The crucial role of positive affect (PA) dysregulations in affective psychopathology is now widely recognized. One clinically significant phenomenon in this context is the dampening of PA, which refers to (attempts to) downregulate or downplay PA states using a variety of mental strategies. Although the transdiagnostic relevance of dampening as a vulnerability and/or maintenance factor for psychopathology is well established, knowledge about motives for individuals to engage in this affect regulation strategy remains underdeveloped and insufficiently integrated. To further the current understanding of dampening, we analyze dampening through the lens of a contemporary goal-directed theory. From this perspective, dampening of PA can be understood as a strategy to reduce discrepancies between current PA and the goal to maintain low PA levels. This homeostasis goal is assumed to be at the service of several superordinate goals. Based on empirical and anecdotal evidence from clinical practice, four types of superordinate goals are identified: a hedonic goal, a self-motivating goal, a social goal, and a self-verification goal. Finally, the goal-directed theory provides guidance to systematically organize existing interventions to diminish PA dampening. The common objective in these interventions is to encourage people to reorient from the homeostasis goal toward an experience goal, which involves allowing oneself to experience PA. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2026 APA, all rights reserved).

This reply engages with five commentaries on my target article advancing the goal-directed theory (GDT). Stussi et al. expand the discussion by emphasizing epistemic goals, whereas Scarantino, Bonard, Pacherie, and Prinz resist my eliminativist conclusion to varying degrees by raising objections in the form of counterexamples (e.g., decisional paralysis, emotional recalcitrance, responding with vs. without emotional heath) and other puzzles (e.g., identity-based irrational emotions). By clarifying several misunderstandings about the GDT (e.g., about the revisability, automaticity, and complexity of goal-directed processes), I show how the theory can accommodate these objections, thereby further strengthening its viability.

I defend the adequacy of the goal-directed theory (GDT) of emotion. After outlining the properties of emotions (mental and bodily aspects, valence, intensity, urgency, automaticity, and irrationality) and common emotion types that emotion theories seek to explain, I contrast the GDT with traditional emotion theories, portraying the former as proactive and the latter as reactive. The GDT proposes that most behavior and feelings, emotional or otherwise, arise from multiple competing, hierarchical goal-directed cycles, each involving discrepancy detection and strategy/behavior selection. I systematically assess the GDT's ability to account for these properties and emotion types. Finally, I discuss implications for (a) the scientific status of emotions, (b) their influence on other entities, (c) emotion regulation, and (d) agency and moral responsibility.

Motivation science has long organized goal pursuit around binary distinctions such as approach versus avoidance and promotion versus prevention. These frameworks have proven enormously productive, but leave open a fundamental question: How do people sustain what is already good in their lives? The Ternary Goal Model proposes three qualitatively distinct goals: progress goals, which aim to close discrepancies between current and desired states; protection goals, which aim to close discrepancies between anticipated and desired states; and maintenance goals, which aim to preserve valued current states and current (lack of) discrepancies. Because maintenance unfolds over extended timeframes and is elicited by the ongoing presence of valued conditions, it is largely invisible to laboratory paradigms—making ecological momentary assessment (EMA) a methodological imperative. We conducted two preregistered EMA studies to test whether these three goal types are empirically distinguishable in daily life. Study 1 (N = 100, 14 days, 6 prompts/day) examined antecedents: As predicted, current–desired discrepancy predicted increases in progress time investment, perceived threat predicted increases in protection time investment, and satisfaction with the current state predicted increases in maintenance time investment. Finally, goal importance was a particularly strong predictor of maintenance. Study 2 (N = 96, 14 days, 6 prompts/day) examined affective consequences: maintenance and progress striving both predicted higher positive affect and lower negative affect, while protection striving predicted the reverse. These findings establish maintenance as a functionally distinct motivational orientation with its own antecedents, affective benefits, and signature stability in everyday life.

According to goal-directed models of behavior causation, the degree to which an agent expects a response to lead to a valued outcome determines the value they attribute to it and their engagement in this response. Conversely, a response that is not expected to lead to a valued outcome should not be valued or enacted. However, it is conceivable that a response that used to lead to a positive outcome retains some degree of residual value from its past co-occurrences with the outcome. This idea stems from findings that an evaluative conditioning effect - a change in the valence of a conditional stimulus (CS) after having been paired with an unconditional stimulus (US) - can subsist even if the CS no longer signals the occurrence of the US. We tested whether the same principles apply to response values, that is, whether pairing a response with an outcome changes the value of the response in line with the value of the outcome and whether this value remains when the response is no longer paired with the outcome. The research design further allowed us to assess whether potential residual value stems from (a) an intact referential relation between the response and its past outcome or (b) a change in the intrinsic value of the response, and (c) whether such a residual value would be sufficient to elicit the response itself. The study used a novel task in which a learned contingency between a response and a valued outcome was removed and liking of and engagement in the response were compared to those of a response for which the same contingency was absent from the start. In line with goal-directed models, we did not observe residual liking nor responding for the response that previously led to the positive outcome relative to the response that never did.

Evidence accumulation models (EAMs) provide a powerful framework for inferring latent cognitive processes from choice and reaction time data. While EAMs are traditionally limited to binary choices, recent developments have extended them to rotationally symmetric continuous responses via the circular diffusion model and the spatially continuous diffusion model . Yet, such extensions are limited in scope, as many psychological constructs are measured on bounded non-rotational scales. In this paper, we bridge this gap by presenting and comparing two adaptations designed for bounded continuous data: the Half-Circular Diffusion Model (HCDM) and the Beta Drift Diffusion Model (BDDM). Using an empirical dataset, we demonstrate a complete methodological workflow for parameter estimation and model selection using Amortized Bayesian Inference (ABI) and Amortized Bayesian Model Comparison (ABMC). These likelihood-free methods bypass the need for analytical likelihood functions, making these complex models accessible for practical data analysis. Our results indicate that both models accurately capture the joint distribution of choices and their reaction times and yield interpretable parameters that can be reliably recovere. The BDDM provides a superior fit in scenarios characterized by very high or very low response precision. To facilitate the adoption of these methods in experimental psychology, we provide fully documented code and example datasets. This work extends the EAM framework to a new application context, the bounded continuous self-report data, offering researchers a user-friendly toolkit for modeling the cognitive dynamics of continuous responses.

In their proposal for unpacking the black box of motivation, Murayama and Jach (M&J) propose three types of reductions: From high-level to low-level motivational constructs, from motivation to cognition, and from contentful to contentless explanations. Although these reductions come with the promise of parsimony, they carry the risk of losing vital explanatory power.

Substance use remains a pressing societal concern, imposing significant burdens on public health systems and the economy, while also affecting individual well-being. This review examines the habit theory as an explanation for problematic substance use, highlighting its weak empirical grounding. As an alternative, we apply the goal-directed theory of Moors et al. [1, 2] to substance use and argue that it offers a better explanation for the heterogeneity in substance use behaviors. Our review of the main assumptions and predictions of the habit theory emphasizes concerns regarding reliability, interpretability, and ecological validity of the tasks used to measure the habit construct. A major challenge for habit theory is explaining the complexity of substance use, specifically, the heterogeneity of consumption patterns within and between individuals, how epidemiological risk factors confer risk, and how interventions produce beneficial outcomes. We argue that the goal-directed theory by Moors et al. [1, 2] provides a more compelling synthesis of the empirical findings and offers a more nuanced understanding of substance use, accounting for complexities that remain unaddressed by the habit theory. We elaborate on five key factors that contribute to problematic substance use and show how the goal-directed theory extends beyond existing models, providing a more nuanced understanding of substance use and informing more effective intervention strategies. We propose shifting from the habit theory to the goal-directed theory of Moors et al. [1, 2], which better accounts for the heterogeneity and motivational strength underlying substance use. This perspective has important implications for understanding risk factors and designing more effective interventions.

In this reply paper, I address three objections that were raised against the goal-directed theory of emotions (Moors 2022). The first objection questions the appropriateness of aligning all emotions, including positive ones, with decision-making processes. The second objection challenges the theory's ability to account for the valence aspect of all positive and negative emotions, highlighting two sets of counterexamples. The third objection asserts that the theory fails to give a satisfactory account of the irrational flavor of certain emotions, in particular recalcitrant ones.

People sometimes emit frequently practiced responses that were previously effective in achieving desired outcomes but are no longer appropriate in the current context. While dual-process theories attribute these action slips to goal-independent, associative processes, we propose that errors in the expectancies about action outcomes contribute to their occurrence. To investigate this, we first replicated an influential study by Hardwick et al. (2019), demonstrating the occurrence of action slips following extensive stimulus-response training when individuals are required to respond rapidly. Building on this foundation, we conducted two additional experiments using a similar procedure, incorporating a measure of outcome expectancies under time pressure. Our findings provide compelling evidence for errors in outcome expectancies, particularly in early time intervals. These results highlight the possible role of goal-directed processes in action slips under time pressure, advancing our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying suboptimal behavior.

This paper aims to revisit and critically analyse the definitions of impulsive actions, challenging the traditional focus on negative outcomes and dysfunctionality. By shifting the discussion away from an exclusive association with dysfunctionality, it advocates for a more nuanced examination of rapid actions undertaken with minimal forethought, potentially uncovering overlooked adaptive qualities and situational benefits. Empirical evidence and formal models challenge the notion that impulsive actions are inherently maladaptive. Instead, these studies suggest that the context and environment play crucial roles in determining whether such actions are or not adaptive. This paper proposes a new perspective on impulsive actions. Impulsive actions are rapid because not all available evidence is considered, but this does not necessarily result in negative outcomes. Future research should focus on developing modified impulsivity measures that reflect this viewpoint. Such measures could provide deeper insights into the nuances of psychopathological symptoms and disordered behaviours.

Traditional emotion theories assume that stimulus-driven processes are responsible for early emotional action tendencies and that goal-directed processes step in at a later stage to implement or correct these action tendencies. In contrast to this, a recent, goal-directed theory proposes that goal-directed processes operate in parallel with stimulus-driven processes at an early stage, that they enter in competition with the stimulus-driven processes, and that they defeat stimulus-driven processes in most cases. Recent studies found evidence that goal-directed processes can indeed determine early action tendencies, but they did not examine what happens when these processes enter in competition with stimulus-driven processes. The aim of the current study was to examine whether goal-directed processes can also determine early action tendencies when they are put in competition with a stimulus-driven process. To test this, we first conducted two experiments (N = 59; N = 40) to establish the operation of a stimulus-driven process and we conducted a third experiment (N = 103) in which the stimulus-driven process was pitted against a goal-directed process. Early action tendencies were measured with implicit measures (i.e., compatibility tasks). The first two experiments provided support for the operation of a stimulus-driven process in which negative valence elicits a tendency to fight. The third experiment suggested that the goal-directed process indeed operated in parallel with the stimulus-driven process, but not that the goal-directed process was able to literally defeat the stimulus-driven process.

The role of nature in promoting both affective and cognitive benefits has been extensively studied in the field of environmental psychology. Two well-established theories, Stress Recovery Theory (SRT) and Attention Restoration Theory (ART), are commonly used to explain these restorative benefits. However, despite their popularity, both theories face important challenges. To address these challenges, in the current paper, we propose an alternative goal-directed account of restorative nature experiences. In our account, we consider individuals as goal-directed agents and argue that the to-be-restored states that are central to SRT and ART – stress and negative affect (in SRT) and declines in cognitive performance (in ART) – can be interpreted as discrepancies between an individual’s goals and their current situation, instead of drained affective and/or cognitive resources. We propose that affective (see SRT) and cognitive nature benefits (see ART) both arise from a process of discrepancy reduction, where nature helps individuals to reduce discrepancies between their current situation and their goals. Nature can facilitate this discrepancy reduction process through three pathways: (a) by modifying goals, (b) by modifying interpretations of the situation, or (c) by affording actions that can fulfill thwarted goals. We compare our account to SRT and ART, highlighting similarities and differences between our proposal and the two theories, and illustrate how it can guide empirical studies and real-life interventions.

People often engage in unhealthy eating despite having an explicit goal to follow a healthy diet, especially under certain conditions such as a lack of time. A promising explanation from the value accumulation account is that food choices are based on the sequential consideration of the values of multiple outcomes, such as health and taste outcomes. Unhealthy choices may result if taste is considered before health. We examined whether making a health outcome more salient could alter this order, thereby leading to more healthy choices even under time pressure. Two studies examined the time-dependent effect of outcome values and salience on food choices. Participants first completed priming trials on which they rated food items on healthiness (health condition), tastiness (taste condition), or both healthiness and tastiness (control condition). They then completed blocks of binary choice trials between healthy and tasty items. The available response time was manipulated continuously in Study 1 (N = 161) and categorically in Study 2 (N = 318). As predicted, results showed that the values of health and taste outcomes influenced choices and that priming led to more choices in line with the primed outcomes even when time was scarce. We did not obtain support for the prediction that the priming effect is time-dependent in the sense that primed outcomes are considered before non-primed outcomes. Together, these findings suggest that increasing the value and salience of a health outcome may be effective ways to increase healthy choices, even under poor conditions such as time pressure.

Eder proposes a theory of action causation based on Powers' control theory and Hommel's theory of event coding in which emotional feelings play a crucial role. After presenting a rough description of Eder's theory in which I try to spell out the various steps in the control cycle, I compare his theory to my own goal-directed theory. The two theories converge in that they (a) rely on a control cycle in which different states are compared and (b) emphasise the instrumental or goal-directed nature of emotional actions. Points of divergence include the content of the representations involved in the control cycle and the meaning and role of feelings.

People are more likely to engage in various suboptimal behaviors such as overeating, addictive behaviors, and short-sighted financial decision making when they are under stress. Traditional dual-process models propose that stress can impair the ability to engage in goal- directed behavior so that people have to rely on habitual behavior. Support for this idea comes from a study by Schwabe and Wolf (2010), in which stressed participants continued to perform a learned instrumental behavior leading to a liquid after the liquid was devalued with a satiation procedure. Based on these findings, suboptimal behavior under stress is often seen as habitual. In the current study, we conducted a conceptual replication of the study by Schwabe and Wolf (2010). Instead of using a satiation procedure to achieve the outcome devaluation, we devalued outcomes through taste aversion. We did not replicate the pattern of findings by Schwabe and Wolf (2010). Our results indicate instead that stressed participants were sensitive to outcome values when the outcomes became truly aversive and hence that their behavior was goal-directed. This suggests either that (a) habitual processes are subject to boundary conditions or (b) the processes responsible for the findings of Schwabe and Wolf (2010) were never habitual to begin with. This may have far-reaching implications for explaining suboptimal behavior under stress in general.

Researchers still seem to be reluctant to adopt open access publishing despite acknowledging the benefits. This paper will approach this reluctance from a psychological perspective, thereby highlighting important barriers and intervention strategies.

People often keep engaging in behaviors that used to be successful in the past but which are knowingly no longer effective in the current situation, so called action slips. Such action slips are often explained with stimulus-driven processes in which behavior is caused by a stimulus- response association and without information about the outcome of the behavior. This process is contrasted with a goal-directed process in which behavior is selected because it is expected to lead to a desired outcome. Failing to act in line with changes in the outcome, is taken as evidence for stimulus-driven processes. Stimulus-driven processes are assumed to get installed after overtraining and to be deployed under poor operating conditions. In line with this, previous research has found that action slips are more likely to occur after extensive training and when under time pressure. We propose an alternative goal-directed explanation according to which action slips are caused by a goal-directed process that relies on old, no longer accurate, outcome information. In the current study, participants learned four stimulus- response-outcome contingencies during a single (i.e., moderate training) or a four-day training schedule (i.e., extensive training). Afterwards two contingencies were reversed and performance was assessed under time pressure. Results show that after extensive training, participants not only committed more action slips but also reported more old response- outcome contingencies in line with these action slips. This is consistent with the goal-directed explanation that action slips result from a reliance on old, no longer accurate outcome information.