Our 1996 article, "Face preference at birth" (Valenza et al., 1996), sparked much interest and was followed, over the past 3 decades, by many studies on newborns' and young infants' face processing skills. The present article revisits that previous article's theoretical and methodological background and highlights its contribution to our understanding of the developmental pathway toward more complex social abilities. Here, we will examine the evidence presented in the 1996 article and its influence on subsequent investigation of this subject. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

In recent years, a number of disciplines have appeared, which all are characterized by the prefix "neuro" attached to the name of an older and well-established discipline. They can collectively be referred to as the "neuro+" disciplines. Here it is argued that they are not new. In fact, they have existed for many years (at least since the early '60s of last century) under the title of "neuropsychology". These "neuro+" disciplines, besides not being new, lack credibility because they uncritically take for granted a modular view of both the mind and the brain. Modularity is certainly not the only conceivable way of viewing either the mind or the brain. In addition, there is ground for being skeptical about the empirical results obtained to date by the "neuro+" disciplines. That is because these empirical results very often depend on the tenability of a procedure, the so-called "cognitive subtraction", which was shown to be highly problematic, if not altogether untenable, nearly a century ago.

This paper relates how modern psychology, which is mostly devoted to the exploration of cognitive processes and their neural bases, started been practiced at the University of Bologna in the second half of the '60s of last century, especially because of prof. Renzo Canestrari's effort and commitment. In those years, prof. Canestrari's scientific interests were mainly inclined toward clinical psychology and investigating visual perception through gestaltist paradigms. However, he proved open minded enough as to promote research in fields much distant from those he was working on. The chapter relates how he supported projects, widely recognized internationally, that explored cognitive processes and functional hemispheric specialization by means of recording speed of response (i.e., reaction times). In addition, prof. Canestrari supported projects that explored cognitive deficits in brain-damaged patients. These studies, besides producing results that were internationally recognized, were also instrumental in producing positive effects in the field of clinical neuropsychology and neural rehabilitation. An outstanding example is the Center for Cognitive Neurosciences in Cesena.

The Simon effect refers to the fact that, even though stimulus position is task-irrelevant, responses to a task-relevant stimulus dimension are faster and more accurate when the stimulus and response spatially correspond than when they do not. Although the Simon effect is a very robust phenomenon, it is modulated by practice or transfer from previous tasks. Practice refers to the modulation of the Simon effect as a function of number of trials. Transfer refers to the modulation of the Simon effect as a function of preceding tasks. The aim of the present study is to disentangle the role of practice and transfer in modulating the Simon effect and to investigate whether such modulation can be extended to a different response modality. Three experiments were conducted, which included three sessions: the Baseline session, the Inducer session and the Diagnostic session. The task performed in the Baseline and the Diagnostic sessions were comprised of location-irrelevant trials (i.e., they were Simon tasks). The task performed in the Inducer session required performing location-relevant trials (i.e., it was a spatial compatibility task with a compatible or an incompatible stimulus–response mapping). In the first and third experiments, participants were required to respond manually in all sessions. In the second experiment, the task performed in the Inducer session required manual response, while in the Baseline and Diagnostic sessions the tasks required ocular response. Results showed a reduced-Diagnostic Simon effect after both compatible and incompatible mapping in the Inducer session, regardless of whether response modality was the same or different. These results support the notion that the practice effect prevails over the transfer effect.

The Spatial-Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) suggests the existence of an association between number magnitude and response location, with faster left key-press responses to small numbers and faster right key-press responses to large numbers. We investigated whether a similar association exists between musical notes on the stave and the space of response execution, involving amateur and expert musicians (Experiment 1). Moreover, in Experiment 2 we further investigated such association in two groups of expert musicians (piano and transverse flute players) who differ in the note mapping on their instruments. Results indicate a clear association between musical notes and the space of response execution only for musicians with formal education. Furthermore, this association seems not to be influenced by the specific instrument played, as both piano and transverse flute players showed the same effect direction (left key-press advantage for low notes, and vice versa).

The generation of spatial representations linking sensation to action is a primary function of the posterior parietal cortex. Recent proposals suggest that parietal neurons compute basis functions of their input signals, implementing a gain field mechanism (i.e., modulation of visual information by postural variables) to perform coordinate transformations through simple linear mappings. Our study builds on the basis functions approach to develop a biologically inspired computational model accounting for sensorimotor transformations in saccadic planning and spatial attention. We show that the modulation of parietal neurons by the same postural variable to which their visual selectivity is invariant can be used to remap eye-centered representations across eye movements. We also demonstrate that the same connections involved in the generation of saccadic eye movements produce top-down attentional priming without requiring any additional mechanism and learning, providing computational support to the premotor theory of attention. Finally, the model predicts that top-down signals can determine attentional facilitation in at least two different spatial maps, which code spatial locations in eye and head-centered coordinates.

This article investigates simple mental arithmetic from a computational perspective and proposes an associative connectionist model that integrates semantic and symbolic representations of numbers. To simulate simple addition, we trained neural networks on addition facts, encoded both semantically and symbolically. Addition tasks were then solved by presenting only the symbolic representations of the operands and retrieving the sum. The networks exhibited the benchmark problem-size effect and tie effect, and accounted for a large proportion of the variance of human addition RTs. Studying the networks during retrieval, we found that they exclusively relied on the semantic "computational core". We conclude that simple mental arithmetic is a semantic process, and that verbal / Arabic numbers mainly serve as an interface.

The Simon effect lies on the automatic generation of a stimulus spatial code, which, however, is not relevant for performing the task. Results typically show faster performance when stimulus and response locations correspond, rather than when they do not. Considering reaction time distributions, two types of Simon effect have been individuated, which are thought to depend on different mechanisms: visuomotor activation versus cognitive translation of spatial codes. The present study aimed to investigate whether the presence of a distractor, which affects the allocation of attentional resources and, thus, the time needed to generate the spatial code, changes the nature of the Simon effect. In four experiments, we manipulated the presence and the characteristics of the distractor. Findings extend previous evidence regarding the distinction between visuomotor activation and cognitive translation of spatial stimulus codes in a Simon task. They are discussed with reference to the attentional model of the Simon effect.

The human brain is an extremely complex system of interacting physical and functional units, ranging from single neurons to complex networks. Cognition is a network phenomenon because it does not exist in isolated synapses, neurons, or even brain areas. In spite of that, a great amount of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have explored what areas are involved in a variety of cognitive processes, merely localizing where in the brain those processes occur. Instead, the very notion of network phenomena requires understanding spatiotemporal dynamics, which, in turn, depends on the way fMRI data are analyzed.What are themechanisms for simulating different cognitive functions and their spatiotemporal activity patterns? In order to bridge the gap between brain network activity and the emerging cognitive functions, we needmore plausible computational models, which should reflect putative neural mechanisms and the properties of brain network dynamics.

Stroop-like and Simon tasks produce two sources of interference in human information processing. Despite being logically similar, it is still debated whether the conflicts ensuing from the two tasks are resolved by the same or different mechanisms. In the present study, we compare two accounts of the Stroop-like effect. According to the Perceptual Account, the Stroop-like effect is due to Stimulus-Stimulus congruence. According to the Decisional Account, the Stroop-like effect results from the same mechanisms that produce the Simon effect, that is, Stimulus-Response compatibility. In two experiments we produced Stroop-like and Simon effects by presenting left/right-located stimuli consisting of a colored square surrounded by a frame of the same color as the square or of a different color. Results showed that discriminating either the color of the square (Experiment 1) or that of the frame (Experiment 2) yielded additive Stroop-like and Simon effects. In addition, the patterns of temporal distributions of the two effects were different. These results support the Perceptual Account of the Stroop-like effect and the notion that the Stroop-like effect and the Simon effect occur at different processing stages and are attributable to different mechanisms.

The concept of stimulus response compatibility (SRC) refers to the existence of a privileged association between a specific stimulus feature and a specific response feature. Two examples of SRC are the Spatial Numerical Association of Response Codes (SNARC) and the Markedness Association of Response Codes (MARC) effects. According to the polarity correspondence principle, these two SRC effects occur because of a match between the most salient dimensions of stimulus and response. Specifically, the SNARC effect would be caused by a match between right-sided responses and large numbers, while a match between right-sided responses and even numbers would give rise to the MARC effect. The aim of the present study was to test the validity of the polarity correspondence principle in explaining these two SRC effects. To this end, we applied transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) over left and right posterior parietal cortex (PPC), which is thought to be the neural basis of salience processing, during a parity judgement task. Results showed that cathodal tDCS over the PPC significantly reduced the MARC effect but did not affect the SNARC effect, suggesting a dissociation between the two effects. That is, the MARC would rely on a salience processing mechanism, whereas the SNARC would not. Despite this interpretation is in need of further experimental confirmations (i.e., testing different tasks or using different tDCS montages), our results suggest that the polarity correspondence principle can be a plausible explanation only for the MARC effect but not for the SNARC effect.

The reversal logical recoding rule (i.e., “respond opposite”) induced by an incompatible task (e.g., a task requiring to respond to red or green stimuli by pressing a key of the alternative colour compared to that of the stimulus) can be transferred to another task when the two tasks are combined in a task-switching paradigm. When the task to which the rule is transferred is a Simon task, this causes the disappearance of the typical advantage for responses that spatially correspond to the stimulus, or even results in an advantage for spatially noncorresponding responses. The present study aimed at investigating whether the transferred rule is independent of the specific stimulus and response dimensions for which it has been created. Previous studies suggest that when a Simon task is coupled with a colour incompatible task, the Simon effect may disappear or reverse even when stimuli in the two tasks, apart from being both visual and appearing on the same computer screen, have no other features in common. Results of the present study corroborate the hypothesis that feature overlap between stimuli is not necessary for the between-task transfer of the logical rule. However, an overlap between the representations of responses appears to be crucial. No modulation of the Simon effect was observed when the Simon task required bimanual responses while the colour-compatibility task required either vocal responses or responses executed with the two feet. In contrast, we did observe such a modulation when the discriminative response dimension and the effectors/response device were the same in the two tasks, even though these two tasks provided for different stimuli.

Many cognitive tasks involve a response conflict between the response selected on the basis of the task-relevant attribute and that primed by an irrelevant attribute. Although response priming has been extensively investigated, we still have little evidence on whether it entails both excitatory and inhibitory processes and the way in which these processes are modulated by the prior occurrence of a conflict between-response alternatives. To shed light on these issues, we tested motor cortex excitability during a two-choice compatibility task (a Simon task) by delivering single pulses of transcranial magnetic stimulation and recording the resulting motor evoked potentials (MEPs). We obtained consistent behavioural and MEP results suggesting that the presentation of a left- or right-side stimulus causes the activation of the ipsilateral response, which—in turn—inhibits the alternative response. Both processes are modulated by the spatial compatibility of the preceding trial. In trials following compatible trials (i.e. after conditions wherein the primed response was the correct one), we found response efficiency advantages and disadvantages of compatible and incompatible trials, respectively, which were mirrored by an increase of the excitability of the motor cortex primed by stimulus position and by a parallel decrease of the contralateral cortex excitability. Both the facilitation and interference components of the behavioural effect and the excitatory and inhibitory effects of the stimulus position on motor excitability were smaller after neutral trials (i.e. when the stimulus of the previous trial was aligned with fixation, thus not priming any response) and absent after incompatible trials (i.e. after having experienced a conflict between the primed and correct responses). These results are consistent with the idea that location-based response priming is under control of a conflict monitoring mechanism that strengthens ipsilateral response activation and contralateral response inhibition after compatible trials and weakens both processes after incompatible trials.

We investigated whether angle magnitude, similarly to numerical quantities (i.e., the spatial-numerical association of response codes effect), is associated to the side of response execution. In addition, we investigated whether this association has the properties of a spatially oriented mental line, since angles are taught in a right-to-left progression. We tested two groups of participants: civil engineering students (high familiarity with angles) and psychology students (low familiarity with angles). In Experiment 1, participants were asked to judge the continuity of the angles’ arms (continuous vs. dashed). Magnitude of the angles was task-irrelevant. In Experiment 2, they were asked to judge whether the presented angles were smaller or larger than a right angle (90°). Therefore, the angle magnitude was relevant for performing the task. Overall, engineering students responded faster with their left hand to large angles and with their right hand to small angles. Conversely, psychology students did not show any reliable differences between left- and right-hand responses. In the case of engineering students, the spatial association has a right-to-left (counter clockwise) direction, suggesting the influence of education and practice on the mental representation of angle magnitude.

The effects of concurrent working memory load in attentional processes have been 1 of the most puzzling issues in cognitive psychology. Studies have shown detrimental effects, no effects, and even beneficial effects of working memory load in different attentional tasks. In the present study we attempted to replicate Kim, Kim, and Chun's (2005, Experiment 3b) findings of beneficial effects of concurrent working memory load in a spatial Stroop-like task. In 3 experiments in which our sample was 3 times larger than that in the original Kim et al. study, we could not replicate their findings. The results are discussed in terms of what may have produced the conflicting results, trying to shed light on how working memory load affects attentional tasks. Also, we emphasize the importance of using adequately large samples in cognitive research. Although we acknowledge the relevance of meta-analyses to analyze conflicting results, in the present article we stress (perhaps more important) the power of an essential trademark in science for research development: replicability.