Although metacognitive monitoring is widely studied in cognitive domains, its role in emotional functioning remains underexplored. The present research investigates whether traditional measures of metacognitive monitoring, assessed through confidence ratings in cognitive tasks, are associated with and can influence emotional intelligence. In Study 1 (N = 226), participants completed a perceptual discrimination task with confidence ratings and a knowledge-based emotion management measure (the STEM-B). Results showed that metacognitive sensitivity (the correspondence between confidence and accuracy) was positively related to emotion management performance, while metacognitive bias (overall confidence) was negatively related. In Study 2 (N = 200), participants were randomly assigned to complete the emotion management task either with or without confidence ratings. Participants prompted to make metacognitive judgments performed significantly better, providing causal evidence that metacognitive engagement can enhance emotion management knowledge. These findings suggest that metacognitive monitoring, typically studied in ‘cold’ cognitive contexts, may play a functional role in the regulation of emotion. They also point to new opportunities for improving emotional intelligence through scalable, cognitively grounded interventions.

Romantic partners’ emotions are interdependent, yet it remains unclear whether their emotion regulation behaviours also influence each other over time. This study investigated bidirectional associations between intrinsic emotion regulation (regulating one’s own emotions) and extrinsic emotion regulation (regulating a partner’s emotions) in 387 heterosexual couples assessed across seven waves over two years from August 2021 to August 2023 (1,699 observations). At each wave, both partners reported their use of six pairs of intrinsic-extrinsic strategies: expressive suppression, humor, reappraisal, distraction, direct action, and sharing. Couples showed limited temporal influence on each other (within-dyad effects), but robust trait level associations of intrinsic and extrinsic regulation (between-dyad effects). Individuals tended to use similar strategies to regulate their own and their partner’s emotions. Partner effects varied by strategy: Men who used more humor to regulate their emotions received less humor from women whereas men who used more distraction to regulate their emotions received more distraction from women. Direct action and sharing showed bidirectional partner effects. Men’s use of direct action to regulate their emotions predicted (and was predicted by) less direct action received from women. Men’s use of sharing to regulate their own emotions predicted (and was predicted by) more sharing received from women. Overall, our findings support that emotion regulation in romantic relationships is inherently interpersonal, with interdependence operating primarily through stable trait-level patterns rather than temporal influences. Generalizability is limited by the relatively homogeneous sample (predominantly Caucasian, English-speaking, and highly educated).

Emotional intelligence (EI) reflects individuals’ capacities, whereas emotion regulation involves the behaviours people use to manage emotions. This meta-analysis (n = 115 studies, k = 923 effects) examined associations between EI and 20 common regulation processes, considering three major EI streams and four ability branches. EI was positively associated with putatively adaptive processes (direct situation modification, positive reappraisal, deep acting, seeking help), negatively associated with putatively maladaptive processes (avoidance, denial, surface acting, catastrophizing, self-blame, expressive suppression, substance use), and positively associated with religious coping and humor. EI stream moderated effects for direct situation modification, acceptance, positive reappraisal, distraction, and seeking help (weaker for ability EI than other streams; weaker for mixed EI than self-rated EI). EI branch moderated associations of ability EI with direct situation modification and seeking help, with stronger effects for emotion management. Overall, findings indicate that emotionally intelligent individuals primarily regulate emotions by addressing problems (direct modification, seeking help) or reframing situations (positive reappraisal), reflecting a tendency to use engagement rather than disengagement regulation processes. Test format (ability vs. rating scale) and theoretical model (ability vs. mixed) significantly influenced effect sizes. This meta-analysis advances understanding of emotion regulation as a key pathway linking EI to positive outcomes.

Research on regulating others’ emotions is burgeoning, yet most studies rely on Western, individualistic samples. While culture is known to influence the way people regulate their own emotions, it remains largely unclear how culture shapes the regulation of others’ emotions. We address this gap by testing cultural differences in the goals and strategies people use to regulate others’ emotions in a daily diary study. East Asian (n = 87) and Anglo-Celtic (n = 93) participants completed a five-day daily diary (720 entries). Each day, participants indicated their use of four strategies (expressive suppression, distraction, cognitive reappraisal, and receptive listening) and five goals (pro-hedonic, performance, relational bonding, avoiding conflict, and impression management) to regulate others’ emotions. Two key findings emerged. First, East Asians reported greater use of expressive suppression (but not other strategies) than Anglo-Celtic participants. Second, East Asians endorsed greater impression management and avoiding conflict goals (but not other goals) than Anglo-Celtic participants. These results provided a more nuanced picture of how culture shapes how and why people regulate others’ emotions. The findings may inform future research on enhancing cross-cultural communication and intergroup relations.

Research on emotion regulation has mainly focused on how we regulate our own emotions, only recently broadening to a focus on how we regulate others’ emotions. Although emotion regulation is fundamentally goal-driven, little is known about how regulation goals shape strategy use when we regulate others’ emotions. The present study addressed this gap using a daily diary design. Participants (N = 190) completed up to five daily diary surveys (794 entries) assessing four strategies (expressive suppression, distraction, cognitive reappraisal, receptive listening) and five goals (pro-hedonic, performance, bonding, avoiding conflict, and impression management) for regulating others’ emotions. Results showed significant within-person associations. Pro-hedonic goals were associated with greater use of all four strategies, whereas performance goals were associated with greater use of expressive suppression, distraction, and reappraisal. In addition, the two relational goals showed divergent effects: relational bonding goals were associated with greater receptive listening, while avoiding conflict goals were associated with less receptive listening and greater expressive suppression. Impression management goals were also associated with less receptive listening. Similar patterns were observed at the between-person level. These findings revealed similarities and distinctions from patterns previously observed in why and how people regulate their own emotions. The study provided a foundation for understanding why people choose particular strategies to regulate others’ emotions in daily life.

We can regulate our own and other people's emotions, but it is not clear whether we use the same strategies to regulate others' emotions as we do to regulate our own. In three preregistered studies, we compared participants' preferences for eight different emotion regulation strategies as a function of target identity. Study 1 (N = 119) compared regulating oneself versus a friend and found that direct action, distraction, suppression, and downward comparison were all used significantly more on oneself compared to a friend, while humor, valuing, and receptive listening were all used more on a friend compared to oneself. Study 2 (N = 120) then examined the role of closeness in emotion regulation strategy choice by comparing strategy preference for regulating oneself versus a close friend versus an acquaintance. Humor, valuing, receptive listening, and direct action were used significantly more on friends compared to acquaintances, while there was no significant difference for reappraisal, downward comparison, distraction, or supression. These results suggest that people show a consistent difference in preference for emotion regulation strategies as a function of who the target of the regulation is and that extrinsic and intrinsic emotion regulation may differ markedly in the strategies people choose to use. A third preregistered study (N = 120) reframed the same comparison in terms of perceived feasibility and found that the strategies participants rated as more feasible to use on themselves, a close friend, or an acquaintance closely mirrored those they reported using, suggesting that perceived feasibility may help explain target-related differences in emotion regulation choice.

Self-report and ability-based measures of emotional intelligence (EI) are assumed to assess the same construct, yet they typically weakly converge. One possibility is that accurate self-reports depend on introspective abilities, including metacognitive monitoring, whereas inflated self-views may reflect generalised confidence. We tested whether metacognition and confidence explain discrepancies between perceived and demonstrated EI. Undergraduate participants (N =195) completed a perceptual decision-making task yielding indices of metacognition and confidence, alongside matched self-report and performance-based measures of emotional understanding and management. Replicating prior work, self-report and ability EI were weakly related. In the emotional management domain, the association was negative, such that participants with higher self-ratings tended to perform worse. Contrary to predictions, metacognition was unrelated to either self-report or ability EI and did not moderate their correspondence. Confidence, however, showed a distinct pattern: higher confidence was associated with higher self-rated emotional management, lower performance on both ability tasks, and larger self-report/ability EI discrepancies. Confidence also weakened the relation between self-rated and ability emotional management, indicating poorer calibration among more confident individuals. These findings suggest that confidence, not metacognition, may drive the divergence between self-perceived and actual EI, and that self-report EI may partly capture certainty in ability rather than ability itself.

When regulating someone’s emotions, your goal might be to make them feel better (other-focused regulation goal) or to make yourself feel better (self-focused regulation goal; e.g., reducing their distress to relieve your own negative feelings). These contrasting goals may drive differences in the regulation strategies you choose. The current pre-registered study (N = 55) uses a repeated-measures within-subjects design to compare strategies for pro-hedonic other-focused versus self-focused goals. Strategies represented low (expressive suppression, downward social comparison), moderate (humour, distraction, direct action) or high (valuing, cognitive reframing, receptive listening) engagement with the other person. Compared to self-focused goals, other-focused goals led to significantly higher valuing and listening but lower suppression. Moreover, there were significant main effects for engagement (across goals, people used more high-engagement strategies than suppression—the lowest-engagement strategy), for goals (across strategies, people engaged in greater regulation for other- than self-focused goals) and their interaction (greater use of high-engagement strategies than suppression was stronger for other- than self-focused goals). Our findings suggest that affective engagement is the primary driver of which strategies are chosen to make someone else versus yourself feel better. Future research could examine instrumental as well as hedonic goals and consider more objective assessments.

Emotional intelligence (EI) has been positively associated with relationship quality in romantic couples, but few studies have examined the mechanisms underlying this association. The current study examines the mediating role of extrinsic emotion regulation (regulating your partner's emotions) on the associations between EI and relationship quality. Specifically, we studied the mediating effects of three extrinsic regulation strategies involving high engagement with the partner's emotions (cognitive reframing, receptive listening, and valuing). Heterosexual couples (N = 175) completed three waves of surveys across 14 weeks from August to October 2021. EI, extrinsic emotion regulation strategies, and relationship quality were measured at three time points. Actor-Partner Interdependence Mediation Models (APIMeMs) were applied to the dyadic data to predict relationship quality and changes in relationship quality (with baseline relationship quality controlled). Results showed that valuing one's partner was the only significant mediator linking EI to relationship quality. For both men and women, individuals' EI is associated with better relationship quality for themselves and their partners, through their use of valuing to regulate their partners. However, the mediation effect did not extend to residualized changes in relationship quality over time, indicating that EI and mutual valuing may not drive long-term growth. These findings underscore the importance of fostering EI and mutual valuing within couples, which related to healthier present relational functioning. Future research is needed to clarify their roles in sustaining long-term relationship trajectories.

There is evidence that people use different strategies to regulate sadness versus anger. However, prior studies have not controlled for emotional intensity as a confounding variable nor explored whether people form different goals to regulate sadness versus anger. The current pre-registered study addresses these two research gaps using a within-person experimental manipulation of emotion type (sadness versus anger) embedded in a daily diary design. Undergraduate psychology students completed six end-of-day surveys (N = 239 participants, n = 1039 surveys), which asked about either an angry event or a sad event that day. Participants rated the event’s emotional intensity, four regulation goals (pro-hedonic, pro-social, impression management, and performance) and five strategies (reappraisal, expressive suppression, social support seeking, distraction, and rumination). Compared to anger, sadness resulted in significantly stronger distraction, rumination, and pro-hedonic goals (but not other strategies or goals), even after controlling for intensity. Within-person regressions where the four goals predicted each strategy found significant effects of different goals on reappraisal, distraction, expressive suppression, and rumination. Emotional intensity was significantly stronger for sadness than anger, supporting the idea of an intensity/emotion type confound. Moreover, intensity significantly predicted greater use of all strategies and two goals (pro-social and impression management goals). These findings suggest that emotional intensity is a more important contextual factor than emotion type for determining goals and strategies. Future studies should examine the effect of intensity on goals experimentally and test whether the causes of anger and sadness matter for predicting goals and strategies.

When regulating another person’s emotions, your aim could be to make them feel better (an other-focused emotion regulation goal) or to make yourself feel better by regulating their emotions (a self-focused emotion regulation goal). These different goals may drive differences in the regulation strategies you choose. The current pre-registered study (N = 55) uses a repeated-measures within-subjects design to compare the effect of self-focused versus other-focused goals on the use of eight strategies to make another person feel better (expressive suppression, downward social comparison, humour, distraction, direct action, valuing, cognitive reframing, and receptive listening). Compared to self-focused goals, we found that other-focused goals led to significantly higher valuing and receptive listening but significantly lower expressive suppression. Our findings suggest that affective engagement is the primary driver of which strategies are chosen for other-focused goals (where higher-engagement strategies are chosen) versus self-focused goals (where lower-engagement strategies are chosen). Future research could expand this initial finding to examine instrumental goals as well as hedonic goals and consider other modes of assessment.

At work and in everyday life, people regulate each other's emotions (i.e., extrinsic emotion regulation). To date, research on workplace extrinsic emotion regulation has focused primarily on the outcomes of regulation and less on why people regulate others' emotions (i.e., emotion regulation goals) and how they do it (i.e., the emotion regulation strategies used). In this paper, we investigate how regulation goals influence the regulation strategies people use to regulate their co-workers' emotions, and how these relate to co-worker relationship quality (conflict and team-member exchange). Across three studies using experimental and field study designs (Study 1: N = 216; Study 2: N = 471; Study 3: N = 277 co-workers regulated by N = 143 employees) we find that employees with pro-hedonic goals are more likely to use the strategy of receptive listening (allowing co-workers to talk about their problems), which is associated with lower relationship conflict. Employees with instrumental goals, specifically keeping up appearances at work, are more likely to use expressive suppression (asking co-workers to suppress expressions of emotion), which is associated with higher relationship conflict and lower team-member exchange. These results extend theoretical insights into extrinsic emotion regulation and have important practical implications for promoting high-quality interactions between colleagues as well as interventions for building positive workplace cultures and emotion regulation norms within organizations.

Theoretical models of interpersonal extrinsic emotion regulation (the regulation of others' emotions) recognize many different regulation strategies, yet existing assessments do not assess a wide number of strategies at a granular level. In the present research, we develop the Regulation of Others' Emotions Scale to capture eight extrinsic emotion regulation strategies (expressive suppression, downward social comparison, humor, distraction, direct action, cognitive reframing, valuing, and receptive listening). Studies 1 (N = 321) and 2 (N = 121) identified eight strategies that differ in how much they require engagement with the target person. Studies 3 (N = 310) and 4 (N = 150 dyads) found evidence for test-retest reliability, structural validity, and correlations with other constructs (i.e., discriminant, convergent, and criterion-related validity). Results suggest that three high-engagement strategies have the strongest links to regulator and target outcomes (such as well-being and relationship quality), with the strongest effects for valuing, then cognitive reframing, and then receptive listening. The discussion focuses on the two broad contributions of the current research: a new instrument assessing multiple strategies and the integration of two different theoretical frameworks for the regulation of others' emotions. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).

Emotionally intelligent people tend to have higher wellbeing. It is possible that their high emotional intelligence (EI) also affects the wellbeing of the people they interact with. This is particularly true in romantic relationships, where a person’s EI may play an important role in their partner’s emotional experiences. The current study (N = 407 romantic dyads) uses actor-partner interdependence models to examine the associations between EI (ability and self-rated) and wellbeing (psychological wellbeing, life satisfaction, affect). Self-rated EI showed consistent actor effects on all wellbeing variables with relatively large effects. Actor effects for ability EI were much smaller and inconsistent for men versus women. Partner effects were largely significant for self-rated, but not ability EI. The results suggest that romantic partners’ self-rated EI impacts some aspects of wellbeing. Findings are discussed in terms of the distinction between emotional abilities (ability EI) and self-beliefs (self-rated EI), including implications for couples counselling.

Emotion regulation predicts important life outcomes including psychopathology, social outcomes, work performance, and academic achievement. Extrinsic emotion regulation strategies (the strategies used to influence others' emotions) are under-studied relative to intrinsic regulation strategies (the strategies used to regulate one's own emotions). In the current study, we used experience sampling to examine participants' extrinsic emotion regulation strategies. Participants (165 university students) reported the strategies they used to regulate others' emotions on 30 occasions over 5 days. The findings suggest that participants frequently report regulating others' emotions and report using receptive listening and reframing more than humor and distraction. Empathy, conscientiousness and agreeableness were associated with differences in the use of extrinsic emotion regulation strategies. These findings help characterize everyday extrinsic emotion regulation strategies and how these strategies relate to other individual differences.

The present research examined cultural differences of co-rumination in predicting psychological well-being between 331 Chinese and 166 Australian college students. Results of comparative analyses indicated three higher positive co-rumination factors (i.e., affirmation, problem-solving, and enhancing friendship), one higher negative co-rumination factor (i.e., inhibiting happiness), but one lower negative co-rumination factor (i.e., worry about evaluation) in Chinese participants, than in Australian participants. The neutral factors of co-rumination (i.e., frequency P and N) did not show group differences. Regression analyses indicated that affirmation and problem-solving were positive predictors whereas worry about evaluation, and slack were negative predictors for Chinese participants. Affirmation, problem-solving, and enhancing friendship were positive predictors whereas worry about evaluation, inhibiting happiness, and slack were negative predictors for Australian participants. Overall, these findings indicate that different strategies of co-rumination have different relationships with psychological well-being while highlighting important differences between East and West cultures.

Research consistently demonstrates that people can distort their responses on self-report personality tests. Informant-reports (where a knowledgeable informant rates a target's personality) can be used as an alternative to self-ratings. However, there has been little research on the extent to which informants can distort their responses on personality tests (or their motives for response distortion). The current study examines the effects of experimentally induced response distortion on self- and informant-reports of the Dark Triad. The participants (N = 834 undergraduates) completed Dark Triad measures in a 2 x 3 between-person design crossing format (self- vs. informant-report [imagined friend]) with instruction condition (answer honestly, look good, or look bad). "Look good" effects were significant for both self-reports (d = -1.22 to 1.42) and informant-reports (d = -1.35 to 0.62). "Look bad" effects were also significant for both self-reports (d = -0.56 to 3.58) and informant-reports (d = -0.55 to 3.70). The Five Factor Machiavellianism Inventory results were opposite to hypotheses, but Dirty Dozen Machiavellianism results were as expected. We conclude that people can distort Dark Triad scores for themselves (self-report) and on behalf of someone else (informant-report). We discuss the relevance of our findings for self- and informant-report assessment in applied contexts. The study demonstrates that informants can distort their responses on Dark Triad personality domains, highlighting the need for scrutiny in informant-reports and self-reports. By manipulating instructions to "look good" and "look bad," the study found significant effects of faking on both self-reports and informant-reports of the Dark Triad domains. Results of this study emphasize the importance of considering response distortion in the assessment of the Dark Triad, especially in high-stakes real-world contexts, to ensure accurate score interpretation.