Recruitment windfalls can strengthen militant organizations while redirecting their strategy and tactics. This article develops the growth trap mechanism, a grassroots driven process in which incomplete socialization and delegation embed new recruits' preferences into organizational behavior. These upward pressures can transform a group's strategic priorities and operational focus. Drawing on qualitative documents, event data, and computational text analysis, I trace the evolution of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (2009-2016) to illustrate this dynamic. The growth trap highlights how organizational expansion can sow the seeds of transformation-a paradox that illuminates both militant evolution and the life cycle of opaque, high-risk institutions.
Why do jihadist groups attack some countries more than others? Perpetrators claim their attacks retaliate against military interventionism, while Western leaders argue they are targeted for their liberal values. This article examines whether liberal values or military interventionism shaped the Islamic State's choice of target countries between 2013 and 2019. Using binomial regression and difference-in-differences estimates, our results show that countries are targeted due to their military involvement in the Middle East, not because they promote values opposed by IS. This challenges the dominant Western political narrative and supports the retaliatory explanation offered by jihadist groups themselves.
Despite extensive research on terrorism, hate crimes, and mass violence, less is known about how the public perceives incidents that overlap these categories. Many attacks exhibit features that could fit multiple labels, yet public labeling remains underexplored. This study uses a survey-embedded conjoint experiment with 1,181 US adults to examine objective and subjective factors shaping perceptions of violent attacks as terrorism, hate crimes, or mass violence. Participants evaluated hypothetical scenarios varying by weapon type, target, casualties, perpetrator characteristics, and motive. Findings provide insight into public perceptions and inform strategies for reporting and addressing hate crimes and violent extremism.
Aid organizations in conflict zones face systematic exploitation by violent nonstate actors seeking resources and legitimacy. This paper theorizes how such exploitation becomes institutionalized as armed groups consolidate territorial and bureaucratic control. We argue that coercion of aid providers shifts from episodic abuse to an embedded governance practice once rebel authority stabilizes. Institutionalization operates through labor capture, regulatory interference, intimidation, and control of assets, integrating humanitarian operations into rebel political economies. The argument bridges rebel governance and organizational sociology, showing how humanitarian neutrality erodes under consolidated rebel rule. These dynamics generate material benefits and legitimacy while constraining humanitarian operational autonomy.
