Under the headings of ' instrumental' and • genetic' logic 2 the evolution theory has worked its way into the discussion of the higher processes of thought.The theory that thought is an instrument for dealing with social and practical situations -for solving problems of adjustment and truth -has given to discussions of knowledge and reality a new and vital interest.All knowledge remains experimental until it is confirmed, and it can be confirmed only by a resort to trial in the domain of its appropriate application.This leads up to two very important positions in the newer logic: a view as to the nature of truth on the one hand, and a view on the other hand as to the nature of the ' laws of thought,' the so-called categories or ' schemes,' in which the mind builds up and systematizes its acquisitions.The theory of truth becomes either one of extreme ' Pragmatism ' or one at least of ' Instrumentalism.'Instrumentalism holds that all truth is tentatively arrived at and experimentally verified.The method of knowledge is the now familiar Darwinian procedure of ' trial and error.'The thinker, whether working in the laboratory with things or among the products of his own imaginative thought, tries out hypotheses ; and only by trying out hypotheses does he establish truth.Here Darwinism gives support to the empiricism of Hume and Mill and forwards the sober British philosophical tradition.And no one illustrates better than Darwin, in his own scientific method, the soberness, caution, and soundness of this procedure.

James Mark Baldwin (1861-1934) was one of American psychology's seminal thinkers. His biosocial theory of mind, elaborated in in the Child and the Race and in Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development, influenced thinkers as diverse as Piaget, Vygotsky, and Mead. His empirical research, republished with important philosophical papers in Fragments in Philosophy and Science, helped create a standard for rigorous objective procedure and a functionalist attitude within the newly emerging science. His concept of organic selection, elaborated in papers brought together in Development and Evolution and further discussed in Darwin and the Humanities, intoduced a mechanism into evolution theory whereby the effects of acquired adaptations could be taken into account within violating principles of natural selection. His approach to the development of individual minds in social relationship, summarized in The Individual and Society, helped not only to found American social psychology but to give its uniquely individualistic cast. Finally, his genetic epistemology, given final form in Genetic Theory of Reality, outlined a theory of mental operations culminating in aesthetic experience. Importantly, during the 1990s, Baldwin studies have undergone a small renaissance, especially as his relationship to Piaget and Vygotsky has been explored. This has created a market for Baldwin materials that this collection should help to fill. Selected here are the best editions of seven key writings, both landmark works and never reprinted essays.

The description of logical meaning from the point of view of the belief embodied in the various forms of judgment, leads naturally on to the inquiry as to its development.We have seen, in our broad survey of the genesis of the logical mode, certain motive principles at work for the establishing of logical content or subject matter.It is, of course the continued action of these motives that carries on the movement, in the logical mode itself, by which its meanings are added to and extended.We may therefore, in taking up the problem of the development that logical meanings normally undergo, recall to mind the essential movements already recognized.

Pragmatism -variously understood, variously approached, variously turned to account -is in the air.I shall not venture to define pragmatism, much less to ascribe any definite form of it to any particular writer; on the contrary, I shall merely state broadl}' the general idea involved in it, as a way of looking at things, and from the outcome try to reach an understanding as to what in fact it is.Broadly speaking, enquiries are pragmatic which, with more or less thoroughness, make such conceptions as thought, existence, truth, reality, etc., relative to other terms in a movement, development, or evolution ; relative to antecedents, consequences, modes of function, ends.All such determinations are not only ends reached in a movment, but also means to ends yet to be reached; and all of them, considered thus functionally, as terms of genetic organization, in so far forbid definition in a static, absolute, once-for-all-fixed system.Now whether or not all those who call themselves pragmatic-not to say pragmatists -admit that this fairly characterizes that feature of their thought, still that is what I now mean, and that is what this paper is about.In the theory of knowledge, it is one of the main claimsand one of the prime advantages -of pragmatic theory, that it avoids and denies any dualism between reality and thought, in the sense that thought, or knowledge, somehow represents or reveals a system of realities which are already fixed, definite, and absolute, apart from the processes of cognition.It claims that reality is determined as truth, and truth is a mode of mental organization.It claims to be able to point out the adequate processes of knowledge and action, of selection and systematization, which determine truth; and thus to yield a theory of

1 1 use ' external' as opposed to subjective, since the term ' objective,' applying as well to mental objects which are not external, would be ambiguous.2 See the joint art.' Experience,' in the writer's Diet, of Philos., in which James goes further than either Stout or the present writer in maintaining the virgin neutrality of experience of the earliest type, with reference to ' inner' and 'outer.'