New lines of theorizing in international relations don’t appear very often. Realism proudly proclaims a lineage of 2,500-odd years. Liberalism, in its various forms, traces its roots back several centuries. The appearance and spread of constructivism in the 1990s thus invite explanation. In this essay we explore the “construction of constructivism”—both the conditions of possibility for intellectual change and the goals of scholars proposing it. Constructivism’s success was both unexpected and, in some ways, unintended. Proponents of existing theories remained (and remain) confident in their own tools and early constructivists often had modest goals. Constructivism took off for at least two broad reasons. One was the intellectual landscape of the late 1980s and early 1990s. This was a period when IR theory in the United States had sharply narrowed its concerns, leaving mainstream scholarship on the back foot when the USSR collapsed, and the Cold War ended. The second set of reasons lay in the nature of the constructivist ideas, themselves. Intellectually, constructivist ideas had a plasticity and capaciousness that other IR theories did not. Theoretically, it is a social theory, not specific to IR, which made it useful for tackling a broad range of problems. Empirically, it was portable and open to political analysis at all levels and in all places. Methodologically, it was pluralistic; scholars can and have used diverse methods to explore its claims. In this situation, constructivist scholars, overwhelmingly young and untenured, worked hard to carve out a niche for themselves in the field. That these ideas caught on and became broadly popular has surprised us as much as anyone.

Undertaking a collaborative inquiry into a convergence of quantum theory, science, and technology, the chapter makes the case for a new human science for International Relations (IR). As new scientific discoveries and technological applications suggest large-scale quantum phenomena, near-simultaneous interconnectivity creates global entanglements, and ubiquitous media produce profound observer effects of uncertainty, IR theory needs to “quantize” if it is to retain relevancy in the twenty-first century. The central concepts of quantum mechanics that inform a quantized IR are introduced, and the heuristic advantages of quantum over traditional approaches are presented.

AbstractPart II responds to some of my critics' substantive concerns about QMASS. However, to sharpen that discussion I first introduce the idea of classical and quantum physical instantiation tests or ‘PITs’. PITs are a thought experiment taking advantage of the causal closure of physics. To encourage critical self-reflection on the usually tacit ontological assumptions of our theories, PITs invite social scientists to translate their mostly qualitative, folk psychological arguments into physical descriptions, meeting classical and quantum constraints respectively, to see which feels more appropriate to the case at hand. With this diagnostic tool in hand, the paper addresses criticisms of QMASS in five areas: (1) the threat of physics reductionism; (2) the potential for epistemic repression stemming from the realist nature of QMASS’ argument; (3) doubts that a quantum approach can support a genuine notion of human freedom; (4) the place of ethics and normativity in social and international life; and (5) implications for graduate methods training and quantum pedagogy more generally.

Drugi tom antologii tekstów źródłowych zawiera starannie wybrane i po raz pierwszy przetłumaczone na język polski fragmenty 40 prac naukowych, po 1989 roku kształtujących naukę o stosunkach międzynarodowych. Zbiór otwiera fragment słynnej książki Cynthii

Abstract How burdens of proof are allocated in science has an important bearing on how new knowledge develops. Usually, the burden is on new theories to prove their worth relative to a default, baseline of knowledge that is considered established and secure. However, in the case of classical vs. quantum social science matters are not that simple because the long-standing classical default has itself already failed to pass crucial tests, which has spurred the search for quantum solutions instead. Part I of this paper, therefore, tries to ‘re-balance’ the burdens of proof with Quantum Mind and Social Science’ critics, by highlighting two significant limits to date of classical thinking about the mind and society: the philosophical problem of finding a place for consciousness in the universe, and the scientific problem of explaining the Kahneman–Tversky anomalies in psychology. Acknowledging these outstanding problems does not equalize the burdens of proof, but it does mean that as we head into the more substantive discussion in Part II there is no secure default position. Just burdens of proof all around.

This special issue is conceived out of the proposition that recent developments in quantum theory as well as innovations in quantum technology have profound implications for international relations, especially in the field of international security. Interaction with quantum theory outside the circle of physics has been limited; our goal is to catalyse an informed debate on the virtues of quantum theory for international relations. As new scientific discoveries and technological applications suggest large-scale quantum phenomena, near-simultaneous interconnectivity creates global entanglements, and ubiquitous media produce profound observer-effects, we wish to make of quantum theory a human science. With the arrival of quantum computing, communications and artificial intelligence, we can also expect to see significant transformations in the nature, production and distribution of power and knowledge. This special issue introduces quantum approaches that can help us better understand, anticipate and perhaps even ameliorate the most pressing global issues facing us today and in the near future.

This comment addresses some of the critiques of Quantum Mind and Social Science by the other contributors, with special reference to the challenge that the mind-body problem poses to conventional, classical thinking about social science. A quantum social ontology transcends those challenges, and in the process could transform social scientific thinking across the board. As an example the essay concludes with a consideration of the physics of social structure.

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Language is the most fundamental institution of human society. It sets us apart from all other species, and our other institutions would be impossible without it. However, to call language an “institution” is already to take sides in a debate about what language is, one which implicates the agent–structure problem. In recent years the dominant view in linguistics has been to think of language as being in the heads of individuals, whether as a “mental organ,” “computational device,” or even “instinct.” On this view linguistics is essentially a branch of cognitive science. A very different view is taken by those who emphasize the supra-individual character of language. Saussure, Wittgenstein, Davidson, and Searle – to drop just a few names – have all highlighted the ways in which our use of language is constituted and regulated by norms shared by a community of speakers. From this perspective language is less a cognitive than institutional fact. Of course, institutions cannot exist apart from people, so “top-downers” would agree that what is in people's heads matters too, just as “bottom-uppers” would agree that language must be shared for communication to be possible. But, as in the agent–structure problem more generally, it is not obvious how to combine parts and whole.

In recent decades it has become common throughout the social sciences to think of the human mind simply as a very complex computer. Drawing on an older materialist metaphor of the mind as a machine, the “computational” model of the mind took off after the mid-century invention of the computer and subsequent cognitive revolution in psychology, and has since permeated the social sciences in the form of rational choice and other prominent social theories. The contributions of this model have been huge; but it has always been assumed that the computations going on inside our heads are classical. Quantum brain theory challenges this assumption by proposing that the mind is actually a quantum computer. Classical computers are based on binary digits or “bits” with well defined values (0 or 1), which are transformed in serial operations by a program into an output. Quantum computers in contrast are based on “qubits” that can be in superpositions of 0 and 1 at the same time and also interact non-locally, enabling every qubit to be operated on simultaneously. The idea of a quantum computer was first proposed in the 1980s and is still far from being realized technologically, but it has fired the imagination of scientists by raising the prospect of unimaginable increases in computational power, and other neat tricks besides. If quantum brain theory is true, then our model of the mind would be similarly radically altered, irrespective of the issue of consciousness.

The heyday of emergentist thinking was in the 1920s, when it was seen as a middle position in the reductionist–vitalist debate. However, as a result of ambiguities in its original formulation and the rise on the larger philosophical scene of logical positivism, with its strong reductionist impulse, emergentism fell rapidly out of favor. However, since the 1970s it has undergone a revival, due on the one hand to the failure of reductionism to solve the problems of life and mind, and on the other to the invention of dynamical systems and complexity theories, which seem to cry out for an emergentist interpretation. Emergentism is by no means now orthodoxy, especially in the practice of science, where reductionism is still the default method, but in philosophy it is again taken quite seriously.

There is an underlying assumption in the social sciences that consciousness and social life are ultimately classical physical/material phenomena. In this ground-breaking book, Alexander Wendt challenges this assumption by proposing that consciousness is, in fact, a macroscopic quantum mechanical phenomenon. In the first half of the book, Wendt justifies the insertion of quantum theory into social scientific debates, introduces social scientists to quantum theory and the philosophical controversy about its interpretation, and then defends the quantum consciousness hypothesis against the orthodox, classical approach to the mind-body problem. In the second half, he develops the implications of this metaphysical perspective for the nature of language and the agent-structure problem in social ontology. Wendt's argument is a revolutionary development which raises fundamental questions about the nature of social life and the work of those who study it.

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Chapter 1 dealt with one of the deepest mysteries in modern science: how to explain consciousness. This Part deals with another mystery: how to make sense of quantum mechanics. Both involve a problem of reconciliation with the classical worldview, which is one hint that the two mysteries might be related. A second is that, unlike classical physics, which makes no reference to or allowance for consciousness, quantum theory raises the issue of consciousness and its relationship to the physical world in a very direct way. These hints do not necessarily mean there is a connection between the two mysteries, but by the end of this Part I hope to have shown why it would be natural to look for one.