The relevance of Freud's ideas for the 21(st) Century had been discussed (Reppen, 2006). Although most of the contributors to that compendium believed that they were, I suggest that a 'yes' or 'no' answer is not possible with regard to the corpus of Freud's ideas as a whole; each idea has to be evaluated separately. Freud's theorizing is built on two different bases: a psychological and a biological one. Not only do these eventuate in two different kinds of formulations throughout this theory, but sometimes even with regard to the same construct at different times in his writing. As a consequence, the assessment of the relevance of Freud's ideas for the 21(st) Century must be made construct by construct. A sampling of Freud's ideas about motivation, psychopathology and treatment were examined as to their contemporary relevance.

Freud's first formulation about the structure of the mind was a tripartite theory of awareness-conscious, preconscious and unconscious-referred to as "the system unconscious." Fayek (2005) addresses the fate of this construct, pointing out that it is no longer used as Freud construed it. Fayek gives reasons for this eventuality: assertions I question. I offer an alternative explanation.

Lettieri (2005) maintained that a modem conflict theory needs a concept of an ego. This commentary is in response to that suggestion. Because the construct of the ego has been seriously criticized in the psychoanalytic literature, such a suggestion must first address the tenability of the criticisms before such a recommendation can be actualized. In this response to Lettieri's paper, I try to do just that.

The author replies to J. Mills's (2004) comment on his article "Triebe and Their Vicissitudes: Freud's Theory of Motivation Reconsidered" (G. Frank, 2003).

Although Freud's concept of instinct (as in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes"; 1915/1964b) seems outmoded and has been found to have many conceptual faults, it can still be found in contemporary overviews of what are considered to be significant psychoanalytic constructs (e.g., Psychoanalysis: The Major Concepts; B. E. Moore & B. D. Fine, 1995). The purpose of this essay was twofold: to make the argument that the term instinct (or drive) should be expunged from any psychoanalyst's lexicon and to introduce a new paradigm, in terms of both form (the multidimensionality of that which can explain the behavior of humans) and content (needs, affects, beliefs, etc.) instead of instincts.

Freud's concept of the superego was reviewed, and its meaningfulness and heuristic value were assessed. Because of conceptual problems, the recommendation is made to no longer use the term the superego and refer rather to the processes involved.

Psychoanalytic treatment entails an intense exploration of one's beliefs about self and other as these are played out with significant others in one's life, including the therapist. This exploration requires that a person be capable of such intensive and extensive self-exploration. Ordinarily, this assessment is made by the clinician on the basis of interview. However, an interview does not match the emotional rigors of an actual psychoanalytic experience and, hence, can miss the detection of latent and subtle ego defects that can potentially have a deleterious effect on the patient and the analysis. The analysis of a person's response to the Rorschach blots can be a helpful adjunct in this assessment.

I maintain that the proponents of the relational school of psychoanalysis underestimate the role of interpersonal relations in Freud's theory and in contemporary Freudian theory, thereby overestimating the nature of their contribution to psychoanalytic theory. This polarization only contributes to the fragmentation in psychoanalytic theory today.

A problematic issue in the intersubjective approach is the intersubjectivists' concept of reality. They seem to imply that the reality of the patient-analyst interaction is that which is created by them in the moment. The basis for a transference interpretation thereby seems unclear.

The author examines the search for the common ground of the psychoanalytic process.

Freud's drive theory has been proven to be an untenable model from which to generate ideas about personality, psychopathology, or treatment. Various alternative constructs have been proffered as meaningful replacements for the concept of drive as the central organizer of personality and behavior (e.g., wishes, affects, and schema). Of all the constructs recommended as replacements for drive, the construct of belief encapsulates wishes, affects, and meaning. The construct of belief is discussed as organizing and giving meaning to past experience, current experience, and future expectations. The construct of belief is analyzed from a developmental, dynamic, and structural point of view, and the heuristic value of the construct of belief for psychoanalysis is highlighted.

This presentation is an extension and amplification of the ego-psychological assessment of Rorschach data initiated in 1946 by Rapaport, Gill, and Schafer whose focus was on the quality of the perception of reality and the assessment of defence. A more contemporary view of ego psychology not only includes an expanded view of defence but also of the nature of self- and object representations and the nature of object relations. An assessment of the synthesizing function of the ego was also discussed. The present purpose was to present a comprehensive assessment of Rorschach data from the point of view of contemporary ego psychology.

Comments clarify the intent of the 1994 paper and confirm that aggressive behavior must be predicted from a larger base than Rorschach data alone.

The last extensive and comprehensive reviews of research on whether the Rorschach can be used to predict suicide were done in the 1970s. All of these reviews concluded that there was not much support for this assumption; however, all of the reviewers pointed to methodological issues which might have obscured or diluted that relationship. Little research has been done in this area of study since the 1970s and that which has been done did not address the methodological issues to which reviewers point. The present paper, then, is less a review of new research since the last reviews and more an opportunity to remind investigators of the research which still needs to be done before a final assessment can be made as to whether the Rorschach can be useful in the detection of suicidal potential.

(1992). On the Use of the Rorschach in the Study of PSTD. Journal of Personality Assessment: Vol. 59, No. 3, pp. 641-643.

Studies exploring the performance of African Americans on the Rorschach were reviewed. The review revealed the limited number of studies done in this area of study, as well as the fact that the research paradigm for all of this research has been limited to comparing the Rorschach performance of African Americans to that of Whites. However, no one has offered a rationale for such a research paradigm. Without a scientific reason to expect personality to be a function of race, another research design was recommended, one that explores the effect of a variety of aspects of living conditions on the development of the personality of African Americans.

A review of research on the use of the Rorschach in the assessment of cerebral dysfunction indicated that the Rorschachs of patients with cerebral dysfunction do not manifest any characteristic response in terms of percentages, ratios, or any unique response to any one of the stimulus determinants of the blots (color, shading, the stimulus for movement). The patient with cerebral dysfunction does manifest a unique style of thinking; responses tend to be concrete, perseverative, and stereotypic. This finding is similar to that found with schizophrenics where research, summarized by Frank in 1990, also indicated no uniquely 'objective' response style but reflected a unique cognitive style. These two reviews taken together suggest that the better way to use Rorschach data in clinical work is as an opportunity to assess patients' thinking as opposed to the Rorschach being used as a psychometric device, yielding 'numbers.'

Dissatisfaction with the psychiatric system of classification of psychopathology has existed for decades. The many revisions have not rectified the many problems. An entirely different paradigm for the description and classification of psychopathology seemed necessary. Based on research, a proposal for a psychological system of classification of psychopathology is offered, one based on disorder in cognitive, emotional, and social functioning. A program of research to test the validity and heuristic value of this system is discussed.

Research on the use of the Rorschach in the diagnosis of schizophrenia is reviewed. The analysis of this research (from that done by Rorschach to the most recent) indicates that schizophrenics do not respond in any unique fashion to any particular determinant or any particular card. The research also indicates that the computation of percentages and ratios, no matter how complex, does not facilitate the identification of a schizophrenic process. What the research does demonstrate is that schizophrenia, in its overt as well as latent and borderline forms, is detectable on the Rorschach through an analysis of the patient's thinking. The thinking of the schizophrenic reveals highly personal, illogical, and bizarre associations to the blots. This analysis of thinking is not accomplished through assessment of the formal properties of the blots, e.g., the analysis of response to color, movement, shading, the color-to-movement ratio, or form level (low form level proves to be a function of psychoticism, not schizophrenia, per se) but more in terms of the phenomenology of the responses.