This paper introduces the multi-dimensional concept of anthropocentrism with respect to computers, the tendency to believe that (1) computers do not possess human physical and psychological capabilities; and (2) it is not acceptable for computers to fill routinized (e.g., auto mechanic), interpretive (e.g., newspaper reporter), and personal (e.g., baby sitter) roles traditionally held only by people. A mail survey (n = 133) of individuals in Northern California focuses on individual differences rather than differences between technologies. As suggested by the literature on ethnocentrism, experience with other cultures and education are strong predictors of the dimensions of anthropocentrism; surprisingly, experience with computers fails as a predictor.

Article Free Access Share on Computers are social actors Authors: Clifford Nass Department of Communication, Stanford University, Stanford, CA Department of Communication, Stanford University, Stanford, CAView Profile , Jonathan Steuer Department of Communication, Stanford University, Stanford, CA Department of Communication, Stanford University, Stanford, CAView Profile , Ellen R. Tauber Department of Communication, Stanford University, Stanford, CA Department of Communication, Stanford University, Stanford, CAView Profile Authors Info & Claims CHI '94: Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing SystemsApril 1994Pages 72–78https://doi.org/10.1145/191666.191703Published:24 April 1994Publication History 783citation16,174DownloadsMetricsTotal Citations783Total Downloads16,174Last 12 Months5,437Last 6 weeks619 Get Citation AlertsNew Citation Alert added!This alert has been successfully added and will be sent to:You will be notified whenever a record that you have chosen has been cited.To manage your alert preferences, click on the button below.Manage my AlertsNew Citation Alert!Please log in to your account Publisher SiteeReaderPDF

We show that individuals use inappropriate social rules in assessing machine behavior. Explanations of ignorance and individuals' views of machines as proxies for humans are shown to be inadequate; instead, individuals' responses to technology are shown to be inconsistent with their espoused beliefs. In two laboratory studies, computer-literate college students used computers for tutoring and testing. The first study (n = 22) demonstrates that subjects using a computer that praised itself believed that it was more helpful, contributed more to the subject's test score, and was more responsive than did subjects using a computer that criticized itself, although the tutoring and testing sessions were identical. In the second study (n = 44), the praise or criticism came from either the computer that did the tutoring or a different computer. Subjects responded as if they attributed a "self" and self-focused attributions (termed "ethopoeia") to the computers. Specifically, subjects responses followed the rules "other-praise is more valid and friendlier than self-praise", "self-criticism is friendlier than other-criticism", and "criticizers are smarter than praisers" to evaluate the computers, although the subjects claimed to believe that these rules should not be applied to computers.

Attempts to generate anthropomorphic responses to computers have been based on complex, agent-based interfaces. This study provides experimental evidence that minimal social cues can induce computer-literate individuals to use social rules-praise of others is more valid than praise of self, praise of others is friendlier than pmise of self, and criticism of others is less friendly than criticism of self—to evaluate the performance of computers. We also demonstrate that different voices are treated as distinct agents.

Can adults be induced to use social rules distinguishing “self” and “other” to respond to the behaviors of technologies? In a 2×2×2 between-subjects laboratory experiment involving the use of multiple computers with voice output, 88 computer-literate college students used a computer for tutoring and a different computer for testing. The performance of the tutoring session was either praised or criticized (Manipulation 1) in the same voice as the tutoring session or a distinct voice (Manipulation 2) via the computer (box) that performed the tutoring or a distinct computer (box; Manipulation 3). Respondents were shown to use voices but not boxes to distinguish “self” from “other” behavior in applying the social rules “Performance evaluations from others are more accurate than are performance evaluations of self,”“Praise from others is friendlier than praise from self,” and “Criticism from self is friendlier than is criticism from others,” to evaluate the tutoring and evaluation session.

Virtual reality (VR) is typically defined in terms of technological hardware. This paper attempts to cast a new, variable-based definition of virtual reality that can be used to classify virtual reality in relation to other media. The defintion of virtual reality is based on concepts of “presence” and “telepresence,” which refer to the sense of being in an environment, generated by natural or mediated means, respectively. Two technological dimensions that contribute to telepresence, vividness and interactivity, are discussed. A variety of media are classified according to these dimensions. Suggestions are made for the application of the new definition of virtual reality within the field of communication research.

Journal Article Defining Virtual Reality: Dimensions Determining Telepresence Get access Jonathan Steuer Jonathan Steuer 1Jonathan Steuer is a doctoral student in the Department of Communication at Stanford University, Stanford, California. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of Communication, Volume 42, Issue 4, December 1992, Pages 73–93, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1992.tb00812.x Published: 07 February 2006