Migration profoundly transforms the material, social and cultural environments of migrants, which creates psychological demands that are often experienced as challenges or threats. At the same time, migration changes the receiving context, which can generate psychological demands for local residents. Consequently, perceptions of and responses to immigration-related demands critically depend on the other group’s responses. In this Review, we consider the interplay between migrants’ and local residents’ responses to migration from a psychological perspective. We first review psychological factors and processes underlying emigration, with a focus on decision processes. Once migrants have arrived in a receiving society, both migrant and local resident groups face immigration-related demands. Corresponding need threats for migrants are exacerbated by the (perceived) forced nature of migration. We review research on migrants’ and local residents’ psychological responses to these immigration-related demands, including local residents’ helping responses, and consider the extended intergroup dynamics of such responses in acculturation. We conclude by identifying directions for future research. Migration transforms migrants’ material, social, and cultural environments. Migration also changes the receiving context, which affects local residents. In this Review, Echterhoff et al. consider the interplay between migrants’ and local residents’ responses to migration and the influence of the perceived forced nature of migration.

Experiences of migration can elicit various emotions, including feelings of regret about leaving their country of origin. Building on theorizing about distinct features of refugeehood, we examined whether and how migration perils (hardship encountered before and during migration) and perceived forcedness influence regret among Arabic-speaking refugees (N = 388). To illuminate underlying psychological processes, we assessed counterfactual thinking (CFT). We found that regret was negatively associated with forcedness and with perils (before and during migration) but positively with post-arrival stressors. Downward CFT (things could have been worse if not having left one’s country) was positively associated with migration perils and perceived forcedness but negatively with regret. Upward CFT (things could have been better), which increased with higher post-arrival stressors, was positively associated with regret. A moderated mediation analysis indicated that perceived forcedness attenuated the effect of perils on downward CFT and the indirect effect of perils via downward CFT on regret. This finding may indicate that, after arrival in the receiving society and under lower perceived forcedness, regret is reduced to the extent that past experiences of perils are justified through downward CFT; under high forcedness, however, these processes are triggered to a lesser extent. Our study offers insights into the cognitive-emotional processes underlying refugees’ responses to migration, while highlighting the role of ongoing stressors in post-migration adjustment.

A scarcely studied route to shared reality is the social verification of one's impressions, a process that should promote impression consolidation. We tested this prediction across four experiments (N = 1342) using a hiringdecision paradigm. Participants evaluated pairs of similarly qualified applicants based on brief descriptions and portrait photos, made hiring decisions alongside a fictitious partner, and received either verification or no verification of their choices. Impression consolidation was assessed via subsequent speeded trait attributions. We expected stronger consolidation following verification, reflected in greater evaluative choice-consistency (i.e., attributing more positive traits to chosen than unchosen applicants), indexed by signal detection theory's discriminability, as well as increased accessibility (response latencies). Participants also reported experienced shared reality with the partner. Across studies, social verification reliably increased experienced shared reality and choice-consistent discriminability. Accessibility effects, in contrast, were inconsistent and contextdependent. Experiment 3 showed that verification enhanced choice-consistent discriminability only for recruitment-relevant traits. Experiment 4 showed no trait-specific consolidation for explicit, implied, or unrelated profile traits beyond evaluative choice-consistency. Moreover, across studies, experienced shared reality was positively associated with choice-consistent discriminability, but not with accessibility. Together, these findings indicate that social verification selectively consolidates impressions by stabilizing their evaluative structure-particularly on relevant domains-rather than by uniformly enhancing accessibility. Therefore, our results showed that even brief verification from an unfamiliar partner can strengthen shared reality and reinforce impressions primarily through increased evaluative consistency. Implications for impression formation and motivated cognition are discussed.

Memory is shaped not only by the information itself but also by its social relevance. The present study investigated whether, in the absence of misleading information, social relevance can increase false memory by altering encoding processes, and whether this effect depends on sensory modality. Using a social DRM paradigm combined with fNIRS, we manipulated item relevance (self-relevant, partner-relevant, irrelevant) and encoding modality (visual, auditory). Behavioral results showed that partner-relevant items elicited more false memories than irrelevant items, indicating that social relevance alone is sufficient to enhance false memory; moreover, this effect was stronger under auditory than visual encoding. Neural findings revealed that socially relevant items recruited the frontal, temporal, and temporoparietal regions during encoding, suggesting that social relevance may trigger a spontaneous monitoring process. Further analyses indicated that frontal and temporal activity predicted subsequent false memory, whereas temporoparietal activity reflected social orienting rather than directly predicting memory distortion. These results suggest that false memory may arise not only from external misinformation but also from encoding biases triggered by social cues. Overall, this study provides new evidence for understanding how social contexts influence false memory and suggests that social relevance may shape subsequent memory performance by modulating attentional allocation and encoding processes.

Many models of radicalization have been developed in recent decades. However, these usually lack coverage and empirical verification of the multiple factors shaping radicalization pathways on the one hand, and differentiation between ideologies on the other. This study aimed to address these gaps. We coded 370 radicalization cases from the German domestic intelligence service and international online sources across multiple variables. To map the temporal course of radicalization, we examined both individuals in midprocess and those with largely completed radicalization. Based on this, pathway models for religiously motivated, rightwing and leftwing radicalization were developed. Results suggest that radicalization can be basically understood as a mix of need-oriented, group-related, and disinhibitory processes. All of these process clusters are observable at different stages of radicalization. However, their relevance appears to shift sequentially as radicalization advances, with disinhibitory processes playing a particularly inciting role in later stages. Notably, both religiously motivated and right-wing radicalization share the same process clusters, though configured differently. In contrast, left-wing radicalization differs substantially in individual profiles, and is characterized by a relative absence of disinhibitory processes. Overall, the study provides a conceptual framework that can inform future research as well as the detection, prevention, and intervention of radicalization.

Co-attention has been shown to enhance memory. Although this effect has been replicated in different social contexts, its minimal conditions remain unclear. Features of previous experiments have been conducive to collaboration, such as participants completing complementary tasks or experiencing a minimal ingroup manipulation. Consequently, it remains unknown whether co-attention effects on memory reflect a fundamental motivation to represent the mental states of those around us, or whether they are limited to coordination contexts. The proposed studies will test whether mere passive co-attention with a stranger is sufficient to enhance memory. We plan two experiments to: (1) conceptually replicate Shteynberg’s (2010; JPSP) finding that seeing the same (versus different) stimuli alongside an in-group member enhances memory, and (2) test whether mere co-attention enhances memory, absent the group manipulation.

Episodic memories can be shaped by various contextual factors. While social and sensory cues such as odors and music have been shown to influence encoding and retrieval, the role of tactile information remains unclear. In this preregistered study, we investigated the effects of affective touch on face memory. 57 healthy adults (40 women) completed the Cambridge Face Memory Tests and the Social Touch Questionnaire to assess general face recognition ability and attitudes toward social touch. During encoding, participants viewed neutral faces while receiving either static, dynamic, or no touch from a hidden experimenter and rated each face’s attractiveness and trustworthiness. Recognition was tested two days later. Outcome measures included recognition accuracy, metacognitive sensitivity (i.e., the ability of confidence ratings to distinguish between correct and incorrect responses), and judgments of attractiveness and trustworthiness. No significant differences emerged between touch conditions, and neither face recognition ability nor attitudes toward touch moderated these effects. Bayesian analyses provided moderate to strong evidence for the absence of touch effects on recognition accuracy and confidence ratings, whereas evidence regarding metacognitive sensitivity and trustworthiness evaluations was inconclusive. Overall, the findings suggest that brief social touch in a controlled laboratory context has limited measurable effects on face memory, and that richer social context may be required for touch to influence memory processes.

We tested whether residents of Germany are more willing to help refugees from Ukraine compared to Syria and examined underlying psychological factors (perceptions of similarity, intergroup threat and the association with Islam). Across three experiments (total N = 3,119), a significant pro-Ukrainian preference emerged: Ukrainian refugees (vs. Syrian refugees) were perceived as less threatening (both realistically and symbolically), elicited less safety threat and were seen as more similar. Study 1 (N = 991) showed that perceptions of threat and similarity mediated the impact of refugees' nationality on helping intentions. Study 2 (N = 938) further demonstrated that perceptions of Syrian refugees as predominantly Muslim contributed to heightened perceptions of threat, which was associated with reduced helping intentions. In Study 3 (N = 1,190), we employed vignettes to manipulate refugees' nationality (Ukrainian/Syrian) and religion (Muslim/Christian). Participants perceived Ukrainian refugees portrayed as Christian (vs. Muslim) as more similar to themselves and less threatening and were more willing to help them. There was no effect of religion on helping behaviour, threat and similarity perceptions for Syrian refugees. The implications of these findings are discussed. Comprobamos si una muestra de residentes en Alemania se muestra m & aacute;s tendente a ayudar a refugiados ucranianos que a refugiados sirios y analizamos los factores que subyacen tras esa preferencia (percepciones de semejanza, amenaza intergrupal y los v & iacute;nculos con el Islam). En tres experimentos (total N = 3,119) se comprueba una preferencia pro-ucraniana significativa: Los refugiados ucranianos (frente a los sirios) eran percibidos como una amenaza mucho menor (tanto realista como simb & oacute;lica), suscitaban un nivel menor de amenaza a la seguridad y se consideraban m & aacute;s semejantes a la poblaci & oacute;n alemana. El Estudio 1 (N = 991) revela que la percepci & oacute;n de amenaza y de semejanza mediaban el impacto de la nacionalidad de los refugiados en la intenci & oacute;n de ayuda. El Estudio 2 (N = 938) demuestra que la percepci & oacute;n de los refugiados sirios como predominantemente musulmanes contribuy & oacute; a una percepci & oacute;n m & aacute;s elevada de amenaza, vinculada a una menor intenci & oacute;n de ayuda. En el Estudio 3 (N = 1,190) hicimos uso de textos breves para manipular la nacionalidad de los refugiados (ucranios/sirios) y su religi & oacute;n (musulmanes/cristianos). Los participantes percibieron a los refugiados ucranianos presentados como cristianos (frente a los musulmanes) como m & aacute;s semejantes a ellos y suscitaron menor nivel de amenaza, por lo que se mostraron m & aacute;s dispuestos a prestarles ayuda. No se observ & oacute; un efecto de la religi & oacute;n en la intenci & oacute;n de ayuda, nivel de amenaza y percepci & oacute;n de semejanza respecto a los refugiados sirios. Se discuten las implicaciones de estos resultados.

In the context of growing international migration, it is crucial to understand factors that might alleviate or amplify threat perceptions by outgroups. Hereby, the role of subjective societal status (SSS), religiosity, Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) are not fully understood. In a large online survey ( N = 1257), we investigated the joint and interactive effects of RWA, SDO, SSS, and religiosity on German residents’ threat perceptions by Middle Eastern immigrants. Higher RWA and SDO, and lower SSS, predicted both symbolic and realistic threat, even after controlling for income, education, age, and gender. Furthermore, higher SSS buffered the effect of RWA and SDO for realistic threat, while religiosity was not related to threat perceptions and did not moderate RWA or SDO threat associations. We discuss methodological limitations and implications of our findings for the understanding of societal conflict.

Human memory is susceptible to various biases, often resulting from social interaction and communication. One example is the "saying-is-believing" (SIB) effect, where a communicator's memory is evaluatively biased by the previous tuning of messages about a target towards their audience's attitude, an effect explained by the communicator's shared reality creation with the audience. According to previous theorising (Echterhoff & Higgins, 2017), the communicators' initial, audience-independent judgments of a target are also likely to affect the evaluative tone of their subsequent memory. We investigated, for the first time, the role of the communicator's own judgment (OJ) as a possible moderator of the audience-congruent memory bias. Across three studies (total N = 1,070 participants), participants' OJs shaped the evaluative tone of their memory. However, there was no evidence that the audience-congruent recall bias depended on whether participants had initially formed a neutral or a valenced (positive or negative) own judgment of a target person. Hence, the audience-congruent memory bias persisted regardless of communicators' own initial judgments. We discuss implications for the study of memory and social influence. The findings are relevant for everyday life, given that people often talk about topics about which they have already formed their own judgment.

Subtle (vs. blatant) expressions of prejudice (EoPs) have been proposed to be detrimental and distressing partly because they are more ambiguous and socially accepted. Ambiguity might increase targets’ rumination and barriers of confronting EoPs. To test these assumptions, we developed a novel stimulus set (n = 130) based on a large literature base, including subtle and blatant EoPs. Muslim participants in Germany (N = 417) perceived subtle (vs. blatant) expressions of prejudice as more ambiguous, less discriminatory, and less distressing – with discrimination and distress ratings still above the scale midpoint. They reported to encounter subtle EoPs slightly more frequently and confronting them less. Contrary to common assumptions, participants expected to ruminate less about the discriminatory nature of subtle (vs. blatant) EoPs. We discuss conceptual and methodological reasons for these mixed findings. Further, we explored potential moderator effects, with a specific focus on gender. Together, these results suggest that even subtle EoPs impact well-being, while also highlighting the continued need for psychological research to address the consequences of blatant expressions of anti-Muslim prejudice.

Many experiments in psychology involve deceiving participants about aspects of the study. Researchers who employ deception sometimes administer post-experiment suspicion probes and exclude participants from analysis if their responses indicate that they were not successfully deceived. However, several studies have found that their suspicious participants behave as if they were deceived as intended. One explanation is that participants infer that they were deceived upon being presented with a suspicion probe, which biases them to overreport being suspicious. We tested whether post-experiment beliefs about deception can indeed induce such biases by manipulating whether we admitted to using deception before administering suspicion probes. Admitting to deception did not increase the amount of suspicion reported (Experiment 1), nor did the content of participants’ suspicions reflect the content of our admission (Experiment 2). Results suggest that it is unlikely that suspicion probes ‘tip off’ participants in a way that causes them to overreport suspicion.

IntroductionExtant research has studied prejudice expressions mainly from the majority perspective. We examined whether prejudice expressions conceptualized as subtle (vs. blatant) are perceived differently by their targets.MethodsParticipants who self-identified as potential targets of ethno-racial or religious prejudice (e.g., anti-Muslim, anti-Asian, anti-Arab, anti-Slavic, and anti-Black prejudice), answered questions about verbal expressions of prejudice taken from the subtle and blatant prejudice scales in an online survey.ResultsItems of the subtle (vs. blatant) prejudice scale were rated as more socially accepted and less discriminatory, elicited less negative emotions, and were reported to be experienced more often. Subtle expressions of prejudice were not more familiar to participants than blatant ones. Remarkably, blatant prejudice expressions were also perceived as relatively socially accepted and subtle prejudices as relatively discriminatory, as indicated by mean ratings above the scale midpoint. Lower discrimination ratings of subtle (vs. blatant) prejudice expressions were mainly due to perceptions of expressions exaggerating cultural differences. Exploratory analyses indicate that participants who reported more (vs. less) frequent overall exposure to the prejudice expressions perceived subtle and blatant stimuli as similarly discriminatory. This finding is compatible with the idea that individuals factor their personal experiences with prejudice into their assessments of discrimination.DiscussionWe discuss implications for interventions, especially regarding the social acceptability of blatant prejudice and promoting awareness of the discriminatory impact of subtle prejudice.

Shared reality—the experience of sharing common inner states (e.g. feelings, beliefs) with other people about a given topic or target—is a ubiquitous human experience. With research on the construct of shared reality burgeoning in various domains, we examined a fundamental, yet understudied topic: the role of experiencing shared reality about a target in real‐time conversations and real‐world contexts. Across five studies conducted in various contexts (total N = 973), we developed a measure of target‐specific shared reality (SR‐T) and examined its role in interpersonal interactions and protective health behaviours. In our initial Studies (1a‐2), we developed a measure of SR‐T and establish psychometric, construct and criterion validity. In Study 3, we established predictive validity by investigating the link between SR‐T and important interpersonal interaction constructs (e.g. interpersonal rapport and epistemic trust in the partner). In Study 4 (preregistered), SR‐T moderated the effect of close others’ attitudes on vaccination and precautionary behaviours against COVID‐19 during the Omicron‐variant peak (2022). Our findings suggest that the experience of SR‐T, assessed with a valid measure, is linked to important dimensions of interpersonal interactions and health decisions in the real world.

After communicators have tuned a message about a target person’s behaviors to their audience’s attitude, their recall of the target’s behaviors is often evaluatively consistent with their audience’s attitude. This audience-tuning effect on recall has been explained as resulting from the communicators’ creation of a shared reality with the audience, which helps communicators to achieve epistemic needs for confident judgments and knowledge. Drawing on the ROAR (Relevance Of A Representation) model, we argue that shared reality increases the cognitive accessibility of information consistent (vs. inconsistent) with the audience’s attitude, due to enhanced truth relevance of this information. We tested this prediction with a novel reaction-time task in three experiments employing the saying-is-believing paradigm. Faster reactions to audience-consistent (vs. audience-inconsistent) information were found for trait information but not for behavioral information. Thus, audience-congruent accessibility bias emerged at the level at which impressions and judgments of other persons are typically organized. Consistent with a shared-reality account, the audience-consistent accessibility bias was correlated with perceived shared reality about the target person and with epistemic trust in the audience. Among possible explanations, the findings are best reconciled with the view that the creation of shared reality with an audience triggers basic and "automatic" (spontaneous, low-level) cognitive mechanisms that facilitate the retrieval of audience-congruent (vs. audience-incongruent) trait information about a target person.

Migrants who flee their home country for economic (vs. political) reasons often elicit more negative responses in receiving countries. We examined psychological processes underlying this flight‐reason bias, focusing on majority residents’ perceptions of migration circumstances and their emotional responses. In three preregistered studies (total N = 1394), participants read texts about an individual refugee (Studies 1 and 2) or groups of refugees (Study 3) who fled because of economic versus political reasons. Overall, participants perceived migration as less forced in the economic‐flight reason condition. Economic (vs. political) flight reasons also elicited less willingness to accept refugees. Additional analyses suggest that the flight‐reason bias was driven by greater perceived control of refugees over emigration (for perceived forcedness), by lower empathy (for willingness to accept refugees) and by lower perceived pre‐migration perils (for both outcomes) in the economic‐flight reason conditions. We discuss implications for political and humanitarian issues surrounding refugee immigration and integration.

With phubbing (i.e., "The act of snubbing someone… by looking at your phone instead of paying attention") being a widespread phenomenon, a sound understanding of its emotional reverberations and consequences for interpersonal relationships is required. To the extent that phubbing is perceived as a momentary act of ostracism, it should influence both emotional and behavioral reactions. To address this issue empirically, we investigated effects of phubbing on variables previously shown to be affected by ostracism. Specifically, we examined in two studies how being phubbed affects participants' mood, satisfaction of fundamental needs, feelings of being ostracized (Study 1 and 2) and trust (Study 2). In Study 1, participants remembered a situation in which they were either phubbed, phubbed someone else or experienced an attentive conversation. In Study 2 different phubbing behaviors were manipulated during an ongoing conversation. Results from both studies suggest that phubbing triggers negative mood and feelings of ostracism, and threatens fundamental needs. Study 2 revealed that these effects were stronger when phubbing occurred three times (vs. once). Study 2 further demonstrated behavioral consequences of phubbing, namely that trust in a trust game was reduced when participants were phubbed three times (vs. once). We discuss conceptual and practical implications of smartphone use for emotion regulation and interpersonal relations.

Theory of mind research has traditionally focused on the ascription of mental states to a single individual. Here, we introduce a theory of collective mind: the ascription of a unified mental state to a group of agents with convergent experiences. Rather than differentiation between one's personal perspective and that of another agent, a theory of collective mind requires perspectival unification across agents. We review recent scholarship across the cognitive sciences concerning the conceptual foundations of collective mind representations and their empirical induction through the synchronous arrival of shared information. Research suggests that representations of a collective mind cause psychological amplification of co-attended stimuli, create relational bonds, and increase cooperation, among co-attendees.

We experimentally explored whether and how conversation dynamics would benefit collaborative remembering in intimate couples over time. To this end, we ran a study with a three-factor mixed design with relationship type (couples vs. strangers) and age (older adults vs. younger adults) as between-participants variables, and remembering condition (collaborative vs. individual) as a within-participants variable. Thirty pairs of intimate couples (fifteen long-term relationship older couples, fifteen short-term relationship younger couples) and thirty pairs of corresponding stranger-pairs (including older strangers and younger strangers) were compared with respect to recall accuracy and conversation dynamics, specifically considering the role of gender. Results revealed significant collaborative facilitation only in older couples. Also, females’ communication behaviors facilitated males’ collaborative remembering performance only in older (vs. younger) couples. In addition, a gender-specific pattern of shifts from the individual to collaborative context emerged only in older couple (vs. strangers). The findings are consistent with the notion that a longer experience of collaboration and more effective conversation dynamics allow older (vs. younger) couples to perform better at collaborative remembering. We discuss processes underlying the observed gender differences, and the social and motivational implications of collaborative remembering.