Fairness concerns shape how people judge wages, institutions, taxes, transfers and social conflict. Decades of research show that people care not only about their own outcomes but also about how outcomes are distributed across others. The key question is now how these concerns operate outside simple laboratory settings, in real social and institutional environments. We argue that fairness concerns are shaped by comparison groups, beliefs about what outcomes are deserved, social norms, early-life experience and the institutions that make some comparisons more visible than others. This means that policies and organizations do not merely respond to fairness preferences; they can also activate, redirect and reshape them. Progress requires methods that connect experiments with field data, institutional variation and richer measures of how people evaluate whole income distributions. Such work can improve the design of workplaces, welfare policies and public institutions that are both effective and seen as legitimate.
In recent years, increasing skepticism regarding oxytocin's (OT) influence on social behavior arose. Low power, HARKing (hypothesizing after the results are known), and replication failures have clouded the field. Here, we directly address these concerns with a high-powered, preregistered study that offers robust evidence for a causal effect of OT on trust among males with a low disposition to trust. We recruited 359 low-trusting men who participated in a trust game with complete anonymity. Results show that OT administration significantly increased trusting behavior by roughly 15%, with consistent effects across regression models with and without controls for personality traits. A pooled data analysis incorporating a previous sample (n = 219) of low-trusting individuals further strengthens this conclusion, yielding a statistically significant 16.9% increase in trust. No interaction effect was found between OT and the degree of dispositional trust, suggesting OT's effect may be uniform across the low-trusting spectrum. These findings present a strong case for OT's selective trust-enhancing role. By isolating OT's impact within a well-defined subpopulation and experimental context, this study resolves a key question in the debate over neurobiological determinants of trust.
Agreements are rarely fully enforceable, exposing trading parties to the risk of exploitation. In such cases, trust-defined as the belief in the trustworthiness of others-may be key to realising gains from trade. This paper asks whether trust substitutes for or complements contract enforcement. While intuition may suggest that trust matters more when enforcement is weak, our experiment, which exogenously varies both trust and enforcement, shows that it can matter more when enforcement is strong. The mechanism is equilibrium selection: stronger enforcement allows more equilibria, and trust helps select efficient ones. This complementarity between trust and enforcement has important policy implications.
We examine whether individual preferences predict higher-education choices. According to standard human capital theory, differences in individuals' time and risk preferences lead to differences in educational investments. Testing this hypothesis is challenging, as it requires measuring individuals' preferences, doing so before they make educational investments, and subsequently observing their educational choices. We combine incentivized, experimentally elicited measures of time and risk preferences for a large, representative sample of 18- to 19-y-old Danes with administrative data on subsequent higher-education choices, program-specific earnings trajectories, prior school performance, and family background. In line with theory, we find that more patient individuals choose longer education programs and programs with steeper early-career earnings profiles, while more risk-averse individuals select programs with lower earnings dispersion and reduced downside risk. These relationships remain strong after controlling for cognitive ability, prior academic performance, and family background. Our findings suggest that preferences have a substantial impact on real-world educational investments and have implications for educational sorting.
In recent years, increasing skepticism regarding oxytocin’s (OT) influence on social behavior arose. Low power, HARKing (hypothesizing after the results are known), and replication failures have clouded the field. Here, we directly address these concerns with a high-powered, preregistered study that offers robust evidence for a causal effect of OT on trust among individuals with a low disposition to trust. We recruited 359 low-trusting individuals who participated in a trust game under strict anonymity conditions. Results show that OT administration significantly increased trusting behavior by roughly 15%, with consistent effects across regression models with and without controls for personality traits. A pooled data analysis incorporating a previous sample (n=219) of low-trusting individuals further strengthens this conclusion, yielding a statistically significant 16.9% increase in trust. Crucially, no interaction effect was found between OT and the degree of dispositional trust, suggesting OT’s effect is uniform across the low-trusting spectrum. These findings present a strong case for OT’s selective trust-enhancing role. By isolating OT’s impact within a well-defined subpopulation and experimental context, this study provides a critical pivot in the debate over neurobiological mechanisms of trust.
We review the vast literature on social preferences by assessing what is known about their fundamental properties, their distribution in the broader population, and their consequences for important economic and political behaviors. We provide, in particular, an overview of the empirical characteristics of distributional preferences and how they are affected by merit, luck, and concerns for equality of opportunity. In addition, we discuss the evidence for reciprocity and guilt aversion and assess the empirical relevance of self-image and social image concerns in prosocial behaviors. The overall evidence indicates that a large majority of individuals have some sort of social preferences, while purely self-interested subjects are a minority. We also document converging insights from the lab and the field on the impact of wage inequality on work morale, employees' resistance to wage cuts, and the role of social preferences for cooperation and collective action, distributive politics, and individuals' selection into different occupations. (JEL D63, D71, D72, D86, H23, J53)
Working-memory (WM) capacity is a key component of a wide range of cognitive and noncognitive skills-such as fluid IQ, math, reading, and inhibitory control-but can WM training improve these skills? Here, we examine the causal impact of WM training embedded in regular school teaching, using a randomized educational intervention with 6-7-year-old children. We find substantial gains in WM capacity and document positive spillover effects on geometry, fluid IQ, and inhibitory control. Three years later, treated children are 16 percentage points more likely to enter an advanced secondary school track.
Do beliefs about inequality depend on distributive preferences? What is the joint role of preferences and beliefs about inequality for support for redistribution? We study these questions in a staggered experiment with a broadly representative sample of the Swiss population conducted in the context of a vote on a highly redistributive policy proposal. Our sample comprises a majority of inequality averse subjects, a sizeable group of altruistic subjects, and a minority of predominantly selfish subjects. Irrespective of preference types, individuals overestimate the extent of income inequality. An information intervention successfully corrects these large misperceptions for all types, but essentially does not affect aggregate support for redistribution. These results hide, however, important heterogeneity because the effects of beliefs about inequality for demand for redistribution are preference-dependent: only inequality averse individuals, but not the selfish and altruistic ones, significantly reduce their support for redistribution. These findings cast a new light on the seemingly puzzling result that, in the aggregate, large changes in beliefs about inequality often do not translate into changes in demand for redistribution.
Repeated interactions provide an evolutionary explanation for one-shot human cooperation that is counterintuitive but orthodox 1 – 3 . Intergroup competition 4 – 7 provides an explanation that is intuitive but heterodox. Here, using models and a behavioural experiment, we show that neither mechanism reliably supports cooperation. Ambiguous reciprocity, a class of strategies that is generally ignored in models of reciprocal altruism, undermines cooperation under repeated interactions. This finding challenges repeated interactions as an evolutionary explanation for cooperation in general, which further challenges the claim that repeated interactions in the past can explain one-shot cooperation in the present. Intergroup competitions also do not reliably support cooperation because groups quickly become extremely similar, which limits scope for group selection. Moreover, even if groups vary, group competitions may generate little group selection for multiple reasons. Cooperative groups, for example, may tend to compete against each other 8 . Whereas repeated interactions and group competitions do not support cooperation by themselves, combining them triggers powerful synergies because group competitions constrain the corrosive effect of ambiguous reciprocity. Evolved strategies often consist of cooperative reciprocity with ingroup partners and uncooperative reciprocity with outgroup partners. Results from a behavioural experiment in Papua New Guinea fit exactly this pattern. They thus suggest neither an evolutionary history of repeated interactions without group competition nor a history of group competition without repeated interactions. Instead, our results suggest social motives that evolved under the joint influence of both mechanisms.
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Rising inequality has brought redistribution back on the political agenda. In theory, inequality aversion drives people’s support for redistribution. People can dislike both advantageous inequality (comparison relative to those worse off) and disadvantageous inequality (comparison relative to those better off). Existing experimental evidence reveals substantial variation across people in these preferences. However, evidence is scarce on the broader role of these two distinct forms of inequality aversion for redistribution in society. We provide evidence by exploiting a unique combination of data. We use an incentivized experiment to measure inequality aversion in a large population sample (≈9,000 among 20- to 64-y-old Danes). We link the elicited inequality aversion to survey information on individuals’ support for public redistribution (policies that reduce income differences) and administrative records revealing their private redistribution (real-life donations to charity). In addition, the link to administrative data enables us to include a large battery of controls in the empirical analysis. Theory predicts that support for public redistribution increases with both types of inequality aversion, while private redistribution should increase with advantageous inequality aversion, but decrease with disadvantageous inequality aversion. A strong dislike for disadvantageous inequality makes people willing to sacrifice own income to reduce the income of people who are better off, thereby reducing the distance to people with more income than themselves. Public redistribution schemes achieve this but private donations to charity do not. Our empirical results provide strong support for these predictions and with quantitatively large effects compared to other predictors.
Ambiguous prospects are ubiquitous in social and economic life, but the psychological foundations of behavior under ambiguity are still not well understood. One of the most robust empirical regularities is the strong correlation between attitudes towards ambiguity and compound risk which suggests that compound risk aversion may provide a psychological foundation for ambiguity aversion. However, compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion may also be independent psychological phenomena, but what would then explain their strong correlation? We tackle these questions by training a treatment group's ability to reduce compound to simple risks, and analyzing how this affects their compound risk and ambiguity attitudes in comparison to a control group who is taught something unrelated to reducing compound risk. We find that aversion to compound risk disappears almost entirely in the treatment group, while the aversion towards both artificial and natural sources of ambiguity remain high and are basically unaffected by the teaching of how to reduce compound lotteries. Moreover, similar to previous studies, we observe a strong correlation between compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion, but this correlation only exists in the control group while in the treatment group it is rather low and insignificant. These findings suggest that ambiguity attitudes are not a psychological relative, and derived from, attitudes towards compound risk, i.e., compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion do not share the same psychological foundations. While compound risk aversion is primarily driven by a form of bounded rationality – the inability to reduce compound lotteries – ambiguity aversion is unrelated to this inability, suggesting that ambiguity aversion may be a genuine preference in its own right.
Research on the personality of creative scientists is revisited using the Neo-Socioanalytic model of personality psychology as an organizing framework. Past research shows that creative scientists, largely from the 20th century, were distinguished by high levels of openness to experience, dominance, ambition, intelligence, and low levels of agreeableness. Contradictory findings for environmental influences highlighted the potential importance of both supportive and adverse diversifying experiences. Developmental trends also run contrary to the likelihood of scientific creativity occurring later in life, which is consistent with the life span models of creativity. Based on this review, we highlight much needed updating to the basic science of scientific creativity, including the need to test these findings in populations other than older white men, and the testing of both environmental experiences and individual differences simultaneously. An agenda for identifying and developing the 21st century creative scientist is provided.
Parsimony is a desirable feature of economic models but almost all human behaviors are characterized by vast individual variation that appears to defy parsimony. How much parsimony do we need to give up to capture the fundamental aspects of a population’s distributional preferences and to maintain high predictive ability? Using a Bayesian nonparametric clustering method that makes the trade-off between parsimony and descriptive accuracy explicit, we show that three preference types—an inequality averse, an altruistic and a predominantly selfish type—capture the essence of behavioral heterogeneity. These types independently emerge in four different data sets and are strikingly stable over time. They predict out-of-sample behaviour equally well as a model that permits all individuals to differ and substantially better than a representative agent model and a state-of-the-art machine learning algorithm. Thus, a parsimonious model with three stable types captures key characteristics of distributional preferences and has excellent predictive power.
The widespread use of markets leads to unprecedented material well-being in many societies. We study whether market interaction, as a side effect, erodes moral values. In an influential paper, Falk and Szech (2013) provide experimental data that seem to suggest that “market interaction erodes moral values.” Although we replicate their main treatment effect, we show that additional treatments are necessary to corroborate their conclusion. These treatments reveal that playing repeatedly, and not market interaction, causes the erosion of moral values. Our paper thus shows that neither Falk and Szech’s data nor our data support the claim that markets erode morals.
Understanding who commits crime and why is a key topic in social science and important for the design of crime prevention policy. In theory, people who commit crime face different social and economic incentives for criminal activity than other people, or they evaluate the costs and benefits of crime differently because they have different preferences. Empirical evidence on the role of preferences is scarce. Theoretically, risk-tolerant, impatient, and self-interested people are more prone to commit crime than risk-averse, patient, and altruistic people. We test these predictions with a unique combination of data where we use incentivized experiments to elicit the preferences of young men and link these experimental data to their criminal records. In addition, our data allow us to control extensively for other characteristics such as cognitive skills, socioeconomic background, and self-control problems. We find that preferences are strongly associated with actual criminal behavior. Impatience and, in particular, risk tolerance are still strong predictors when we include the full battery of controls. Crime propensities are 8 to 10 percentage points higher for the most risk-tolerant individuals compared to the most risk averse. This effect is half the size of the effect of cognitive skills, which is known to be a very strong predictor of criminal behavior. Looking into different types of crime, we find that preferences significantly predict property offenses, while self-control problems significantly predict violent, drug, and sexual offenses.
The potential benefits and mechanistic effects of working memory training (WMT) in children are the subject of much research and debate. We show that after five weeks of school-based, adaptive WMT 6-9 year-old primary school children had greater activity in prefrontal and striatal brain regions, higher task accuracy, and reduced intra-individual variability in response times compared to controls. Using a sequential sampling decision model, we demonstrate that this reduction in intra-individual variability can be explained by changes to the evidence accumulation rates and thresholds. Critically, intra-individual variability is useful in quantifying the immediate impact of cognitive training interventions, being a better predictor of academic skills and well-being 6-12 months after the end of training than task accuracy. Taken together, our results suggest that attention control is the initial mechanism that leads to the long-run benefits from adaptive WMT. Selective and sustained attention abilities may serve as a scaffold for subsequent changes in higher cognitive processes, academic skills, and general well-being. Furthermore, these results highlight that the selection of outcome measures and the timing of the assessments play a crucial role in detecting training efficacy. Thus, evaluating intra-individual variability, during or directly after training could allow for the early tailoring of training interventions in terms of duration or content to maximise their impact.
Children’s self-regulation abilities are key predictors of educational success and other life outcomes such as income and health. However, self-regulation is not a school subject, and knowledge about how to generate lasting improvements in self-regulation and academic achievements with easily scalable, low-cost interventions is still limited. Here we report the results of a randomized controlled field study that integrates a short self-regulation teaching unit based on the concept of mental contrasting with implementation intentions into the school curriculum of first graders. We demonstrate that the treatment increases children’s skills in terms of impulse control and self-regulation while also generating lasting improvements in academic skills such as reading and monitoring careless mistakes. Moreover, it has a substantial effect on children’s long-term school career by increasing the likelihood of enroling in an advanced secondary school track three years later. Thus, self-regulation teaching can be integrated into the regular school curriculum at low cost, is easily scalable, and can substantially improve important abilities and children’s educational career path. Schunk et al. report the results of a randomized controlled field study that integrates a short self-regulation teaching unit based on the concept of mental contrasting with implementation intentions into the school curriculum of first graders. The findings suggest positive effects of the treatment on impulse control and self-regulation as well as lasting improvements in academic skills.
Abstract We study the link between social preferences and a behaviorally validated measure of support for redistribution. We uncover three fundamentally distinct social preference types: predominantly selfish, inequality averse and altruistic individuals. Inequality averse and altruistic individuals display a much stronger support for redistribution, particularly if they are more affluent. Beliefs about the role of effort and luck for success play no role for selfish individuals but are highly relevant for other-regarding individuals. Finally, while inequality averse individuals display strong support for policies aimed at reducing the incomes of the rich, altruistic individuals are considerably less supportive of these policies.