In her 1990 book, Andrea Nye famously called for the abolition of logic, citing feminist reasons. I offer a reinterpretation of her position in contemporary terms, as ‘tradition-rejection anti-exceptionalism’ about logic, i.e., a variant of logical anti-exceptionalism that puts into question the exceptional properties of logic, such as topic-neutrality and self-evidence. This move, I argue, makes Nye’s account more inviting. Further, I claim that most of Nye’s points are supported by insights from contemporary feminist research in metaphysics and epistemology. I thus propose that we adopt a feminist radical anti-exceptionalism about logic. Like Nye, we should direct our attention to the feminist critique of logic as a scientific/philosophical discipline, not just logic as a formal system. Tied to this, it is also important, I argue, that we don’t define feminist logic only in terms of “feminist topics”. Finally, I show that accounts of logic (mostly) in line with the proposed view can already be found in logical abductivist literature – so we needn’t abolish logic after all.

In this paper, I propose a logical model of mixed feelings. I claim that contrary emotions of desire, fear and indifference can be felt towards the same state of affairs and that this phenomenon can be modeled with the fuzzy logical hexagon. In the fuzzy logical hexagon, contrary notions are allowed to be true simultaneously, but with a special proviso: the sum of their values must be 100%. The same ratio, I claim, appears among the emotions of desire, fear and indifference when they are felt towards one and the same state of affairs. To calculate the percentage of an emotion in an 'emotional ratio', I propose an analysis of states in terms of their aspects, understood as relevant implications. For instance, a state can be both desired and feared if some of its relevant implications are desired and some feared. The present approach is in opposition to a non-realist stance in philosophy of affectivity about the possibility of simultaneous contrary emotions, where differentiation between aspects of a state is often used to explain away the possibility of mixed feelings. The proposed model also differs from some other graded formal approaches to desire and fear, which treat these two emotions separately, each according to its own logic. I claim that logic of desire and logic of fear is one and the same-that of the fuzzy logical hexagon.

I this paper, I discuss Plumwood's feminist logic program. I argue both in favor of her general stance in feminist philosophy of logic and her more specific feminist critique of classical logic. Plumwood's general position is in opposition with (I think it's safe to say) the prevailing view in analytic philosophy about the relation between formal logic and feminist theory, according to which feminist theory cannot say anything about or against logic proper, since the issues of oppression are external to logic as a (formal) discipline. Connected to this externalism is a non-Plumwoodian view that "feminist logic" either doesn't mean anything, or that it has some figurative meaning. Concerning Plumwood's (I think it's safe to say) not widely accepted feminist critique of classical logic, I propose an interpretation according to which classical logic is oppressive only when it's used to describe a particular, "dualized" or "dualizable", kind of notions. In accordance with this understanding, I consider five features of oppressive differentiations as proposed by Plumwood, arguing that two of them don't concern negation, the feminist critique of which operator Plumwood is mostly (in)famous for.

U radu razmatram filozofijsku poziciju Alberta Bazale, za koju predlažem obuhvatan naziv »umjereni iracionalizam«. Naime, nastojim pokazati kako je Bazala za »metalogički korijen filozofije« koristio različite izraze, pa se time nameću i nazivi različiti od »voluntarističkog aktivizma«, kako se običava nazivati stajalište tog filozofa. Isto tako, tvrdim da je njegov projekt primarno negativan, u smislu da mu je cilj prije svega pružiti otpor isključivo intelektualističkom poimanju svijesti i svijeta. Kako bih opravdao umjerenost Bazalina iracionalizma, upućujem na mjesta na kojim Bazala ističe ulogu i nužnost razuma i logike u filozofijskoj i znanstvenoj spoznaji. Pritom ipak naglašavam kako se za Bazalu u osnovi sveg duhovnog života nalaze izvanrazumski faktori, bez kojih čovjeku zapravo i nema autentične egzistencije. Bazalinu umjerenost u iracionalizmu potkrepljujem i usporedbom njegove filozofije s onom L. E. J. Brouwera, osnivača matematičkog intuicionizma. Tvrdim kako se Bazalino stajalište dade jasno distingvirati od Brouwerova, pri čem je potonji kudikamo radikalniji u svom otporu razumu. Cilj je rada doprinijeti blagonaklonijem poimanju iracionalizma i pokazati kako otpor intelektualnom ne mora nužno značiti sumanutost ili proizvoljnost, već naprotiv, da može predstavljati i koherentnu, ali i živu, životnu i životvornu poziciju, čega je primjer upravo Bazalina filozofija.

According to Brouwer's 'theory of the exodus of consciousness', our experience includes 'egoicity', a distinct kind of feeling. In this paper, we (i) describe his phenomenology in order to (ii) explore and elaborate on the notion of egoic sensations. In the world of perception formed from sensations, some of them are, Brouwer claims, not completely separated or 'estranged' from the subject, which is to say they have a certain degree of egoicity. We claim this phenomenon can be explained in terms of the primordial state of consciousness from where the 'exodus' starts. Having undertaken the analysis and interpretation of Brouwer's descriptions and examples of egoic sensations, we (iii) provide a formal account of egoicity based on Brouwer's definition of its relation to estrangement, desire and fear. We show that the four terms can be modeled by a classical and a graded logical hexagon, giving the corresponding axiomatizations.

The aim of this work is to place Brouwer's intuitionism in a wider context of his theory of the exodus of consciousness. Intuitionistic mathematics is a free creation of the human mind, but the mind itself is a creation; it is constituted in the exiting consciousness as a result of one of its phases. We can say that the consciousness precedes the mind, and mind precedes mathematics. Here we try to oer a reconstruction of the development of consciousness. This we do in two phases. Firstly by analysing the fundamental concepts of Brouwer's theory, and secondly by proposing two logics elaborating in detail some of Brouwer's tenets. The rst part, titled The exodus of consciousness, brings an analysis and reconstruction of Brouwer's theory of the exodus of consciousness, mostly in the light of his late article Consciousness, philosophy, and mathematics. We draw special attention to the concepts of egoicity and estrangement, analysis of which in the literature is provided by, as far as we know, only van Dalen. We deem these concepts fundamental in Brouwer's philosophy, as they appear as early as in the rst phase, along with more widely known time-awareness as the foundation of mathematics. Moreover, as a function of estrangement, Brouwer denes desire and apprehension, the essential characteristics of sensations present at the very outset of the exodus.

LCG is a logic of change proposed in 2007 by Swietorzecka. Its initial goal was to analyze in a logical framework the Aristotelian theory of substantial change - a kind of change that is more fundamental than others. Motivated by Aristotle's account, Swietorzecka proposes to enrich the language of classical logic by two operators of change, reflecting the Aristotelian dichotomy of generation and corruption. However, along with the Aristotelian interpretation, as an independent formal system, LCG offers a plethora of possible interpretations and insights. In the present article I briefly summarize the existing work in LCG and reflect on its further development.