We offer an account of the nature and structure of the immorality of colonialism. We distinguish between the fundamental wrong of colonialism and the other wrongs that the fundamental wrong facilitated. On our view, the fundamental wrong was that colonizers regarded the colonized as incapable of managing their own affairs, in effect relegating them to the status of minors or mentally incompetent adults. We call this the nonautonomy assumption. It could also be called the inferior status assumption, for reasons that will become clear as we proceed. We argue that, in addition to the nonautonomy assumption, the most serious wrongs of colonialism were severe economic injustices and practices of humiliation, and that these wrongs can reasonably be seen to be facilitated by or grounded in the fundamental wrong. We make the case that our analysis has two virtues: it provides a more comprehensive characterization of the wrongs of colonialism and the relationships between them than extant philosophical accounts and it helps make sense of the concepts of neocolonialism and internal colonialism, which extant accounts are unable to do. This has the added advantage of bringing discussions that have hitherto taken place in fields such as political theory, postcolonial studies, history, and critical theory into the ambit of analysis by political philosophers, using tools and concepts that philosophers have at their command, such as the notions of autonomy and inferior status. After developing our own view, we offer a critical appraisal of three prominent recent attempts to identify "the wrong" of colonialism, the views of Anna Stilz, Massimo Renzo, and Lea Ypi. We argue that by focusing on defects of the political structure of colonialism such as the deprivation of collective self-determination, these accounts do not clearly identify the fundamental wrong of colonialism and either completely ignore or pay insufficient attention to severe economic injustices and practices of humiliation; and that they also render the notions of neocolonialism and internal colonialism unintelligible. While acknowledging that the nonautonomy assumption encouraged colonialists to deprive the colonized of collective self-determination and recognizing that this was a serious wrong, we deny that the deprivation of collective self-determination was the fundamental wrong of colonialism, as the denial of autonomy is more basic than the denial of political self-management. The analysis we offer makes it clear that colonialism is not a topic of merely historical interest. The most serious wrongs suffered by colonized people did not end with decolonization, that is, the achievement of independent statehood. The fundamental wrong of colonialism was grounded in inequalities of power that persist today and that continue to contribute to economic injustices and to the failure to regard the weaker as equals, in a variety of contexts, including, but not limited to the case of formerly colonized peoples.

This essay provides a comprehensive and critical introduction to ideology. It traces the origins and development of various conceptions of ideology, articulating both what they have in common and their differences. Among the distinctions that we develop are the contrasts between pejorative and nonpejorative conceptions, functionalist and causal conceptions, and conceptions that limit ideologies to supporting existing oppressive orders and those that allow for ideologies that challenge such orders. We also explain the role that ideologies can play in either preventing or facilitating social movements to overturn or improve existing institutions. The concluding section of this essay provides a list of important topics for future research on ideology and emphasizes that, in each case, an interdisciplinary approach is needed to understand them fully.

This essay explores the range of phenomena that can be explained by application of a suitably broad but contentful concept of ideology. According to this concept, an ideology is an evaluative map of the social world, typically featuring an ingroup-outgroup distinction, at least in the case of political ideologies. This concept allows for ideologies that support the existing order and those that challenge it, including revolutionary ideologies. I refute the claim that the concept of ideology is not needed because "voluntary servitude" can be explained as a failure of collective action. I show that ideologies can inhibit revolutionary action as well as stimulate and guide it. They can inhibit revolutionary action by convincing the oppressed that their predicament is natural or inevitable or that they are not being oppressed. They can stimulate and guide revolution by debunking oppression-supporting ideologies and by supplying moral motivation that avoids the calculation of costs and benefits that cause failures of collective action.

Abstract For most of human natural history, moral success and evolutionary fitness were closely intertwined: the success of moral systems could plausibly be gauged by the cooperative advantages they conferred in the Darwinian competition among cultural groups. Recently, however, the premium of evolutionary fitness has given way to a truly normative project of human betterment, allowing for the proliferation of moral values and goals that are orthogonal or even contrary to the evolutionary fitness of groups. This chapter shows that the decoupling of fitness and moral success poses a serious problem for evolutionary defenses of ethical pluralism, the thesis that there is more than one valid morality. It develops a stronger evolutionary argument for ethical pluralism that is grounded not in local selective optimization but in the dynamics of individual moral ontogeny and the path dependency of moral cultural evolution. This analysis leads to the conclusion that it is unlikely there is only one valid morality for human beings.

Abstract There is a resurgence of interest in social experimentation as a means of promoting social progress, including progress in justice. In this chapter, we first advance an argument in favor of social experimentation drawing on its capacity to resolve uncertainty both about how to achieve socially valuable goals and about which goals are worth pursuing. We then identify four challenges: the information problem (experiments may not yield relevant information), the selection bias problem (potentially informative experiments may not be undertaken), the uptake problem (the information generated by experiments may not be put to good use), and the risk problem (experiments may carry unacceptable risks). Finally, we argue that certain injustices can exacerbate all four problems, rendering social experimentation a less reliable path to progress, and, in cases of severe injustice, perhaps even a regressive force. The upshot is not that we should abandon social experimentation, but that we should temper our expectations and focus on constructing conditions under which experimentation is more likely to be progressive. Specifically, to render social experimentation a more reliable engine for social progress of any sort, we must remedy or mitigate the injustices that diminish its value.

My aim in this essay is to argue for a better moral-conceptual framework and for institutional innovation in preparation for the next pandemic. My main conclusions are as follows. (1) The primary moral principle that should guide responses to the next pandemic is the duty to prevent and mitigate serious harms. (2) A proper understanding of the moral foundations and scope of the duty to prevent and mitigate serious harms requires rejecting both Extreme Nationalism and Extreme Cosmopolitanism. (3) A better response to the next pandemic requires transforming the moral landscape through institutional innovation by developing an international institution that can perfect indeterminate duties (i) by identifying duty-bearers, (ii) by specifying their duties to provide medical resources and other forms of aid, (iii) by allocating the specified duties to various public and private entities in such a way as to ensure effective coordination and that the costs of providing aid are fairly distributed, and (iv) by providing effective mechanisms for compliance with the specified duties. (4) Institutional innovation is morally required, regardless of whether the harm prevention and mitigation duties of the better-off are duties of justice or of beneficence, because without institutionalization, some duties of justice, including those requiring the prevention and mitigation of serious harms, suffer some of the same indeterminacies that are present in duties of beneficence.

Previous articleNext article No AccessBook ReviewsCruft, Rowan. Human Rights, Ownership, and the Individual. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019. Pp. 304. $70.00 (cloth).Allen Buchanan and Gopal SreenivasanAllen BuchananUniversity of Arizona Search for more articles by this author and Gopal SreenivasanDuke University Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by Ethics Volume 131, Number 2January 2021 Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.1086/711216 Views: 189Total views on this site For permission to reuse, please contact [email protected]PDF download Crossref reports no articles citing this article.

My goal in writing Our Moral Fate: Evolution and the Escape from Tribalism, as with all of my work, was not to have the last word on the subject it addresses, but rather to say enough of value to stimulate better thinkers to go farther. The quality of comments by professors Corradetti, Sterelny, Tiribelli, and Murphy show that I have succeeded. I won’t be able to do justice to their constructive (and charitable) insights in the space allotted; I can only hope to engage as constructively with them as they have with me.

COVID-19 vaccines are likely to be scarce for years to come. Many countries, from India to the U.K., have demonstrated vaccine nationalism. What are the ethical limits to this vaccine nationalism? Neither extreme nationalism nor extreme cosmopolitanism is ethically justifiable. Instead, we propose the fair priority for residents (FPR) framework, in which governments can retain COVID-19 vaccine doses for their residents only to the extent that they are needed to maintain a noncrisis level of mortality while they are implementing reasonable public health interventions. Practically, a noncrisis level of mortality is that experienced during a bad influenza season, which society considers an acceptable background risk. Governments take action to limit mortality from influenza, but there is no emergency that includes severe lockdowns. This “flu-risk standard” is a nonarbitrary and generally accepted heuristic. Mortality above the flu-risk standard justifies greater governmental interventions, including retaining vaccines for a country's own citizens over global need. The precise level of vaccination needed to meet the flu-risk standard will depend upon empirical factors related to the pandemic. This links the ethical principles to the scientific data emerging from the emergency. Thus, the FPR framework recognizes that governments should prioritize procuring vaccines for their country when doing so is necessary to reduce mortality to noncrisis flu-like levels. But after that, a government is obligated to do its part to share vaccines to reduce risks of mortality for people in other countries. We consider and reject objections to the FPR framework based on a country: (1) having developed a vaccine, (2) raising taxes to pay for vaccine research and purchase, (3) wanting to eliminate economic and social burdens, and (4) being ineffective in combating COVID-19 through public health interventions.

AbstractSince the earliest human societies, there has been an ongoing struggle between hierarchy and resistance to hierarchy, and this struggle is a major driver of the evolution of moralities and of institutions. Attempts to initiate or sustain hierarchies are often met with resistance; hierarchs then adopt new strategies, which in turn prompt new strategies of resistance; and so on. The key point is that the struggle is typically conducted using moral concepts in justifications for or against unequal power and involves the stimulation of the moral emotions. Both parties to the struggle treat morality as a valuable strategic resource; and the dynamic of interaction between hierarchs and resisters generates changes in that resource. The hierarch/resister struggle is in part a competition between moral concepts and justifications, and that competition drives the emergence of new moral concepts and justifications, just as competition in other contexts generates innovations. Among the moral concepts generated by the struggle are the following: authority, legitimacy, aristocracy, the divine right of kings, the mandate of heaven, natural rights, civil and political rights, constitutionalism, the rule of law, sovereignty, collective self-determination, exploitation, oppression, and domination.

During a global health emergency, everyone is morally required to help to combat the disease. With approximately 8000–10 000 people dying every day from COVID-19, as of writing, only rapid and globally distributed vaccinations will end the pandemic. With the support of national governments, pharmaceutical companies have produced more than 250 vaccine candidates to date.

In this article, I argue that overly-optimistic beliefs about how much progress toward justice has been made and overly-pessimistic beliefs about what progress toward justice can be made can both help perpetuate injustices. Further, such beliefs can help perpetuate injustices even if those who hold them have a firm grasp of the correct principles of justice, a robust commitment to realize them, and the political influence to make their commitment effective. I also argue that when mistaken beliefs about justice of either sort are embedded in ideologies, they are an especially serious obstacle to moral progress. Finally, I conclude that ideologies can help perpetuate injustices even if they do not 'mask' them, if they include either overly-optimistic or overly-pessimistic beliefs about progress toward justice.

Moral reasoning is modulated by emotions and other cognitive biases. How do these covert biasing mechanisms shape perceptions of more fundamental moral categories, such as moral standing and moral status (together, “MSS”), out of which specific moral attitudes and behaviors flow? This chapter explains the centrality of MSS to human evolution, and examines several evolved biases that distort MSS ascription. These include tendencies to deny moral standing, or to attribute lower moral status, to beings that elicit feelings of disgust or fear, as well as to those that are perceived as less similar, less attractive, less individualized, and less disposed toward reciprocal cooperation. These adaptive mechanisms may have served human groups well in the evolutionary past, but in the modern world they pose an obstacle to moral progress and play a key role in moral regression. The chapter argues that these biases have also influenced philosophical and scientific research on animal minds. The aim is to develop a richer, biocultural understanding of how conceptions of the moral community evolve.

A provocative and probing argument showing how human beings can for the first time in history take charge of their moral fate. Is tribalism—the political and cultural divisions between Us and Them—an inherent part of our basic moral psychology? Many scientists link tribalism and morality, arguing that the evolved “moral mind” is tribalistic. Any escape from tribalism, according to this thinking, would be partial and fragile, because it goes against the grain of our nature. In this book, Allen Buchanan offers a counterargument: the moral mind is highly flexible, capable of both tribalism and deeply inclusive moralities, depending on the social environment in which the moral mind operates. We can't be morally tribalistic by nature, Buchanan explains, because quite recently there has been a remarkable shift away from tribalism and toward inclusiveness, as growing numbers of people acknowledge that all human beings have equal moral status, and that at least some nonhumans also have moral standing. These are what Buchanan terms the Two Great Expansions of moral regard. And yet, he argues, moral progress is not inevitable but depends partly on whether we have the good fortune to develop as moral agents in a society that provides the right conditions for realizing our moral potential. But morality need not depend on luck. We can take charge of our moral fate by deliberately shaping our social environment—by engaging in scientifically informed “moral institutional design.” For the first time in human history, human beings can determine what sort of morality is predominant in their societies and what kinds of moral agents they are.