This essay offers replies to the commentaries on my recent book, Free Will’s Value: Criminal Justice, Pride, and Love (Lemos, 2023). Issues addressed concern the coherence of my indeterministic weightings view of libertarian free will, the empirical plausibility of the view, the rational basis for my rejection of compatibilism, and the merits of my pragmatic/axiological defense of belief in such free will.
This essay gives a summary account of the central theses in my recent book, Free Will’s Value: Criminal Justice, Pride, and Love (Routledge, 2023). The book defends a particular version of libertarian free will, what I call “the indeterministic weightings view.” This view is similar to Robert Kane’s libertarian view. It is argued that (a) it is a coherent view that fits with scientific naturalism and (b) while we lack sufficient evidentiary grounds to believe we have such free will, there are nonetheless sufficient axiological reasons to believe, or at least live and act as if, we have such free will.
This article compares the quarantine model of criminal justice advocated by Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso with the corrections model of criminal justice advocated by Michael Corrado. Both of these theories are grounded on the presumption that persons lack desert-grounding free will. It is argued that on this presumption there is no reason to believe that Michael Corrado’s corrections model is any better than the quarantine model.
In recent work, I defend an indeterministic weightings model of libertarian free will. (Lemos, 2018, Ch. 5; 2021; 2023, Ch. 6). On this view, basic free-willed actions are understood as the result of causally indeterminate deliberative processes in which the agent assigns evaluative weight to the reasons for the different choice options under consideration. In basic free-willed actions, the assignment of weights is causally undetermined, and the choices are typically the causal consequence of these assignments of weights in which the choice option that is more highly valued is the choice option selected. In a recent article, Ishtiyaque Haji (2022) criticizes my view, arguing that it: (a) does not resolve worries about luck and (b) does not make coherent sense of the freedom of the weightings involved in free choices. I argue that his criticisms are based on misunderstandings of my position.
Dwayne Moore (2021) argues that libertarians about free will who are reductive physicalists cannot make proper sense of free will. In doing so, he presents what he calls “the physical indeterminism luck objection” to libertarian free will. He goes on to consider three different contemporary naturalistic approaches to libertarian free will (LFW) – those of Christopher Franklin, Mark Balaguer, and Robert Kane – and argues that if understood as reductive physicalist views they all fall prey to this objection. While it’s not entirely clear that Kane is a reductive physicalist, it is clear that he would reject any kind of eliminative materialism or eliminative physicalism (Kane 1996, 147). Regardless, in this essay I argue that even if Kane’s view is a kind of reductive physicalist view, it is immune to the arguments made in Moore’s essay.
Human beings are the products of many thousands of years of biological evolution, and this process occurs in accordance with the principles of natural selection originally articulated and defended by Charles Darwin and developed and defended further in the modern synthesis of the 20th century. In this paper, I consider how it may be thought that this fact threatens the rationality of belief in the Christian God. These threats are countenanced with respect to issues of design, randomness, suffering, and the objectivity of ethics. I argue that while some versions of Christian belief, such as those grounded in a literalist reading of the Genesis creation story or those committed to the image of God thesis, may be threatened by a Darwinian worldview, there are nonetheless plausible versions of Christian belief that are immune to Darwinian challenges.
This paper provides a brief review of some of the central elements of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarian theory of free will. It then goes on to consider four of the central criticisms Derk Pereboom has made of Kane’s view and it shows how each of these criticisms can be reasonably answered. These criticisms are the no further power/control objection, the disappearing agent/luck objection, the randomizing manipulator objection, and the problem of responsibility for efforts of will.
In his event-causal libertarian theory of free will, Robert Kane maintains that in the moments leading up to an undetermined free choice the agent engages in competing efforts of will and he regards this as crucial in establishing agent control over and responsibility for such undetermined free choices. In contrast, Mark Balaguer puts forward an event-causal theory of undetermined free choice in which such competing efforts of will are not a required element. In a recent published exchange between these two, Kane has made the argument that without including the dual efforts as an essential component of undetermined free choice Balaguer's view falls prey to a certain version of the luck argument. Balaguer has argued that (1) his position is immune to such a luck argument and (2) if it is not immune to it, then Kane's view suffers from the same problem. In this paper the author explains the nature of their different views as well as the nature of this recent debate in which they've engaged. He shows that despite Balaguer's attempt at rebutting Kane's arguments he fails to offer adequate defense of points (1) and (2).
In a recent article ("Hard-heartedness and Libertarianism," 2013), I defended libertarian views of free will against Richard Double's argument that such views are hard-hearted ("The Moral Hardness of Libertarianism," 2002). In supporting my main argument against Double, I invoked what I call "the Puppetmaster" argument. Double has recently countered that this argument fails. In this essay, I provide a response to this negative assessment of the Puppetmaster argument.
Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative can be expressed as the formula of humanity. This states that rational beings ought always to treat humanity, whether in our own persons or in others, as ends in themselves and never as mere means. In this essay, I argue that if God exists, then the Kantian formula of humanity is false. The basic idea behind my argument is that if God exists, then he has knowingly created a world with all kinds of naturally occurring threats, such as disease, flood, drought, etc. and he has knowingly placed human beings in such a world without their consent, knowing that many innocent human beings will be led to suffer, and he allows this suffering to occur. I argue that even if this is somehow for their own good or the good of others or contributes to the goodness of the world as a whole, God treats these innocent human beings as mere means when he places humans in such a world without their consent and allows this suffering to occur.
This article critically examines central arguments made in Sam Harris' "Free Will" as well as key aspects of Daniel Dennett's compatibilist conception of free will. I argue that while Dennett makes thoughtful replies to Harris' critique of compatibilism, his compatibilism continues to be plagued by critical points raised by Bruce Waller. Additionally, I argue that Harris' rejection of the libertarian view of free will is ill-informed and I explain the basics of Robert Kane's libertarian view, arguing that it can be defended against points raised by both Dennett and Harris.
Some contemporary philosophers maintain we lack the kind of free will that makes us morally responsible for our actions. Some of these philosophers, such as Derk Pereboom, Gregg Caruso, and Bruce Waller, also argue that such a view supports the case for significant reform of the penal system. Pereboom and Caruso explicitly endorse a quarantine model for dealing with dangerous criminals, arguing that while not responsible for their crimes such criminals should be detained in non-harsh conditions and offered the opportunity for rehabilitation. Waller does not explicitly endorse the quarantine model, but his view is similar in significant respects. I argue that such views can too easily lead to the endorsement of legal policies which would result in more frequent punishment of innocent persons for crimes they have not committed. Thus, we should have deep moral reservations about such views.
Robert Kane has for many years claimed that in our underivatively free actions, what he calls "self-forming acts"(SFAs), we actually try to do both of the two acts we are contemplating doing and then we ultimately end up doing only one of them. This idea of dual willings/efforts was put forward in an attempt to solve luck problems, but Randolph Clarke and Alfred Mele argue that for this to work agents must, then, freely engage in the dual efforts leading up to their SFAs. In response, Kane has said they do so freely by meeting compatibilist criteria of freedom. In Free Will and Luck (2006), Mele argues that this move is deeply problematic. In this essay, I defend Kane's position. In doing so, I clarify important differences between the SFAs of adults and those of young children, making more clear the connections between SFAs, character, and responsibility.
