In the present essay, I explore some ways in which Polanyi's concepts can be applied to enrich our understanding of epistemological development and the educational practices that seem to facilitate or suppress it. Among the concepts discussed are Polanyi's notion of uncertainty, combined with confidence as driving intellectual activity; the role of conviviality in the collaborative construction of knowledge; the act of discovery as beginning with a problem that obsesses the thinker and proceeding through the integration of (often tacit) fragments into a coherent whole; the notion of personal knowledge and commitment as transcending the disjunction between subjective and objective; apprenticeship as a personal relationship between a learner and a more sophisticated master, and most important, the assertion that belief is prior to doubt. Thus, in terms of the concepts my colleagues and I have developed, "connected knowing" (a personal approach) is not simply equal to "separate knowing" (a detached, impersonal mode) as a procedure for arriving at knowledge, but is prior to it, "making meaning" being a necessary prerequisite to testing the validity of a position. Drawing on interview data and memoirs of academic experiences, I argue that because these priorities are often reversed in educational practice, students learn to delete their personal responses from their essays in order to meet what they perceive as the utterly objective standards of the academy. When educators "endorse" uncertainty, students are encouraged to engage in the collaborative making of meaning and the pursuit of problems of personal importance.

In this essay on epistemological development in college students, I argue that "subjectivism" (a.k.a. "multiplism;" often identified in female undergraduates) should be understood and treated not as a manifestation of a primitive, irrational notion of knowing that must be exterminated and replaced by the more impersonal, detached, objective procedures embodied in scientific method and critical thinking. Rather, it should be regarded as a point of departure for moving into more reflective modes of thought when approached via, and encouraged into, the more personal, empathic procedure made known in Women's Ways of Knowing as "connected knowing." Along the way, I develop further the difference between " connected knowing" and "separate knowing" (the latter being the dominant academic paradigm of knowing), bringing out how connected knowing is an important and at times indispensable complement to separate knowing in achieving an objectivity integrated with subjectivity.

This chapter emphasizes the value of both objectivity and connection in learning and explores the nature of attachment via studies of women's development. It explains how pedagogy can create contexts for students to learn to use both objectivity and connection.

In four studies, college students (both male andfemale, predominantly white) filled out a 50-item surveyconsisting of statements illustrating“separate” (critical, detached) and“connected” (empathic) ways of knowing (Belenky, Clinchy, G oldberger,& Tarule, 1986). The instrument showed acceptableinternal reliability. Scores on the two scales wereuncorrelated, supporting the view that the twoepistemological positions are independent. Females consistentlyrated connected knowing (CK) statements higher thanseparate knowing (SK) statements, while males showed aslight, but non-significant difference favoring SK statements. When participants were dividedinto groups using a joint median split of the two ratingscores, females were disproportionately likely to beplaced in the High CK-Low SK group. CK and SK scores were unrelated to performance on avariety of cognitive tasks, but were related to somemeasures of preference, suggesting that ways of knowingmay function more as approaches or styles rather than basic abilities.

Applied Cognitive PsychologyVolume 11, Issue 2 p. 183-185 Book Review The Psychology of Gender. Anne E. Beall and Robert J. Sternberg (Eds). Guilford Press, New York, 1993. Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Corresponding Author Blythe McVicker Clinchy Department of Psychology, Wellesley College, USADepartment of Psychology, Wellesley College, USASearch for more papers by this author Blythe McVicker Clinchy, Corresponding Author Blythe McVicker Clinchy Department of Psychology, Wellesley College, USADepartment of Psychology, Wellesley College, USASearch for more papers by this author First published: 06 January 1999 https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0720(199704)11:2<183::AID-ACP465>3.0.CO;2-1Citations: 2AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article.Citing Literature Volume11, Issue2April 1997Pages 183-185 RelatedInformation

In this article, I describe ways in which a model of instruction called connected teaching can be applied to undergraduatre courses in developmental psychology. The model contains features that women in interviews say they appreciated or wished had been present in their academic lives. The model emphasizes thinking over expertise; elkitation and exploration of students' narratives of personal experiences; respectful ccmsioeration of commonsense views of development derived from these experiences, especially among students whose backgrounds are poorly represented in the literature; and attention to the social context of the classroom, including facilitation of collaborative as well as adversarial forms of discourse. The overall goal is to convince students that they can actively construct, rather than just passively receive, knowledge about developmental psychology.

The authors of this provocative book pursue the disturbing question Why are so many women reluctant to speak up for what they think? in candid interviews with 135 women, rich and poor, young and old, well-educated and unschooled.

We present a model of education, called “connected education,” designed to be appropriate for women, and derived from interviews with 135 women, varying widely in age, social and ethnic background, and educational institution. We explore four features of the model: (a) explicit confirmation for modes of thinking and kinds of knowledge that women value; (b) opportunities to explore the particularities of firsthand experience, before moving to conceptualization of that experience; (c) support for women's efforts to define their own educational tasks and develop their own individual styles of work; and (d) arrangements for egalitarian, collaborative construction of knowledge among teachers and students.

One hundred and thirty-five women from all walks of life—some enrolled in colleges, others in programs to enhance parenting skills—were interviewed to trace women's natural epistemologies or their ways of thinking about thinking and about themselves as knowers. We describe five different ways of knowing that women use to make sense out of their experience in the world. We also examine the descriptions that the women gave of the patterns of communication in their families. The politics of talk in family life provides insight into the different kinds of environments which promote and inhibit intellectual development. Examining the politics of talk also provides insight into the role that maternal practice and maternal thinking play in promoting human development.

This essay is a short response to comments made by Cannon, Meeks, and Yu to my articles "Beyond Subjectivism," published in this special edition of Tradition and Discovery (34: 1), and "Connected and Separate Knowing: A Marriage of Two Minds," published in Knowledge, Difference, and Power, edited by Nancy Goldberger, et al., focusing on convergences between my work and the ideas of Michael Polanyi.

and I described an epistemological position we called "Procedural Knowledge," which took two forms, encompassing two "procedures" that many of the women we interviewed seemed to use in searching for truth; we called them "separate" and "connected" knowing. In the ensuing years, observing the varied and often surprising meanings assigned to these notions by some who have befriended them, and the abuse that has been heaped upon them by some of their foes, I have occasionally felt like the character played by Woody Allen in the film Annie Hall, who, returning to childhood as an invisible presence, observes his parents engaged in one of their customary and (to him) imbecilic arguments. Incensed by the absurdity of both their positions, he shouts, "You're both wrong!," but his shouts are inaudible. In this chapter I want to make my views on separate and especially connected knowing audible. Connected knowing was originally a serendipitous discovery. We did not ask the women we interviewed to tell us about it; they did so spontaneously, and from their comments we constructed the procedure as a sort of "ideal type." Since then, I have been attempting through systematic research and conversations with colleagues (alive and dead, in person and in print) to ascertain how the two procedures (or various versions thereof) play out in actual practice. Annick Mansfield and I (1992) developed an interview designed to elicit the ways in which men and women define the two procedures, how they feel about them, what they see as their benefits, drawbacks, and purposes, when and where and with whom they do and do not use each procedure, and how their use of them has changed over time. A number of researchers, including Connected and separate knowing page 2 my own students, as well as other investigators at various institutions working with widely varying populations, have also used some version of this interview. Drawing on this work, I shall try in this chapter to clarify and complicate the concepts of separate and connected knowing, and, along the way, contest misreadings of the two modes that seem to me especially pernicious. Believing and doubting. Let me begin by defining the two orientations as we intended to define them in WWK. If you approach this chapter as a separate knower, you examine its arguments with a critical eye, insisting that I justify every point. In Peter Elbow's terms you "play the …