Most work on racial attitudes considers explicitly hostile outgroup evaluations. What about racial attitudes that appear subjectively positive but reinforce racial inequality more broadly? Research in social psychology shows that sexist attitudes are ambivalent; sexism can be hostile or benevolent. Building on the nascent idea that racial prejudice also ranges from hostile to benevolent, we theorize the concept of “racial benevolence” and develop comparable measures of White voters’ benevolent attitudes toward Indigenous peoples in Canada and Black Americans. Unlike hostile prejudicial attitudes, benevolent racial attitudes are motivated by an egalitarian impetus to help. However, benevolent racial attitudes still motivate political behavior that threatens to undermine racial equality more generally by reinforcing target group members’ subordination through assimilation and surveillance. We discuss how hostile and benevolent racial attitudes work in tandem to reinforce racial inequalities.

We used national survey data from 2,526 US households to validate a four-item water provider trust scale. We then explored correlates of this scale using regression models to assess (1) whether the relationship between household water insecurity and water provider trust held after adjusting for personal demographics, health perceptions, and politics; (2) the mediating effects of antiestablishment orientations and perceived stress; and (3) whether these mediating effects vary by race and ethnicity. The water provider trust scale demonstrated a good fit and satisfied standard tests of dimensionality, reliability, and validity. Higher water insecurity was associated with lower water provider trust (beta = -0.111, SE = 0.013, P < 0.001) adjusting for covariates. Both antiestablishment orientations and perceived stress, when specified as mediators, yielded negative indirect effects on water provider trust and negative direct effects of water insecurity on water provider trust. These effects from antiestablishment orientations were only significant among White respondents, while the effects from perceived stress were significant across racial and ethnic groups. The water provider trust scale can help utilities assess public perceptions of their services and improve public engagement in water system resilience-building, particularly in underserved communities.

BACKGROUND:New metrics of household water insecurity have been validated for low- to middle-income countries, but it is unclear how these measurements apply to the experiences of people living in high-income countries. This project aims to develop and validate a novel metric for household water insecurity experiences in the United States (HWISE-USA) using a cross-sectional design and data from the Southwest, Midwest, and Western regions. METHODS:We outline the protocol for the development and validation of a novel household water insecurity scale for the United States to address this scientific need, including the following key steps: (1) item development through literature and theory; (2) pre-testing of items and expert review; (3) scale development and item reduction; and (4) scale validation. To assess the performance of the HWISE-USA scale, we will follow the same scale development analytics on a separate, quasi-nationally-representative U.S. sample. The scale will be generated from household survey data collected from communities at risk of water insecurity throughout the United States. DISCUSSION:We explain how a novel metric of water insecurity experiences for households in the United States has important implications for resource allocation, structural interventions, public health and infrastructure planning, and reductions in inequalities. REGISTRATION:osf.io/zvqs4.

The last few years have witnessed an increase in democratic "backsliding" in the United States-a decline in the quality of democracy, typically accompanied by an influx of non-normative behavior, such as political violence. Despite the real consequences of support for violence, fairly little is known about such an extremist attitude outside studies of terrorism or aggression. Using a unique survey containing many psychological, political, and social characteristics, we find that perceived victimhood, authoritarianism, populism, and white identity are the most powerful predictors of support for violence, though military service, conspiratorial thinking, anxiety, and feelings of powerlessness are also related. These patterns suggest that subjective feelings about being unjustly victimized-irrespective of the truth of the matter-and the psychological baggage that accompanies such feelings lie at the heart of support for violence. We use these results to build a profile of characteristics that explain support for violence; the predictive validity of this profile is then tested by examining its relationship with support for the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol riot, with which it is strongly associated, even accounting for support for Donald Trump. Our findings have implications for the detection of extremist attitudes and our understanding of the non-partisan/ideological foundations of anti-social political behavior.

Recent years have witnessed a global uptick in populist candidates and sentiment. Populist communication and campaign styles are well-studied, but whom in the U.S. mass public is attracted to populist ideas and why is still subject to debate. Using unique survey data, we employ latent profile analysis to estimate constellations of characteristics and orientations that relate to support for populist ideas in the United States. Instead of a single, linear path, there are several routes to populist support composed of many combinations of social, psychological, and political characteristics. Whereas some turn to populism because they feel like victims of the political system, others do so to create exclusive sovereignty for their preferred identity group(s). We also find that populist support is more connected to psychological and political orientations than socioeconomic circumstances or even political predispositions, such as partisanship. While populism, itself, is not anti-democratic, some forms of populist support appear to be exclusionary on the grounds of race, religion, and political identity.

Social scientists, journalists, and policymakers are increasingly interested in methods to mitigate or reverse the public’s beliefs in conspiracy theories, particularly those associated with negative social consequences, including violence. We contribute to this field of research using an artificial intelligence (AI) intervention that prompts individuals to reflect on the uncertainties in their conspiracy theory beliefs. Conspiracy theory believers who interacted with our “street epistemologist” chatbot subsequently showed weaker conviction in their conspiracy theory beliefs; this was also the case for subjects who were asked to reflect on their beliefs without conversing with an AI chatbot. We found that encouraging believers to reflect on their uncertainties can weaken beliefs and that AI-powered interventions can help reduce epistemically unwarranted beliefs for some believers.

Researchers have long sought to make generalizable conclusions about the relationship between conspiracism and political identities. However, this literature remains deeply conflicted. The "extremity hypothesis" argues that, due to the psychology of extremism, individuals who identify as extremely left or right wing should display higher levels of conspiracism than centrists. But the "asymmetry hypothesis" argues that, due to the psychology of conservatism, individuals who self-identify as right wing should display higher levels of conspiracism than those identifying as centrists or left wing. Here, we attempt to reconcile these competing hypotheses and the empirical findings supporting them. First, we demonstrate that the inconsistent findings stem from research designs that cannot support generalizable conclusions about the relationship between conspiracism and political identities. Second, we reexamine the most prominent studies supporting the extremity and asymmetry hypotheses. We find that they suffer from inappropriate measurement and modeling strategies, rendering their conclusions suspect. We then test the extremity and asymmetry hypotheses by reexamining 18 U.S. surveys (2012-21; n = 32,056) and examining new surveys from 18 countries (2022; n = 18,033). In total, our 77 samples spanning a decade and 27 countries (n = 161,492) provide only weak support for either hypothesis. The wide variability in our findings suggests that differences in the relationship between conspiracism and political identities across political and temporal contexts do not stem from sampling variability, but rather from systematic forces that impact ideology, conspiracism, or both. We conclude that there is no single functional form that universally characterizes the relationship between conspiracism and political orientations across countries, or even over time within countries.

Recent instances of political violence have prompted concerns over the relationship between conspiracy theory beliefs and violence. Here, we examine the relationships between beliefs in various conspiracy theories and three operationalizations of violence––support for political violence, self-reported engagement in political violence, and engagement in non-political conflict. While we did observe significant correlations between most conspiracy theory beliefs and (support for) violence, we also observed considerable variability in the correlations. We found that this variability is related to the popularity of the conspiracy theories. Specifically, conspiracy theory beliefs that are more “fringe,” held by smaller groups of homogenous people, are likely to be more strongly correlated with (support for) violence than beliefs in more popular theories. Our findings have implications for those seeking to curtail conspiracy theory-related violence.

Despite a great deal of scholarly attention to the concept of partisan-ideological sorting, few analyses have investigated differences in sorting patterns among subgroups of Americans, with most opting to examine broader trends among the entirety of the mass public instead. However, recent work shows that Black Americans have not sorted to the same degree as Whites. We (1) extend previous studies to include an examination of Latinos and (2) offer an explanation for lower levels of sorting among non-Whites: belief system complexity. We argue that as one's belief system - operationalized by issue attitudes or core values, for example - becomes more multidimensional, the probability of neatly sorting along a unidimensional continuum decreases. Using data from the 1986-2016 ANES American National Election Studies, we first show that Black and Latino Americans have more complex political belief systems, operationalized in several different ways, compared to Whites. Then, we examine the relationship between various measures of belief system complexity and sorting, observing strong relationships that help account for the discrepancy in sorting between White and non-White Americans.

Abstract Despite hundreds of studies examining belief in conspiracy theories, it is still unclear who—demographically—is most likely to believe such theories. To remedy this knowledge gap, we examine survey data containing various operationalizations of conspiracism across diverse sociopolitical contexts. Study 1 employs a 2021 U.S. survey (n = 2021) to examine associations between sociodemographic characteristics and beliefs in 39 conspiracy theories. Study 2 similarly employs a survey of 20 countries (n = 26,416) and 11 conspiracy theory beliefs. Study 3 reports results from a 2020 U.S. survey (n = 2015) measuring perceptions about which groups are engaging in conspiracies. Study 4 interrogates data from nine U.S. surveys (2012–2022; n = 14,334) to examine the relationships between sociodemographic characteristics and generalized conspiracy thinking. Study 5 synchronizes studies 1–4 to provide an intersectional analysis of conspiracy theory belief. Across studies, we observe remarkably consistent patterns: education, income, age (older), and White identification are negatively related to conspiracism, while Black identification is positively related. We conclude by discussing why conspiracy theories may appeal most to historically marginalized groups and how our findings can inform efforts to mitigate the negative effects of conspiracy theories.

The "White Replacement" conspiracy theory, that governments and corporations are "replacing" white people, is linked to several mass shootings. Given its recent ubiquity in elite rhetoric, concerns have arisen about the popularity of this conspiracy theory among the United States mass public. Further, political scientists have noted a need to understand why people believe or act upon this conspiracy theory. Using a 2022 US national survey (n = 2001), we find that a third of Americans agree that leaders are replacing white people with people of color. These beliefs are related to anti-social personality traits, various forms of nationalist and authoritarian sentiments, and negative sentiments toward immigrants, minorities, women, and the political establishment. Regression analysis however fails to find significant effects of partisanship and ideology on these beliefs. Further, we observed that these beliefs are related to a desire to engage in both normative (e.g., run for political office) and nonnormative political participation (e.g., commit violence). Given the popularity of White Replacement conspiracy theories in the US and elsewhere, our findings suggest new avenues for research into potentially dangerous beliefs, as well as xenophobia, antisemitism, racism, sexism, extremism, and political violence.

A moral panic animated by conspiracy theories alleging ritual sex abuse swept through the United States in the 1980s. During that “Satanic Panic,” as it came to be known, people expressed fears of social change regarding gender and sexuality. Beginning in 2022, conservative politicians, pundits, and pastors in the United States levied similar accusations of child grooming, sex trafficking, and satanic sex abuse at the LGBTQ + community, teachers, liberals, and entertainment companies; these accusations were accompanied by repressive legislation and violence. Despite their political salience, little is known about the people who believe these accusations. Using a 2022 U.S. national survey (N = 2,001), we find that up to one-third of Americans believe accusations of satanic cult abuse, government sex trafficking, and an “agenda” to “groom” children into gay or trans lifestyles. These beliefs are correlated with a range of political attitudes (e.g., positive views of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and white nationalists) and policy preferences (e.g., overturning Roe v. Wade), as well as with normative (e.g., a desire to run for political office) and nonnormative (e.g., the acceptance of political violence) political intentions and behaviors. Regression analysis further reveals that these conspiracy theory beliefs are positively associated with dark psychological traits, antiestablishment orientations, and repressive views toward sex and gender. Our findings suggest that these accusations can spark dehumanization and deadly violence by mobilizing into politics people who possess strong feelings of political efficacy, but also antisocial traits, nonnormative tendencies, and a desire to undermine established political institutions.

Conspiracy theories and misinformation (CTM) became a salient feature of the Trump era. However, traditional explanations of political attitudes and behaviors inadequately account for beliefs in CTM or the deleterious behaviors they are associated with. Here, we integrate disparate literatures to explain beliefs in CTM regarding COVID-19, QAnon, and voter fraud. We aim to provide a more holistic accounting, and to determine which political, psychological, and social factors are most associated with such beliefs. Using a unique national survey, we find that anti-social personality traits, anti-establishment orientations, and support for Donald Trump are more strongly related to beliefs in CTM than traditional left-right orientations or other frequently posited factors, such as education, science literacy, and social media use. Our findings encourage researchers to move beyond the traditional correlates of political behavior when examining beliefs that express anti-social tendencies or a deep skepticism of social and political institutions.

While a robust literature on the psychology of conspiracy theories has identified dozens of characteristics correlated with conspiracy theory beliefs, much less attention has been paid to understanding the generalized predisposition towards interpreting events and circumstances as the product of supposed conspiracies. Using a unique national survey of 2015 U.S. adults from October 2020, we investigate the relationship between this predisposition-conspiracy thinking-and 34 different psychological, political, and social correlates. Using conditional inference tree modeling-a machine learning-based approach designed to facilitate prediction using a flexible modeling methodology-we identify the characteristics that are most useful for orienting individuals along the conspiracy thinking continuum, including (but not limited to): anomie, Manicheanism, support for political violence, a tendency to share false information online, populism, narcissism, and psychopathy. Altogether, psychological characteristics are much more useful in predicting conspiracy thinking than are political and social characteristics, though even our robust set of correlates only partially accounts for variance in conspiracy thinking.

Americans of all political stripes abstractly support most of the rights and liberties guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, such as free expression. Yet, we argue that attitudes regarding the basic mechanics of civil liberties-e.g., from whom they are protections-are divided across partisan lines. Because of elite rhetoric, we hypothesize that Republicans are more likely than Democrats to perceive rights violations, often by non-government entities (generally incapable of violations), and that they will perceive rights as under threat with greater frequency. Using a survey containing unique questions about rights, we first demonstrate that a large majority of the mass public has fixed preference structures regarding rights, suggesting that attitudes about liberties are not merely error-ridden, top-of-the-head assessments. These preference structures differ for Democrats and Republicans. Next, we find support for our theory that attitudes regarding rights, from whom they are protective, and their level of protectiveness are asymmetric across partisanship. Beyond implications for citizens' democratic capacities, our results also highlight potential concerns about the influence of partisan bias in demands on leaders regarding rights protection.

QAnon attracted considerable attention from politicians and the press during 2020. Headlines claimed that the group had exploded across social media platforms and was becoming mainstream; these claims were supported by instances of violence and studies of online activity. However, public opinion polls tell a different story. We examine polling data from 2018–2021 to understand the size and scope of QAnon support. Only 5–8 percent of the American public supports QAnon, making it one of the least supported conspiracy theories typically polled on. Moreover, support for the QAnon movement has remained stable over time, with no indication of becoming “mainstream.” We also find that QAnon support is less the product of left-right orientations, as often argued, than anti-establishment sentiments and anti-social personality traits. We argue that politicians strategically trafficked in QAnon rhetoric to expand their support, simultaneously activating a once irrelevant dimension of public opinion.

A sizable literature tracing back to Richard Hofstadter’s The Paranoid Style (1964) argues that Republicans and conservatives are more likely to believe conspiracy theories than Democrats and liberals. However, the evidence for this proposition is mixed. Since conspiracy theory beliefs are associated with dangerous orientations and behaviors, it is imperative that social scientists better understand the connection between conspiracy theories and political orientations. Employing 20 surveys of Americans from 2012 to 2021 (total n = 37,776), as well as surveys of 20 additional countries spanning six continents (total n = 26,416), we undertake an expansive investigation of the asymmetry thesis. First, we examine the relationship between beliefs in 52 conspiracy theories and both partisanship and ideology in the U.S.; this analysis is buttressed by an examination of beliefs in 11 conspiracy theories across 20 more countries. In our second test, we hold constant the content of the conspiracy theories investigated—manipulating only the partisanship of the theorized villains—to decipher whether those on the left or right are more likely to accuse political out-groups of conspiring. Finally, we inspect correlations between political orientations and the general predisposition to believe in conspiracy theories over the span of a decade. In no instance do we observe systematic evidence of a political asymmetry. Instead, the strength and direction of the relationship between political orientations and conspiricism is dependent on the characteristics of the specific conspiracy beliefs employed by researchers and the socio-political context in which those ideas are considered.

Growing concern has been expressed that we have entered a "post-truth" era in which each of us willfully believes whatever we choose, aided and abetted by alternative and social media that spin alternative realities for boutique consumption. A prime example of the belief in alternative realities is said to be acceptance of "conspiracy theories"--a term that is often used as a pejorative to indict claims of conspiracy that are so obviously absurd that only the unhinged could believe them. The epistemological standard often involved in this indictment, however-the standard of "obvious" falsity-invites subjectivity in its application, because what is obviously false to one person can be common sense to another. This is not just a truism; considerable research suggests that people's political beliefs, in general, and their acceptance or rejection of conspiracy theories in particular, tends in large part to be determined by partisan, ideological, and other priors.

The second edition of this popular text, updated throughout and now including Covid-19 and the 2020 presidential election and aftermath, introduces students to the research into conspiracy theories and the people who propagate and believe them. In doing so, Uscinski and Enders address the psychological, sociological, and political sources of conspiracy theorizing. They rigorously analyze the most current arguments and evidence while providing numerous real-world examples so students can contextualize the current debates. Each chapter addresses important current questions, provides conceptual tools, defines important terms, and introduces the appropriate methods of analysis.

While cognitive psychologists have learned a great deal about people's propensity for constructing and acting on false memories, the connection between false memories and politics remains understudied. If partisan bias guides the adoption of beliefs and colors one's interpretation of new events and information, so too might it prove powerful enough to fabricate memories of political circumstances. Across two studies, we first distinguish false memories from false beliefs and expressive responses; false political memories appear to be genuine and subject to partisan bias. We also examine the political and psychological correlates of false memories. Nearly a third of respondents reported remembering a fabricated or factually altered political event, with many going so far as to convey the circumstances under which they "heard about" the event. False-memory recall is correlated with the strength of partisan attachments, interest in politics, and participation, as well as narcissism, conspiratorial thinking, and cognitive ability.