In Pragmatist Semantics Zalabardo devises the main guidelines of a pragmatist semantics as an alternative to semantic representationalism, i.e. to the view that holds that the meaning ground of a declarative sentence is made up of the referential links that bind its constituents to things, properties and relations in the world. The paper reveals four assumptions that support the pragmatist semantics of sentences used to ascribe propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires. These assumptions closely connect the expounded pragmatism with a nihilist semantic tradition that has shaped much of contemporary analytic philosophy, the connection consisting of the abolition of the notion of content as a constituent of a propositional attitude.

Roman Ingarden's writings on literary works contain numerous ideas worthy of consideration in the debate about literary fiction taking place now in analytical philosophy. His philosophical perspective is that of Realist Phenomenology. Among other issues, the article deals with Ingarden's proposals about the identity of literary works and their composition, the contribution made by quasi-perceptual experiences and the nature of fictional entities.

El presente ensayo expone las principales ideas de Chomsky acerca de la Nueva Teoría de la Referencia. Contra dicha teoría, y específicamente contra propuestas bien conocidas de Kripke y Putnam, aduce Chomsky distintos argumentos. Las conclusiones de esos argumentos son las siguientes: (i) que en los lenguajes naturales no hay nombres lógicamente puros; (ii) que no existe ninguna relación de referencia que conecte las palabras con las cosas; (iii) que los conceptos que maneja la así llamada teoría de la referencia no responden a las exigencias metodológicas de la ciencia natural; y (iv) que el significado sí «está en la cabeza». Tratando de poner al descubierto los supuestos en que se fundan estas tesis, el ensayo identifica los siguientes cuatro:su naturalismo metodológico, su pragmatismo en materia de ontología, su perspectivismo conceptual y su racionalismo.

This essay presents Chomsky's views on the New Theory of Reference. As against that theory, particularly against well-known ideas of Kripke's and Putnam's, Chomsky adduces a varied range of arguments whose main conclusions are the following: (i) that there no logically pure names in natural languages; (ii) that there is no non-artificial relation of reference which links words and things; (iii) that the so-called theory of reference deploys concepts which are alien to the methodological requirements built into natural science; and (iv) that meaning "is in the head". Aiming at bringing out the assumptions that support (i) - (iv), the essays hold that Chomsky's rejection of the New Theory of Reference is shaped by his methodological naturalism, his pragmatic attitude towards ontology, his conceptual perspectivism, and his rationalism.

In this work the widely endorsed claim that the conceptions of language that the late Wittgenstein and Chomsky respectively shaped conflict with each other is rejected. On such a viewpoint, while Wittgenstein would have viewed language as a repertoire of actions articulated by social relationships, Chomsky understands language as a faculty of human's biological nature, just like the visual system. In the first six sections of the paper the main criteria resorted to support such an alleged incompatibility are deactivated: either they are coarse enough to make it impossible to render philosophical useful conclusions or they ignore central elements of both Wittgenstein's and Chomsky's philosophies of language. In particular, the confusion that undermines this debate is cleared up by lending attention to the kind of language rules that they respectively focus on. In the remaining sections an argument is built up that goes deeper in the latter criticism's implications. The argument zooms in on the assumption that language is a completely homogenous whole. Once this assumption is brought to light, the alleged incompatibility loosens its grip and nothing stands in the way of concluding that Wittgenstein's and Chomsky's conceptions of language are far from being fully opposite.

This essays examines Hintikka’s trajectory through Semantic Representationalism from the classical, i.e. Wittgensteinian, Picture Theory of Meaning to Game-Theoretical Semantics. It starts by asking what makes a sentence a representation of a fact and what conditions enable a sentence to represent something. It is argued that at the end of his journey Hintikka conceives of the representational function of sentences as arising from the norms that regulate their place in verification practices. As a consequence of it, the analysis of semantic representation in terms of an isomorphic relation between sentences and facts is replaced by a theory based on the concept of winning strategy in a semantical game. This maneuver allows Hintikka to emphasize that semantical representation is shaped by normative constraints that rule the specific activities involved in those games.

Review of Alberto Moretti, Eleonora Orlando y Nora Stigol, comp. 2016. A medio siglo de Formas logicas, realidad y significado de Thomas Moro Simpson.

Acero, J. J. (2017). Alberto Moretti, Eleonora Orlando y Nora Stigol, comp. 2016. A medio siglo de Formas lógicas, realidad y significado de Thomas Moro Simpson. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 32(3), 387–389. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18064

It is generally thought that Carnap's work in semantics decisively contributed to conform the view of language as calculus and to develop the model-theoretical approach to the theory of meaning. Whereas his research on the logical syntax of language was consistent with an understanding of language as a universal medium, in Introduction to Semantics and Meaning and Necessity he moved into the paradigm of language as calculus. In this paper I reinforce Hintikka's renewing work on Carnap's semantics, arguing that Meaning and Necessity still contains a variety of universalist ingredients. It is emphasized that the main feature of Carnap's semantics in this book is that of conceiving a theory of meaning as a translation theory.

This article summarily describes the arrival and establishment of Analytic Philosophy [= AP] in Spain. It first expounds the role played in that process by philosophers such Jose Ferrater Mora, exiled alter the Spanish Civil War, and by Manuel Garrido, Jesus Mosterin, Javier Muguerza, Josep Blasco y Jose Hierro, the proper introducers of AP in the Spanish university. Secondly, the article refers to the work developed by the introducers' former students and disciples, and holds that this second wave of AP in Spain largely helped to its consolidation. Finally, the current situation-a third wave of analytic philosophers in action-is reviewed. Its most actives centres are identified, the main changes in the national scientific policy, its profound effects on academic activities for the last twenty years, and the high degree of internationalization reached by Spanish AP from the 1990s, after the founding of the Sociedad Espanola de Filosofta Analitica (S.E.F.A.), are concisely pointed out.

The question addressed in this paper is whether particular emotional experiences or episodes of an emotion (such as two experiences of happiness) belong to a natural kind. The final answer to this question is that although some, even many, single episodes of an emotion may group into a natural kind, belonging to a natural kind is a highly contextual matter. The proposal relies on two premises. First, a conception of natural kind-hood that follows Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster Theory. Second, a view of emotional episodes that fits with the External Theory of Perception: typical emotional episodes are perceptual experiences of emotional affordances. After pointing out what candidates for emotional homeostatic properties could be like and suggesting some examples of emotional homeostatic mechanisms, the authors conclude that there are property clusters of emotional perceptions stabilized by homeostatic mechanisms. In spite of this, what counts as an emotional natural kind depends on many factors, not all of them natural: world properties, bodily and mental states of the agent, learning mechanisms that help us to satisfactorily navigate in the world, cultural differences that determine our perceptual style, as well as different interests which guide the explanation and prediction of emotional episodes.

In Philosophical Investigations and other postractarian writings Wittgenstein rejected the view of mind that holds Brentano's Thesis. The rejection, specifically addressed against the claim that thoughts depict reality by containing representations that agree with it, denounces a grammatical confusion, that the objects to which thoughts would point to are shadows projected by our language's grammar. Interpreters such us Hacker and Glock have pointed out that that confusion is mainly due to the effects of applying the analysis of non- psychological transitive sentences to the analysis of sentences that ascribe thoughts to agents. In this paper a much more complex view of Wittgenstein's resources to reject Brentano's Thesis is put forward. It is also argued that in his amended explanation of intentionality a number of requirements play a decisive rle, namely those of semantic innocence, expressivism, systematiticity and the view of language as a vehicle of thought, that have been ignored up to now.

En Investigaciones filosóficas y otros escritos postractarianos Wittgenstein rechazó la concepción de lo mental que incorpora la Tesis de Brentano. Ese rechazo, dirigido específicamente contra la idea de que los pensamientos representan la realidad conteniendo representaciones que concuerdan con ella, denuncia una confusión gramatical: los objetos a los que se dirigirían los pensamientos son sombras proyectadas por la gramática del lenguaje. Autores como Hacker y Glock consideran que esa confusión se produce al asimilar las oraciones mediante las cuales se adscriben estados mentales a oraciones transitivas sin verbos psicológicos. El presente trabajo argumenta a favor de una imagen mucho más compleja de los medios utilizados por Wittgenstein para rechazar la Tesis de Brentano. Se defiende también que en la visión corregida de la intencionalidad de lo mental desempeñan un papel decisivo los requisitos de inocencia semántica, expresivismo, sistematicidad del significado y del lenguaje como vehículo del pensamiento, ignorados hasta el momento.

Acero, J. J. (2011). Burge. 2010. Origins of Objectivity . THEORIA, 26(3), 373–376. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.2956

In his book Glock answers the question "what is analytic philosophy?" with two theses. The first is the Thesis of History, i.e. analytic philosophy is a historical or genetic category. The second is the Thesis of Resemblance: namely, that there is only a family resemblance between the authors and schools that make up the analytic tradition in philosophy. Although this paper accepts the first thesis, it rejects the second by insisting that there are highly significant disruptions and therefore less continuity than advocated by Glock, between the various contributions and developments of analytic philosophy.