Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsThe Great War in History: Debates and Controversies, 1914 to the Present. 2d ed. By Jay Winter and Antoine Prost. Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, volume 21. Edited by Robert Gewarth and Jay Winter. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020. Pp. viii+292. $84.99 (cloth); $28.99 (paper); $23.00 (e-book). Beyond the Great War: Making Peace in a Disordered World. Edited by Norman Ingram and Carl Bouchard. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022. Pp. viii+240. $60.00 (cloth or e-book).Alan SharpAlan SharpUlster University Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmailPrint SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Modern History Volume 96, Number 1March 2024 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/728567 For permission to reuse, please contact [email protected].PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Key decision-makers on both sides of the Channel agreed that an alliance between Britain and France in the aftermath of the First World War would represent a major step towards securing their hard-won victory and achieving European stability. Yet negotiations during and after the 1919 Paris Peace Conference failed to conclude terms satisfactory to both states. This paper investigates British attitudes towards a possible pact with France, concentrating in particular on the discussions that occurred in late 1921 and early 1922 which revealed much about the perceptions and objectives of the two powers now most responsible, in the absence of the United States, for executing the Versailles settlement with Germany. Although personalities may have played a minor role in the failure of these negotiations it suggests that the more fundamental missed opportunity was the inability of both states to recognise that a 'return to normalcy' was not a viable option.

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsA Vision of Europe: Franco-German Relations during the Great Depression, 1929–1932. By Conan Fischer.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xiv+206. $90.00.Alan SharpAlan SharpUlster University Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Modern History Volume 91, Number 4December 2019 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/705846 Views: 63Total views on this site For permission to reuse, please contact [email protected]PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

Only David Lloyd George of the Big Four survived to play a major role in early post-war diplomacy, remaining as British premier until October 1922. This analysis assesses the development of his ideas and policies with particular reference to his war aims speech of 5 January 1918, his Peace Conference Fontainebleau Memorandum of 25 March 1919, and the paper handed to the French premier, Aristide Briand, at Cannes on 4 January 1922. John Maynard Keynes accused Lloyd George of being "rooted in nothing," but Edward House's grudging acknowledgement that "With all his faults, he is by birth, instinct and upbringing, a liberal" seems a fairer assessment. He attempted to put his ideas, based on self-determination, trade, disarmament, and a broad sense of what was just, into practice in his ambitious attempt to re-engage Germany and the Soviet Union into the mainstream of international politics at the 1922 Genoa Conference. By then his credibility with his French counterparts and Tories at home was much depleted. Furthermore, he neglected laying the tedious but necessary foundations on which to build his vision and the constraints of international and domestic politics thwarted his proposed panacea to post-war problems.

Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929), as French premier between 1917 and 1920, led France to victory in the First World War and assumed almost total responsibility for French policy during the Paris Peace Conference. This entry examines his diplomatic style and achievements in securing his objectives for France in the postwar settlement.

The third edition of this acclaimed textbook on peace-making after the First World War advances that the responsibility for the outbreak of a new, even more ruinous, war in 1939 cannot be ascribed entirely to the planet's most powerful men and their meeting in Paris in January 1919 to reassemble a shattered world. Giving a concise overview of the problems and pressures these key figures were facing, Alan Sharp provides a coherent introduction to a highly complex and multi-dimensional topic. This is an ideal resource for undergraduate and postgraduate students taking modules on the Versailles Settlement, European and International History, Modern History, Interwar Europe, The Great War, 20th Century Europe, German History, or Diplomatic History, on either history courses or international relations/politics courses.

"Britain and Interwar Danubian Europe: Foreign Policy and Security Challenges, 1919–1936, by Dragan Bakić.." The International History Review, 40(1), pp. 227–228

This is one of the most successful of a spate of books on the diplomatic crisis of July 1914 and the outbreak of the First World War. Its aim is to investigate the reactions of the key European dec...

"M. Mősslang and T. Riotte (Eds.), The Diplomats' World: A Cultural History of Diplomacy, 1815–1914 ." , 20(3), pp. 536–537

The Editors of Ethnopolitics note with great sadness the sudden and unexpected death of Professor Antony Alcock. We have lost with him one of the most active members of our editorial board who helped establish and guide our journal from its inception six years ago. Insightful and constructive in his comments, Antony Alcock refereed a great many submissions to the journal and thus contributed significantly to the quality and originality of the research we have been able to publish. Moreover, he also contributed directly to the journal as a book reviewer.