the transmitted sciences, and later scholars studied these texts in the same light. These study circles were initially local, and they came to be dominated by Ḥanbalīs once they arrived at the Levant in the seventh/thirteenth century.
The Qāʿida muḫtaṣara fī qitāl al-kuffār: Hal sababuhu l-muqātala aw l-kufr? ( QM ), one of the less known epitomes of Ibn Taymiyya’s treatises, is notably important as a summarized gloss of his take on unbelief ( kufr ) as the mere ratio legis to fight or kill non-Muslims. Though its authenticity can be claimed, the disagreements are less about its attribution to Ibn Taymiyya and more about its content that sparked controversy about a crucial issue at the core of the jihad discourse. Examples of the challenging discrepancies of contested texts on the issue of offensive/initiatory jihad ( ǧihād al-ṭalab/al-ibtidāʾ ), spread over Ibn Taymiyya’s large corpus, may offer contradictive perspectives. The analysis and discussion of this treatise, compared to his extant legacy, shows how Ibn Taymiyya does not categorically refute initiating jihad against non-Muslims. He rather stresses a conceptualization of defensive jihad ( ǧihād al-dafʿ ) as the basic legitimate rule, even when initiating ( ibtidāʾ ) a fight is necessary as a preventive anticipatory measure.
This article examines the conception of human acts of the Šayḫ al-Azhar (1263-76/ 1847-60) and prolific author Ibrāhīm al-Bāǧūrī (d. 1276/1860) as a case study for discerning the nature and worth of theological commentary literature, which was long undervalued, and his commitment to the goal of his North African Ašʿarī predecessor Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-Sanūsī (d. 895/1490) to circumvent post-Rāzī, philosophized kalām in favour of earlier Ašʿarī thought, especially that of al-Ǧuwaynī (d. 478/1085). It also briefly compares al-Bāǧūrī’s position with that of the Egyptian reformer Muḥammad ʿAbduh (d. 1323/1905), who, in direct response to the kind of predestinarian stance espoused by al-Bāǧūrī, offered a doctrine that lays greater emphasis on free will. I show that al-Bāǧūrī was a creative and original commentator, carefully sorting through, assessing, and selecting the opinions of his predecessors to craft his own recension of the Ašʿarī doctrine of human acts that at times contradicts even the theological project of al-Sanūsī to whom he was otherwise so indebted for his theology.
