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The Awards for Distinguished Scientific Contributions are presented to persons who, in the opinion of the Committee on Scientific Awards, have made distinguished theoretical or empirical contributions to basic research in psychology. The 2016 recipients of the APA Scientific Contribution Awards were recognized by the 2015 Board of Scientific Affairs and selected by the 2015 Committee on Scientific Awards. Members of the committee were Scott M. Monroe, PhD (Chair); Susan Goldin-Meadow, PhD; James Grau, PhD; Hazel R. Markus, PhD; Karen A. Matthews, PhD; and Linda Smith, PhD. (PsycINFO Database Record

The APA Awards for Distinguished Scientific Contributions are presented to persons who, in the opinion of the Committee on Scientific Awards, have made distinguished theoretical or empirical contributions to basic research in psychology. The 2015 recipients of the APA Scientific Contribution Awards were recognized by the 2014 Board of Scientific Affairs and selected by the 2014 Committee on Scientific Awards. The winners for 1956 through 2015 are listed here. The 2015 award winners are Stanislas Dehaene, Edna B. Foa, and Michael Tomasello. (PsycINFO Database Record

List of Contributors. Prologue. Memory and Consciousness in Tallinn, Endel Tulving. Memory, shmemory: Lest we forget Mnemosyne, Jaan Puhvel. Part I: Memory. Available and accessible information in memory and vision, Juri Allik. Item-specific weighted memory measurement, Herman Buschke and Martin J. Slivinski. Genetics and memory, Lars-Goran Nilsson. Divided attention and memory: Impairment of processing or consolidation? Fergus I.M. Craik and Jill D. Kester. Why retrieval is the key process in understanding memory, Henry L. Roediger, III. Functional neuroimaging of episodic memory retrieval, Roberto Cabeza. Mood dependence and implicit memory, Lee Ryan and Eric Eich. Remembering what never happened, Elizabeth F. Loftus. The seven sins of memory: Perspectives from functional neuroimaging, Daniel L. Schacter. Memory, consciousness and temporality: What is retrieved and who exactly is controlling the retrieval? Gianfranco Dalla Barba. Part II: Consciousness. On the objectivity of subjective experiences of autonoetic and noetic consciousness, John M. Gardiner. What brain activity tells us about conscious awareness of memory retrieval, Emrah Duzel. Varieties of consciousness and memory in the developing child, Mark A. Wheeler. Self-regulation and autonoetic consciousness, Brian Levine. Affectively burnt in: One role of the right frontal lobe? Donald T. Stuss and Michael P. Alexander. 'Hot' emotions in human recollection: Towards a model of traumatic memory. Janet Metcalfe and W.J. Jacobs. Is schizophrenia a disorder of memory or consciousness? Nancy C. Andreasen. Part III: The Brain . Novelty assessment in the brain, Reza Habib and Martin Lepage. Dual effect theory of encoding, Randy Buckner. Successful remembering in the brain, Lars Nyberg. Testing Tulving: The split brain approach, Michael S. Gazzaniga and Michael B. Miller. Repressed memories, Hans J. Markowitsch. Remote memory and retrograde amnesia: Was Endel Tulving right all along? Morris Moscovitch, Tanya Yaschyshyn, Marilyne Ziegler, and Lynn Nadel. From location to integration: How neural interactions form the basis for human cognition, Anthony Randal McIntosh. Epilogue. Human intelligence: A case study of how more and more research can lead us to know less and less about a psychological phenomenon, until finally we know less than we did before we started doing research, Robert J. Sternberg. Author Index. Subject Index.

In this volume, the concept of "prediction" is proposed to be an overarching principle of brain function that encompasses the general capacity to anticipate a broad range of external events in the service of promoting adaptive interactions with one's environment (Bar. 2009). Nonetheless, the various "predicitive" capacities that are discussed here may be distinguished from one another and it will be important for psychologists and nei~roscientists to specify how any one "predictive" capacih is ditrerent from, or similar to, other related capacities. This practicc would serve the purpose of reinforcing thc important observation that is central to Bar's (2009) characterization of "prediction"-that it is a heterogeneous concept and that all "predic-tive" capacities that have thus far been identified. and that will undoubtedly be identified in the future, are not necessarily equal. As a modest starting point, we propose a straightforward distinction between "predic-tions" that are either: (i) inherent to actions and behaviours tied to the present moment (e.g., as is typically observed when humans o r other animals produce intelligible and adaptive behaviours) or (ii) inherent to mental operations predicated on the conscious awareness on the part of the individual that his o r her self extends temporally into the "non-immediate" future (i.e.. a time that does not follow a presently onpoinp sequence of events: e.g., as occurs when human beings contemplate scenarios that have yet to take place). For instance, over an extended period of training, a rat is capable of learning to infer that one stimulus is more preferable (i.e., leads to a reward) than another, even though the rat has never experienced those two stimuli in conjunction in the past (see Eichenbaun~ & Fortin, 2009). In terms that will be used in the current volume, the rat is said to correctly "predict" the most beneficial manner in which to interact with its environment. This kind of "prediction" has to do \\.ith an ongoing sequence of events (in the present moment). Of course, the same characterization can bc made about various kinds of human behaviours. For instance. consider your ability to "predict" how much force will be required to lift a carton of milk (see Linas & Roy. 2009). The fact that yo11 are consistently able to lift a carton of milk without dropping it o r hurling it up towards the ceiling is a testament to the fact that you are able to anticipate the approximate weight …

This chapter is organized into two main sections. First, it provides an overview of the concept of “autonoetic consciousness,” which is defined as the capacity to be consciously aware of one's continued temporal existence. Second, it outlines various “predictive” mental activities that deal with the extended, or “non-immediate,” future of the individual. These include future orientation, episodic future thought, planning, and prospective memory. Furthermore, the chapter considers the nature in which these “predictive” mental activities relate to one another and how, ultimately, each depends on the capacity of autonoetic consciousness.

“Mental time travel” refers to conscious experience of remembering the personal past and imagining the personal future. Little is known about its neural correlates. Here, using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we explored the hypothesis that mental time travel into “nonpresent” times (past and future) is enabled by a special conscious state (chronesthesia). Well-trained subjects repeatedly imagined taking one and the same short walk in a familiar environment, doing so either in the imagined past, present, or future. In an additional condition, they recollected an instance in which they actually performed the same short walk in the same familiar setting. This design allowed us to measure brain activity correlated with “pure” conscious states of different moments of subjective time. The results showed that the left lateral parietal cortex was differentially activated by nonpresent subjective times compared with the present (past and future > present). A similar pattern was observed in the left frontal cortex, cerebellum, and thalamus. There was no evidence that the hippocampal region is involved in subjective time travel. These findings provide support for theoretical ideas concerning chronesthesia and mental time travel.

"We havc to livc today by what truth we can get today, and be ready tomorrow to call it I'itl~~hootl." William James Festschrifts arc among tlic wondcrf'ul inventions of enlightened minds. They serve many purposes. The main purposc. of course, is to honour the honouree and make him happy. Sometimes this purpose does not work because not all great scholars and scientists for whom Festschrifts are written know how to be happy. In the present case, however, the success of this part of the venture is assured because our honouree, Lars-Goran Nilsson, not only believes in happiness but also practises it wherever and whenever possible. In that sense alone, this Festschrift in his honour is especially appropriate. Festschrifts also make Festschrift organizers happy, not only because they can thereby publicly express their respect and admiration for the honouree but also because it makes for a handsome addition to their own curricula vitae. And Festschrifts make the invited contributors happy because it sometimes affords them a chance to publish something that they might not be allowed to publish under less friendly circumstances. As a contributor I am grateful to Lars-Goran Nilsson for laying the groundwork for such an opening, and to Lars Backman and Lars Nyberg for effecting it, thereby making it possible to tell the story that appears here. The story is about novelty. As everyone knows, brains are very good at detecting novelty. The question is, however, how do they do it? I discuss the question and suggest an answer to it. The story has its roots in previous work that I did some time ago with colleagues in Toronto, and also at the University of California at Davis, and that was significantly extended and elaborated by Lars-Goran Nilsson and his students in Stockholm. I first summarize this work and then raise and try to answer a question that emerged from it. It is now possible to imagine that the earlier version of the story may not have been quite right. Here, then, is an opportunity to make amends. How do hrnins detect novelty? 93 PETting memory The story begins back in the 1990s, in the early heady days of "PETting memory". The newly developed technique of positron emission tomography (PET) had just been adapted for studying human cognition and seemed to hold the promise of providing fascinating new insights into the mind and its relation to brain. At …

The present study focused on the processes underlying cognitive association formation by investigating subsequent memory effects. Event-related potentials were recorded as participants studied pairs of words, presented one word at a time, for later recall. The findings showed that a frontal-positive late wave (LW), which occurred 1–1.6 s after the presentation of the second word of a pair during study, was associated with later paired associate recall. The observed LW likely reflected cognitive association formation processing. Paired associate recall was also associated with a larger P555 to each word of a pair, likely reflecting the encoding of each individual word of a pair, which necessarily precedes association formation between the two words. Moreover a larger N425 was elicited by pairs that were encoded in a low context-similarity condition compared to that of a high context-similarity condition, likely reflecting semantic integration. Minimum norm source analyses showed that the likely sources of these ERP effects changed dynamically in time: a widespread fronto-temporo-parietal activation during the N425 was followed by a fronto-temporal activation during the P555, and finally by a left prefrontal activation during the LW.

Rcccnt research suggcsts that thc operations of human memory are carried out by a number of different but closely interacting functional systems and subsystems, subserved by corrcsponding brain structures and mechanisms. A good deal of current research effort is directed at identification of these memory systems, description of their properties, and the analysis of the relations among them. Dichotomies of classification that ' had been proposed earlier, short-term versus long-term memory, episodic versus semantic memory, procedural versus declarative memory, are being replaced with more comprehensive classificatory schemes. One such scheme for which there is some empirical support is summarized in Table 1. It includes fivc major learning and memory systems. The five are procedural memory, perceptual priming, short-term memory, semantic memory, and episodic memory. Each of the five systems is large and complex, comprising a number of subsystems for which evidence at the present stage of our knowledge is of variable quality. The ordering of the major systems in the overall classification scheme corresponds roughly to their presumed developmental sequence, with the procedural system the earliest and the episodic the latest. The ordering of the systems also reflects the conjectured relations among the systems: the operations of the higher ones depend on and are supported by the operations of the lower ones, whereas lower systems can operate essentially independently of the higher. The scheme in Table I does not include primitive forms of learning, such as sensitization and habituation, because little is known about their relation to other forms of learning and memory in humans. But, somc widely used classificatory terms are shown. Thus, since semantic and episodic memory sharc a n ~ ~ n i b e r of features, they are frequently referred to collectively as declarative (or propositional or factual) memory. Another frequently used distinction is that between implicit and explicit memory. Implicit memory designates the e.~pression of stored information without awareness of its acquisition coordinates in space and time, that is, expression of what the individual knows without necessarily remembering how, whcn, or where the knowledge was acquired. Explicit memory, on the other hand, refers to the expression of what the person consciously remembers as a personal experience.

"Mirror, mirror, on the wall, what's the fairest science of them all?" "Why, yours, of course, master: the science of memory, consciousness, and the brain!" "But, mirror, are you sure there is such a thing! I have never heard anyone talk about the science of memory, consciousness, and the brain." "Well, master, now you have. What do you propose to do about it?" The mirror is clever. It shows political wisdom, in saying things that please the questioner, and yet it thinks surprisingly refreshing thoughts. Memory and consciousness have been objects of fascination to dedicated psychologists and other brain scientists for over a hundred years. Owing to the great complexity of the two concepts, however, the progress in their understanding over most of this time has been rather slow, and the quest for such understanding continues unabated. New coalitions and convergences of traditionally separate disciplines are emerging all the time. Although there have been as yet no public utterances made about a separate branch of the science of memory, consciousness, and the brain, it should be clear to anyone who has been close to the scene that the omission lies in the label and not in the to-be-labeled activity. A four-day conference on the topic of "Memory, Consciousness, and the Brain" was held in Tallinn, Estonia, at the end of May 1998. Its purpose was to review the recent progress in the research on the topic of memory, consciousness, and the brain, to identify some of the acute outstanding problems, and to muse about future possibilities. The present

1'11~ idea that mental experience may leave residue in the soul, or mind, that allows later remembering of the experience is as old as recorded history, and probably older. The idea that this residue is physical, somewhere in the brain, 8% more recent, having been first proposed by Robert Hooke (1627-1703) who ~hought that memory is 'as much an Organ as the Eye, Ear, or the Nose', and 1Iii11 it has'its situation somewhere near the Place where Nerves from the other \lbnses concur and meet' (Young 1965, p. 287). The existence of this 'residue' with a remarkable staying power is now taken lor granted, but much about it has remained baffling. How is it formed? What I\ its nature? What kind of thing, or entity or stuff is it? What is the relationship Iwtween the experience and its residue? What is the relationship between thc residue and remembering that it enables? Where does the residue reside? I)oes every experience leave a residue? If not, then what determines which ones do and which ones do not? If yes, what kind of a place is it that can 'hold' .In individual's untold experiences? Does the residue last forever? (Not many \cicntists believe this, but I think that some do.) Does it last at least as long as the individual is alive? These and related questions have been raised and ilcbated, sometimes hotly debated, throughout the human intellectual history. At the present time, n o one knows what the answers are, although we have ~~ndoubtedly made progress in getting a better grip on the questions. The terms that have been used to refer to the memorially relevant components o f the after-effects of experience have varied with the fashions of the times, the .~ccumulated pertinent knowledge already available, and even the languages. ~ n d dialects spoken by those who have thought deeply about the matter. A frequently used term is 'representation', another is 'coding'-as in the title of this section of the book. Other well-known terms are 'engram', 'memory ~rnage' and 'memory trace'. Each has its own connotations that vary from context to context and even from writer to writer, although the concept lying behind all these terms has been and continues to be relatively unambiguous.

It is well known that previous perceptual experiences alter subsequent perception, but the details of the neural underpinnings of this general phenomenon are still sketchy. Here, we ask whether previous experiences with an item (such as seeing a person's face) leads to the alteration of the neural correlates related to processing of the item as such, or whether it creates additional associative connections between such substrates and those activated during prior experience. To address this question, we used magnetoencephalography (MEG) to identify neural changes accompanying subjects' viewing of unfamiliar versus famous faces and hearing the names of unfamiliar versus famous names. We were interested in the nature of the involvement of auditory brain regions in the viewing of faces, and in the involvement of visual regions in the hearing of names. Evoked responses from MEG recordings for the names and faces conditions were localized to auditory and visual cortices, respectively. Unsurprisingly, peak activation strength of evoked responses was larger for famous versus nonfamous names within the superior temporal gyrus (STG), and was similar for famous and nonfamous faces in the occipital cortex. More relevant to the issue of experience on perception, peak activation strength in the STG was larger for viewed famous versus nonfamous faces, and peak activation within the occipital cortex was larger for heard famous versus nonfamous names. Critically, these experience-related responses were present within 150250 msec of stimulus onset. These findings support the hypothesis that prior experiences may influence processing of faces and names such that perception encompasses more than what is imparted on the senses.

n academic Festschrift, as every reader of this volume knows, is a book honoring a respected scholar or scientist. It is usually published to cele- brate an important landmark in the honoree's life. In our case the honored academic is Henry L. (Roddy) Roediger, 111, a brilliant cognitive psychologist, mentor and teacher, friend and colleague. And the landmark, as far as I know, was the discovery in 2004 by Roddy's colleagues at Purdue, primarily Jim Nairne, that they had had the good fortune of having had a truly remarkable colleague in their very midst when Roddy was a faculty me~nber there. The discovery resulted in Roddy's being nominated for and abvarded an honorary doctor's degree by Purdue, followed by a scientific conference to celebrate his achievements, and now this volu~ne to record it for posterity. Wikipedia, the source of infinite knowledge and wisdom in our day and age, offering an explication of the term, declares that "A Festschrift can be anything from a slim volume to a work in several volumes. It often includes important

AbstractWe add one point to Suddendorf & Corballis's (S&C's) story of mental time travel: For the future success of this hot, new area of research, it is imperative to pay attention to the fundamental distinction between the general brain/mind capacity that makes possible conscious awareness of the past and the future (the “medium”), on the one hand, and specific expressions of this capacity in a large variety of future-related mental activities (the “message”), on the other.