本文从融资挤占视角研究发现:地方债扩张会抑制企业持有金融资产尤其是短期金融资产,这表明减持金融资产在信贷环境紧张时发挥了流动性补充功能;这一抑制作用在非国有企业、小规模企业、实体投资较多的企业中更显著;在市场化水平更高、政府与市场关系更友好的地区、企业所在地级市与外省相邻以及货币环境相对宽松时,上述抑制作用更小.这些结论为辩证看待企业金融化、政府转向精准用债、保护市场主体和推动信贷市场统一建设提供了支持.

一、引言 2008年金融危机以来,构建一个宏微观审慎有机结合的框架,成为推进国际社会治理变革和进行金融监管改革的共识. 中国较早就开始了金融宏微观审慎监管协同的探索实践,近年来在影子银行治理、房地产金融管理以及金融科技风险监管等方面,持续完善金融审慎监管协同的新治理架构.

Sustained economic growth at the macro level requires effective support from corporate governance structures at the micro level. However, both in practice and theory, current research on Chinese corporate governance appears to be in a state of ambiguity. The discrepancy between appearance and essence in practice and between essence and form in theory presents a dilemma and challenge for research on Chinese corporate governance. This paper proposes a new perspective on corporate governance—an implicit contract explanation within the Chinese Guanxi structure —to help address this dilemma. Corporate governance comprises a collection of contracts among various stakeholders, with the content and form of these contracts embedded within the social structure of the parties involved in transactions. Without an understanding of contracts, it is difficult to comprehend corporate governance; similarly, without an understanding of Guanxi structures, it is challenging to grasp contracts. From a historical analysis perspective that draws upon ancient Chinese Confucian moral philosophy as well as recent insights from Liang Shuming on Chinese culture and sociologists such as Tao Menghe, Fei Xiaotong, and Zhai Xuewei, this paper outlines the fundamental logic underpinning contemporary society; analyzes social determinants behind contract content and form; identifies key differences between Eastern and Western contract forms; proposes cultural and ethical origins for implicit contracts formed within Chinese society; clarifies characteristics of implicit contracts including their advantages/disadvantages and suitability for use;explains an analytical framework for Chinese corporate governance built upon implicit contracts including reasons for transaction cost savings through implicit contracts as well as their implementation mechanisms within Chinese social Guanxi structures. This paper also reviews existing empirical research findings and analyzes how implicit contracts can stimulate transactions and promote economic growth, providing new insights into Coase’s theorem from a different angle. The perspective on implicit contracts proposed in this paper differs from those based on explicit contracts under Anglo-American models. It offers an effective path for introspection and analysis of corporate governance mechanisms within China’s historical traditions while meeting the requirements for modernization deeply rooted in China’s excellent traditional culture. This approach presents a new vision distinct from Western modernization models and strives for innovation within philosophical and social science disciplines. While this paper does not reject the existing logic of Western corporate governance theories, it emphasizes deeper analysis and expansion based on China’s institutional, social, and cultural background concerning different contract forms and situations.

In the past 20 years,the impact of financial openness on income inequality and income gap has received increasing attention.This paper reviews existing literature on the definition and measurement of financial openness,the impact of capital account openness on income inequality,channels via which financial openness affects income inequality,and the impact of exchange rate and exchange rate reform on income gap.Based on the review of the literature in the recent 20 years and China's reality,the paper poses future research agenda,including case study about China,the opening of foreign exchange market on income gap and the relation between financial openness and income gap based on China's institutions and dual circulation.

硅谷银行在倒闭前是美国第16大银行,是硅谷最早服务于中小科技企业的银行,长期被业界视作"银行支持科创的典范".对于硅谷银行的"突然死亡",更值得关注的是,银行如何才能有效支持科创企业?银行在服务科创企业的过程中产生的风险应该如何防范?本文对此一探究竟.

基于供需双边视角,采用2007-2019年A股上市公司数据,实证检验了需方实体企业金融化对其商业信用融资的影响机制、作用效果及异质性表现.研究表明:需方企业金融化显著降低了其商业信用融资规模,且在控制了内生性问题后结论不变.存在代理问题与套利空间的企业,企业金融化对其商业信用融资的抑制更显著,表现为逐利动机而非预防性动机.机制检验表明,需方企业金融化通过影响实业业绩和企业风险,进而影响其商业信用融资的获取.进一步研究发现:需方企业内外部环境的差异会导致金融化作用效果的非对称性,在国有制、高融资约束和低市场地位的企业中,金融化对其商业信用融资的抑制效果更强.因此,强化内部治理和外部监督可以削弱需方企业金融化的负面影响.

由于共生利益分配的不对称,金融与实体经济在共生发展中存在非对称性,这是导致金融和实体经济失衡的深层原因.基于面板联立方程模型的实证研究发现,总体而言,我国的金融与实体经济实现了共生发展,但在共生利益分配中偏向金融部门,呈现金融对实体经济的促进效应明显弱于实体经济对金融的贡献的"失衡"状态;金融与实体经济共生发展的非对称性及其所引发的失衡程度在不同地区、不同时期和不同行业有所区别.为此,应着力矫正金融与实体经济的非对称共生发展关系,推动二者向对称互惠共生模式演化,促使金融和实体经济从"失衡"走向"均衡".

本文以美国次贷危机的爆发原因和传导机制为研究起点.在中国情境下,以"新常态"时期"供给侧结构"改革所面临的实际问题为研究对象,以关键金融因素资产价格和信贷水平作为研究重心,结合现有研究,关注风险冲击和储蓄成本溢价冲击.在此基础上,通过动态随机一般均衡模型分析两种冲击的宏观经济效应,并发掘储蓄成本溢价的政策内涵.本文研究表明,风险冲击与储蓄成本溢价冲击都会对宏观经济产生负面影响,导致宏观经济基本面的"断崖式"下滑.此时,从政策可行性出发,可将调控重心转向与金融机构经营相关的储蓄成本溢价,发挥其对宏观经济基本面下行的"缓冲"效应,减少社会福利损失.最终,通过对信贷水平的调节,以较小的成本实现对宏观经济异动的有效快速反应.