Philosophy deals with ontological, epistemological and ethical problems, and the philosophy of a particular discipline or practice does this in connection with just this discipline or practice. The three themes mentioned are not unconnected. In the case of medicine, for example, when a physicalist ontology is leading, the concept of 'suffering' would become irrelevant, while human beings would be nothing but complex physio-chemical systems. If so, then this has unavoidable implications for what could be considered as responsible action, which points to ethics. Something analogous would apply to management and organization too. If a company, for instance, is regarded as no more then a money-making machine, then this gives expression to a particular ontology. As such, this view limits where to look at when a business' performance is viewed in terms of relevant ethical criteria.

Organizations are sometimes said to be overly rational, and it is argued that more attention should be given to the soft side, including feelings and emotions. In the same vain it is said that creativity and rationality do not match. On the other hand however, one can trace the idea of organizations being less rational than supposed. This paper explores the view that ‘excess of ...’ can only be evaluated on the basis of a nuanced view of rationality and an adequate insight into the relationship of rationality, emotions/feeling and creativity. A philosophical perspective is helpful in this. It will be argued that various forms of rationality are to be distinguished.

Organizations are sometimes said to be overly rational, and it is argued that more attention should be given to the soft side, including feelings and emotions. In the same vain it is said that creativity and rationality do not match. On the other hand however, one can trace the idea of organizations being less rational than supposed. This paper explores the view that 'excess of ...' can only be evaluated on the basis of a nuanced view of rationality and an adequate insight into the relationship of rationality, emotions/feeling and creativity. A philosophical perspective is helpful in this. It will be argued that various forms of rationality are to be distinguished.

Although Taylor’s scientific management is often severely criticised, his publications are seldom the subject of scrutinised, philosophical, reading. The latter is the aim of the present text. Attention is given to the idea of science, the role of extra-scientific values, the relationship of theory and practice, the societal meaning of management, presenting demarcations, presuppositions and unclarities. The conclusion notes several topics, implied by Taylor’s views and still worth reflecting upon. One example is efficiency as a seemingly context-independent concept.

Horkheimer’s critical view of the customer in Western society concentrates on the threatening influence of instrumental reason, a particular field he mentions being marketing. According to him the real autonomy of the customer, the customer as king, has evaporated. Discusses the relevance of this view today, particularly in connection with such recent developments as customization and relationship marketing. In order to come to a better understanding of the subject, some milestones of the history and philosophy of trade are explored, as well as some aspects of the history of marketing. The main conclusion is that, at the moment, Horkheimer’s approach can function as a critical heuristic, but not as a fully adequate diagnosis.

Nowadays creativity is fashionable. Writers on management and organisation, for example, mention creativity as vital to entrepreneurship. 1 They consider it to be as important as land, labour and capital, which form the traditional factors of production. 2 And related terms such as ‘genius’ are in use again. An example of this is the widely read book Built to Last. 3 Moreover, creativity and rationality are presented as alternatives. To be creative, managers are urged to put rationality aside: ‘being reasonable does not win the day’ they are assured4 and ‘all progress depends on the unreasonable man’. 5 This view that rationality and creativity oppose each other is, however, unsatisfactory involving, as it does, a form of epistemological schizophrenia. One excludes the other only if we adopt a simplistic concept of rationality and an esoteric view of creativity. This article, therefore, sets out to clarify the relationship between the concepts of creativity and rationality. Three ideal-type concepts of rationality will be introduced (algorithmic, judgemental, reflective) and their tolerance of novelty discussed. Then two modes of creativity (explorative and transcendentive) are distinguished, followed by a discussion of whether rationality can enhance creativity. I conclude by reviewing some factors involved in creativity, such as tolerance for ambiguity, playfulness and attentiveness, and with a short discussion of the relationship of creativity to power. 6

This article asks in what sense phenomenology could contribute to reflection as part of organizational practice. It discusses Berger and Luckmann’s view of the role of language in reality construction and, in reaction, argues that Husserl’s method of phenomenological clarification is helpful in order to find proper, valid concepts for dealing with practical organizational affairs. The value of clarification is illustrated by the case of the ‘patient as customer’ and by discussing Schön’s idea of the reflective practitioner. Our cultural situation is rather complicated. One of its aspects is the uncertainty created by socio-economic developments such as globalization and the rise of Asian economic power. Other features, however, are more philosophical. On the one hand, we see high expectations concerning technology, based on the (sometimes implicit/unreflective) philosophical view that science is the only legitimate and useful mode of knowledge we have (often called ‘positivism’, and the view of what science is about: ‘functionalism’). On the other hand, we can also see criticisms of technocracy, of the analytic rationality of control, founded upon a denial of functionalistic/positivistic views of knowledge. The postmodern variants of these criticisms, in particular, aim to liberate spontaneity, creativity, the use of metaphors, narratives, etc. The criticisms just mentioned also touch upon the scientific approaches towards management and organization. A quite recent fruit of these criticisms is the guru approach to management and organization, which waives analytical rationality and favours the role of narratives and performance rather than argument (Huczynski, 1993; among the examples mentioned are Peters and Goldratt).1 However, we might wonder whether the attractiveness of the guru does not take us from the frying pan into the fire. Is it not the case that one unjustified belief, i.e. in the potential of science and of analytical approaches, is exchanged for another? This might be because management gurus have a bewitching influence on the mind, on cognitions, attitudes, emotions and feelings (Clark and Salaman, 1996). We then run the risk that one fascination is succeeded by another, which means that unreflectivManagement Learning Copyright © 1999 Sage Publications London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi Vol. 30(4): 473–485 1350–5076[199912]30:4; 473–485; 010653 ity persists. If managers had a marginal role in society this need not worry us much; however, they assert themselves in many different areas of society; in business, education, art, medicine, law, etc.2 The philosopher Immanuel Kant would probably turn in his grave at the way a self-imposed tutelage (‘selbstverschuldigten Unmündigkeit’) is maintained. From what has been said so far, one might conclude that philosophy has influenced our present cultural situation in a way that is less than wholly positive, because of its unhealthy consequences. However, in analogy to a basic principle of homoeopathic medicine one might also wonder whether philosophy might be helpful in healing, while at the same time giving due credit to the criticisms mentioned above. In other words, the question is whether philosophy could contribute to a more reflective management,3 counterbalancing mental captivity and thereby giving a new actuality to Donald Schön’s idea of the reflective practitioner. Some time ago, I discussed the question of the reflective value of philosophy for management and organization with an American consultant. He suggested, surprisingly but without going into details, that every manager should be a phenomenologist. This sounds interesting because phenomenology basically is driven by the intention to clarify and really understand what is at issue; it rejects all kinds of cognitive bewitchment, including that involved in the unjustified belief in and use of scientific rationality. Keeping this in mind, I want to examine in what sense a reflective management practice could benefit from phenomenology.4 My main point will be that phenomenological clarification is of value in connection with central concepts of the languages used in dealing with practical and management affairs.5 I will start my argument with a short discussion of the phenomenologically inspired view of Berger and Luckmann concerning the role of language. Next, I will explain Husserl’s notion of clarification and illustrate it by means of an example. The article ends with a discussion of Donald Schön’s reflective practitioner. Change and Validity of Language Social scientists and organization theorists in the English-speaking world know about phenomenology mostly from the works of Schutz, Berger and Luckmann. Berger and Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality (first published in 1966), a study in the sociology of knowledge largely inspired by Schütz (1960), is widely read. The authors take a number of phenomenological specialities, such as the intentionality of consciousness and the concept of the ‘life-world’ as a starting point. A central focus in their work, however, is the empirical question of how ‘subjective meanings become objective facticities’(Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 25, 30). In other words, what they want to reveal is how that which we take to be reality is constructed. They employ concepts such as ‘habitualization’, ‘institutionalization’, ‘typification’, ‘symbolic universe’, and ‘definition of reality’. An important issue is how certain (more subjective) definitions of reality obtain objective status and concomitant legitimization. In connection with this issue, Berger and Luckmann mention the role of power. Yet, they consider conversation to be the ‘most important vehicle of realitymaintenance’ (Berger and Luckmann, 1991: 172; Berger, 1977: 7). This latter view, in particular, places language, in its actual contribution to the construction of reality, at the centre of attention (Luckmann, 1983: 88).6 I agree with Berger and Luckmann 474 Management Learning 30(4)

This chapter begins by addressing questions about the meaning of life from the perspectives of both philosophy and psychiatry. The section on philosophy discusses objectivist and subjectivist positions on the question of meaning in life, and proposes an integrative approach that draws on the strengths of each. The section on psychiatry describes parallel debates in the clinic, and considers the question of whether psychotherapy should be aiming to facilitate a meaningful life. The view is put forward that we need to be wary of self-focused navel-gazing; meaning and purpose are found in engaging with the world, and we learn most about ourselves when we do this. Work in cognitive-affective neuroscience is then used to shed light on these philosophical and psychiatric debates. Finally, work on a range of relevant issues is discussed: free will and willpower, what it means to ‘find oneself’, the issue of individual differences in meaning-making; the concepts of truth, beauty, and goodness, and the nature of spirituality and generativity, so exemplifying and expanding the positions put forward here.