For centuries, human mathematicians have written proofs to substantiate their mathematical arguments; yet, the ability to automatically verify the validity of proofs has long been a challenge. Advances in AI systems' ability to generate code and engage in increasingly high-level mathematical reasoning promise to transform people's ability to formalize and thereby verify proofs. While many works focus on benchmarking the current frontier, we instead study how people use these tools and apply agency in doing so. We conduct a mixed-methods analysis into the initial impact of AI on people's formalization workflows: what people claim they want, what they see as the barriers to those visions, and how they actually use and adapt AI in practice. A qualitative survey reveals that people's preferences are diverse, but with a general desire for AI assistance in formalization that preserves high-level human control and agency over the proof discovery process. To assess how people actually engage with AI for formalization, we conduct a controlled user study in which participants formalize informal math problems and their proofs, with and without AI, across a range of mathematical problems at varying levels of difficulty and domains. Despite limitations of the tools at the time for autoformalization, participants tended to attain higher formalization accuracy when allowed access to AI tools than when formalizing on their own, with most participants flexibly choosing to use multiple different AI tools. Taken together, our work sheds light on the early stages of AI integration into formalization workflows, involving an intimate interplay of human agency and AI engagement.

The ability to combine linguistic guidance from others with direct experience is central to human development, enabling safe and rapid learning in new environments. How do people integrate these two sources of knowledge, and how might AI systems? We present a computational framework that models human social learning as joint probabilistic inference over structured, executable world models given sensorimotor and linguistic data. We make this possible by turning a pretrained language model into a probabilistic model of how humans share advice conditioned on their beliefs, allowing our agents both to generate advice for others and to interpret linguistic input as evidence during Bayesian inference. Using behavioral experiments and simulations across 10 video games, we show how linguistic guidance can shape exploration and accelerate learning by reducing risky interactions and speeding up key discoveries in both humans and models. We further explore how knowledge can accumulate across generations through iterated learning experiments and demonstrate successful knowledge transfer between humans and models—revealing how structured, language-compatible representations might enable human-machine collaborative learning.

Medicine is rife with high-stakes uncertainty. Doctors routinely make clinical judgments and decisions that juggle many fundamental unknowns, like predictions about what might be causing a patients' symptoms or decisions about what treatment to try next. Despite increasing interest in developing AI systems that aid or even replace doctors in clinical settings, current systems struggle with calibrated reasoning under uncertainty, and are often deeply opaque about their reasoning. We propose a framework for AI systems that can make practically useful but formally transparent clinical predictions under uncertainty. Given a clinical situation, our framework (MedMSA) uses language models to retrieve relevant prior knowledge, but constructs a formal probabilistic model to support calibrated and verifiable inferences under uncertainty. We show how an initial proof-of-concept of this framework can be used for differential diagnosis, producing an uncertainty-weighted list of potential diagnoses that could explain a patients' symptoms, and discuss future applications and directions for applying this framework more generally for safe clinical collaborations.

People infer rich social information from others' actions. These inferences are often constrained by the physical world: what agents can do, what obstacles permit, and how the physical actions of agents causally change an environment and other agents' mental states and behavior. We propose that such rich social perception is more than visual pattern matching, but rather a reasoning process grounded in an integration of intuitive psychology with intuitive physics. To test this hypothesis, we introduced PHASE (PHysically grounded Abstract Social Events), a large dataset of procedurally generated animations, depicting physically simulated two-agent interactions on a 2D surface. Each animation follows the style of the Heider and Simmel movie, with systematic variation in environment geometry, object dynamics, agent capacities, goals, and relationships (friendly/adversarial/neutral). We then present a computational model, SIMPLE, a physics-grounded Bayesian inverse planning model that integrates planning, probabilistic planning, and physics simulation to infer agents' goals and relations from their trajectories. Our experimental results showed that SIMPLE achieved high accuracy and agreement with human judgments across diverse scenarios, while feedforward baseline models – including strong vision-language models – and physics-agnostic inverse planning failed to achieve human-level performance and did not align with human judgments. These results suggest that our model provides a computational account for how people understand physically grounded social scenes by inverting a generative model of physics and agents.

Long‑horizon embodied planning is challenging because the world does not only change through an agent’s actions: exogenous processes (e.g., water heating, dominoes cascading) unfold concurrently with the agent's actions. We propose a framework for abstract world models that jointly learns (i) symbolic state representations and (ii) causal processes for both endogenous actions and exogenous mechanisms. Each causal process models the time course of a stochastic causal-effect relation. We learn these world models from limited data via variational Bayesian inference combined with LLM proposals. Across five simulated tabletop robotics environments, the learned models enable fast planning that generalizes to held‑out tasks with more objects and more complex goals, outperforming a range of baselines.

Games have long been a microcosm for studying planning and reasoning in both natural and artificial intelligence, often focusing on expert-level or even super-human play1-6. But real life also pushes human intelligence along a different frontier, requiring people to flexibly navigate decision-making problems that they have never thought about before. Here we use novice gameplay to study how people reason about new problem settings. Through a series of large-scale behavioural studies with over 1,000 participants and 121 two-player strategic board games (almost all novel to our participants), we show that people are systematic and adaptively rational in how they play a game for the first time or evaluate a game (for example, how fair or how fun it is likely to be) before they have played it even once. We explain these capacities via a computational cognitive model that we call the 'Intuitive Gamer': a model based on mechanisms of fast and flat (depth-limited) goal-directed probabilistic simulation. Our work offers insights into how people rapidly evaluate, act and make suggestions when encountering novel problems, and could inform the design of more flexible and human-like artificial intelligence systems that can determine not just how to solve new tasks but also whether a task is worth thinking about at all.

Rigorously evaluating machine intelligence against the broad spectrum of human general intelligence has become increasingly important and challenging in this era of rapid technological advance. Conventional AI benchmarks typically assess only narrow capabilities in a limited range of human activity. Most are also static, quickly saturating as developers explicitly or implicitly optimize for them. We propose that a more promising way to evaluate human-like general intelligence in AI systems is through a particularly strong form of general game playing: studying how and how well they play and learn to play all conceivable human games, in comparison to human players with the same level of experience, time, or other resources. We define a "human game" to be a game designed by humans for humans, and argue for the evaluative suitability of this space of all such games people can imagine and enjoy – the "Multiverse of Human Games". Taking a first step towards this vision, we introduce the AI GameStore, a scalable and open-ended platform that uses LLMs with humans-in-the-loop to synthesize new representative human games, by automatically sourcing and adapting standardized and containerized variants of game environments from popular human digital gaming platforms. As a proof of concept, we generated 100 such games based on the top charts of Apple App Store and Steam, and evaluated seven frontier vision-language models (VLMs) on short episodes of play. The best models achieved less than 10% of the human average score on the majority of the games, and especially struggled with games that challenge world-model learning, memory and planning. We conclude with a set of next steps for building out the AI GameStore as a practical way to measure and drive progress toward human-like general intelligence in machines.

"AI psychosis" or "delusional spiraling" is an emerging phenomenon where AI chatbot users find themselves dangerously confident in outlandish beliefs after extended chatbot conversations. This phenomenon is typically attributed to AI chatbots' well-documented bias towards validating users' claims, a property often called "sycophancy." In this paper, we probe the causal link between AI sycophancy and AI-induced psychosis through modeling and simulation. We propose a simple Bayesian model of a user conversing with a chatbot, and formalize notions of sycophancy and delusional spiraling in that model. We then show that in this model, even an idealized Bayes-rational user is vulnerable to delusional spiraling, and that sycophancy plays a causal role. Furthermore, this effect persists in the face of two candidate mitigations: preventing chatbots from hallucinating false claims, and informing users of the possibility of model sycophancy. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results for model developers and policymakers concerned with mitigating the problem of delusional spiraling.

Social learning is a powerful mechanism through which agents learn about the world from others. However, humans sometimes choose direct experience over social learning, which can carry time and cognitive resource costs. How do people balance social and non-social learning? We propose a Rational Mentalizing model of the decision to engage in social learning. This model estimates the utility of social learning by reasoning about another agent's goal and the informativeness of their future actions. It then weighs the utility of social learning against the utility of non-social learning. Using a novel game where players choose between observing other agents or exploring the environment, we show that the Rational Mentalizing model can quantitatively capture human trade-offs between these strategies. These findings suggest that selective social learning is guided by 'Theory of Mind' in the service of utility maximization.

Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how models play games such as chess and Go. In this paper, we advocate for a new paradigm that assesses AI systems' evaluation of games. First, we introduce a formalism for evaluating such evaluations. We then leverage a large-scale dataset of over $100$ novel board games and over 450 human judgments to compare evaluations produced by modern language and reasoning models against those of people and symbolic computational agents. We consider two kinds of evaluative queries: assessing the payoff (or fairness) and the funness of games. These queries span two dimensions relevant to the design of evaluations of AI evaluations: how complex a query is to compute and how difficult a query is to quantify. Our results show that reasoning models are generally more aligned to people in their evaluations of games than non-reasoning language models. However, we observe a non-monotonic relationship: as models get closer to game-theoretic optimal, their fit to human data weakens. We also observe more "jaggedness" across models for assessing funness, in line with the greater difficulty of quantifying this query. Across queries and games, reasoning models show highly variable and unpredictable resource usage when assessing queries, pointing to the importance of imbuing more resource-rational meta-reasoning in language and reasoning models.

A hallmark of intelligence is proficiency in solving new problems, including those that substantially differ from previously seen problems. Problem solving in turn depends on the goal-directed generation of novel ideas and behaviours1, which has been proposed to involve internal representations of discrete units (or symbols) that can be recombined into numerous possible composite representations1-7. Although this view has been influential in cognitive-level explanations of behaviour, definitive evidence for a neuronal substrate of symbols has remained elusive. Here we identify a neural population that encodes action symbols-recombinable representations of discrete units of motor behaviour-in a specific area of the frontal cortex. In macaque monkeys performing a drawing-like task, we found behavioural evidence that action elements (strokes) exhibit three crucial features that indicate an underlying symbolic representation: (1) invariance over low-level motor parameters; (2) categorical structure, which reflects discrete action types; and (3) recombination into novel sequences. Based on simultaneous neural recordings across eight regions of the motor, premotor and prefrontal cortex, we identified population activity specifically in the ventral premotor cortex that encodes planned actions in a manner that also reflects invariance, categorical structure and recombination. These findings reveal a neural representation of action symbols localized to the ventral premotor cortex and a putative neural substrate for symbolic operations.

AI systems will soon have to navigate human environments and make decisions that affect people and other AI agents whose goals and values diverge. Contractualist alignment proposes grounding those decisions in agreements that diverse stakeholders would endorse under the right conditions, yet securing such agreement at scale remains costly and slow -- even for advanced AI. We therefore propose Resource-Rational Contractualism (RRC): a framework where AI systems approximate the agreements rational parties would form by drawing on a toolbox of normatively-grounded, cognitively-inspired heuristics that trade effort for accuracy. An RRC-aligned agent would not only operate efficiently, but also be equipped to dynamically adapt to and interpret the ever-changing human social world.

Humans are endowed with a powerful capacity for inductive and deductive logical thought: we easily form generalizations based on a few examples and draw conclusions from known premises. Humans also arguably have the most sophisticated communication system in the animal kingdom: natural language allows us to express complex and structured meanings. Some have therefore argued for a tight relationship between complex thought and language, postulating that reasoning, including logical reasoning, relies on linguistic representations. We systematically investigated the relationship between logical reasoning and language using two complementary approaches. First, we used noninvasive brain imaging (fMRI) to examine neural activity as healthy adults engaged in logical reasoning tasks. And second, we behaviorally evaluated logical abilities in individuals with extensive lesions to the language brain areas and consequent severe linguistic impairment. Our findings reveal that the language brain network is not engaged during logical reasoning, and patients with severe aphasia exhibit intact performance on logic tasks. Instead, inductive reasoning recruits the domain-general multiple demand network implicated broadly in goal-directed behaviors, whereas deductive reasoning draws on brain regions that are distinct from both the language and the multiple demand networks. Together, these results indicate that linguistic representations are neither utilized nor required for inductive or deductive logical reasoning.

Human visual perception offers valuable insights for understanding computational principles of motion-based scene interpretation. Humans robustly detect and segment moving entities that constitute independently moveable chunks of matter, whether observing sparse moving dots, textured surfaces, or naturalistic scenes. In contrast, existing computer vision systems lack a unified approach that works across these diverse settings. Inspired by principles of human perception, we propose a generative model that hierarchically groups low-level motion and appearance features into particles (small Gaussians representing local matter), and groups particles into clusters capturing coherently and independently moveable physical entities. We develop a hardware-accelerated inference algorithm based on parallelized block Gibbs sampling to recover stable particle motion and groupings. Our model operates on different kinds of inputs (random dots, stylized textures, or naturalistic RGB video), enabling it to work across settings where biological vision succeeds but existing computer vision approaches do not. We validate this unified framework across three domains: on 2D random dot kinematograms, our approach captures human object perception including graded uncertainty across ambiguous conditions; on a Gestalt-inspired dataset of camouflaged rotating objects, our approach recovers correct 3D structure from motion and thereby accurate 2D object segmentation; and on naturalistic RGB videos, our model tracks the moving 3D matter that makes up deforming objects, enabling robust object-level scene understanding. This work thus establishes a general framework for motion-based perception grounded in principles of human vision.

Modern reinforcement learning (RL) systems have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex environments, such as video games. However, they still fall short of achieving human-like sample efficiency and adaptability when learning new domains. Theory-based reinforcement learning (TBRL) is an algorithmic framework specifically designed to address this gap. Modeled on cognitive theories, TBRL leverages structured, causal world models - "theories" - as forward simulators for use in planning, generalization and exploration. Although current TBRL systems provide compelling explanations of how humans learn to play video games, they face several technical limitations: their theory languages are restrictive, and their planning algorithms are not scalable. To address these challenges, we introduce TheoryCoder, an instantiation of TBRL that exploits hierarchical representations of theories and efficient program synthesis methods for more powerful learning and planning. TheoryCoder equips agents with general-purpose abstractions (e.g., "move to"), which are then grounded in a particular environment by learning a low-level transition model (a Python program synthesized from observations by a large language model). A bilevel planning algorithm can exploit this hierarchical structure to solve large domains. We demonstrate that this approach can be successfully applied to diverse and challenging grid-world games, where approaches based on directly synthesizing a policy perform poorly. Ablation studies demonstrate the benefits of using hierarchical abstractions.

Humans learn abstractions and use them to plan efficiently to quickly generalize across tasks – an ability that remains challenging for state-of-the-art large language model (LLM) agents and deep reinforcement learning (RL) systems. Inspired by the cognitive science of how people form abstractions and intuitive theories of their world knowledge, Theory-Based RL (TBRL) systems, such as TheoryCoder, exhibit strong generalization through effective use of abstractions. However, they heavily rely on human-provided abstractions and sidestep the abstraction-learning problem. We introduce TheoryCoder-2, a new TBRL agent that leverages LLMs' in-context learning ability to actively learn reusable abstractions rather than relying on hand-specified ones, by synthesizing abstractions from experience and integrating them into a hierarchical planning process. We conduct experiments on diverse environments, including BabyAI, Minihack and VGDL games like Sokoban. We find that TheoryCoder-2 is significantly more sample-efficient than baseline LLM agents augmented with classical planning domain construction, reasoning-based planning, and prior program-synthesis agents such as WorldCoder. TheoryCoder-2 is able to solve complex tasks that the baselines fail, while only requiring minimal human prompts, unlike prior TBRL systems.

Humans rapidly learn abstract knowledge when encountering novel environments and flexibly deploy this knowledge to guide efficient and intelligent action. Can modern AI systems learn and plan in a similar way? We study this question using a dataset of complex human gameplay with concurrent fMRI recordings, in which participants learn novel video games that require rule discovery, hypothesis revision, and multi-step planning. We jointly evaluate models by their ability to play the games, match human learning behavior, and predict brain activity during the same task, comparing a suite of frontier Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) against model-free and model-based deep reinforcement learning agents and a Bayesian theory-based agent. We find that frontier LRMs most closely match human behavioral patterns during game discovery and predict brain activity an order of magnitude better than both reinforcement learning alternatives across cortical and subcortical regions, with effects robust to permutation controls. Through targeted manipulations, we further show that brain alignment reflects the model's in-context representation of the game state rather than its downstream planning or reasoning. Our results establish LRMs as compelling computational accounts of human learning and decision making in complex, naturalistic environments. Project page with interactive replays: https://botcs.github.io/reason-to-play/

Many high-stakes applications of AI require forming data-driven hypotheses and making targeted guesses; e.g., in scientific and diagnostic settings. Given limited resources, to what extent do agents based on language models (LMs) act rationally? We develop methods to benchmark and enhance agentic information-seeking, drawing on insights from human behavior. First, we introduce a strategic decision-oriented dialogue task called *Collaborative Battleship*, in which a partially-informed *Captain* must balance exploration (asking questions) and action (taking shots), while a fully-informed *Spotter* must provide accurate answers under an information bottleneck. Compared to human players (N=42), we find that LM agents struggle to ground answers in context, generate informative questions, and select high-value actions. Next, to address these gaps, we develop novel Monte Carlo inference strategies for LMs based on principles from Bayesian Experimental Design (BED). For Spotter agents, our approach boosts accuracy by up to 14.7% absolute over LM-only baselines; for Captain agents, it raises expected information gain (EIG) by up to 0.227 bits (94.2% of the achievable noise ceiling). Combined, these components yield sharper targeting (+0.303–0.374 F1), and enable weaker LMs, such as Llama-4-Scout, to outperform both humans (8% → 82% win rate) and frontier models (0% → 67% win rate vs. GPT-5) at ≈1% of GPT-5's cost. We replicate these findings on *Guess Who?* where our methods significantly boost accuracy (+28.3–42.4 p.p.), demonstrating their general applicability for building rational information-seeking agents.

Automatically generating interactive 3D environments is crucial for scaling up robotic data collection in simulation. While prior work has primarily focused on 3D asset placement, it often overlooks the physical relationships between objects (e.g., contact, support, balance, and containment), which are essential for creating complex and realistic manipulation scenarios such as tabletop arrangements, shelf organization, or box packing. Compared to classical 3D scene generation, producing complex physical scenes introduces additional challenges: (a) higher object density and complexity (e.g., a small shelf may hold dozens of books), (b) richer supporting relationships and compact spatial layouts, and (c) the need to accurately model both spatial placement and physical properties. To address these challenges, we propose PhyScensis, an LLM agent-based framework powered by a physics engine, to generate physically accurate 3D scenes with high complexity. Specifically, our framework consists of three main components: an LLM agent iteratively proposes assets with spatial and physical predicates; a solver, equipped with a physics engine, realizes these predicates into a 3D scene; and feedback from the solver informs the agent to refine and enrich the configuration. Moreover, our framework preserves strong controllability over fine-grained textual descriptions and numerical parameters (e.g., relative positions, scene stability), enabled through probabilistic programming for stability and a complementary heuristic that jointly regulates stability and spatial relations. Experimental results show that our method outperforms prior approaches in scene complexity, visual quality, and physical accuracy, offering a unified pipeline for generating complex physical scenes for robotic manipulation.

A unique aspect of human visual understanding is the ability to flexibly interpret abstract concepts: acquiring lifted rules explaining what they symbolize, grounding them across familiar and unfamiliar contexts, and making predictions or reasoning about them. While off-the-shelf vision-language models excel at making literal interpretations of images (e.g., recognizing object categories such as tree branches), they still struggle to make sense of such visual abstractions (e.g., how an arrangement of tree branches may form the walls of a maze). To address this challenge, we introduce Deep Schema Grounding (DSG), a framework that leverages explicit structured representations of visual abstractions for grounding and reasoning. At the core of DSG are schemas--dependency graph descriptions of abstract concepts that decompose them into more primitive-level symbols. DSG uses large language models to extract schemas, then hierarchically grounds concrete to abstract components of the schema onto images with vision-language models. The grounded schema is used to augment visual abstraction understanding. We systematically evaluate DSG and different methods in reasoning on our new Visual Abstractions Dataset, which consists of diverse, real-world images of abstract concepts and corresponding question-answer pairs labeled by humans. We show that DSG significantly improves the abstract visual reasoning performance of vision-language models, and is a step toward human-aligned understanding of visual abstractions.