The link between conspiracy beliefs and political extremism suggests that these beliefs may contribute to attitude polarisation. However, the interplay between attitudinal processes and conspiracy beliefs have been understudied—particularly in the context of ambivalent attitudes. Across three pre-registered experiments, we examined the causal relationship between conspiracy beliefs and attitudinal ambivalence. We did not replicate prior findings suggesting that induced ambivalence would motivate greater reliance on conspiracy beliefs as a compensatory mechanism to cope with attitude conflict (Study 1). Furthermore, we unexpectedly found that conspiracy beliefs were positively associated with ambivalence (Study 2), and that exposure to conspiracy theories increased ambivalence (Study 3). These results suggest that conspiracy theories may intensify, rather than alleviate, attitude conflict and the discomfort associated with it. This research contributes to the comprehension of the attitudinal consequences of conspiracy beliefs, highlighting their potential to hinder people’s evaluative judgement.

Conspiracy beliefs vary widely across nations, yet their societal predictors remain poorly understood. Applying machine-learning meta-analytic techniques, we simultaneously examined 18 national-level developmental and cultural factors and ranked their relative importance in predicting conspiracy beliefs. Across six large cross-national datasets (total N = 178,789; 72 countries), the best-performing model (MetaForest) explained 43% of variance in test data. Corruption was the strongest predictor, followed by power distance, reading proficiency, individualism, mathematics proficiency, human development, GDP, and science proficiency. Conspiracy beliefs were most prevalent in societies marked by higher corruption and power distance, and lower educational performance, individualism, and socioeconomic development; developmental indicators generally outranked cultural ones, and dimensions such as WEIRDness, uncertainty avoidance, and long-term orientation mattered little. By integrating developmental and cultural predictors in a single framework, this study offers the most comprehensive test to date of national correlates of conspiracy beliefs and demonstrates the value of machine-learning approaches.

Science is integral to society because it can inform individual, government, corporate, and civil society decision-making on issues such as public health, new technologies or climate change. Yet, public distrust and populist sentiment challenge the relationship between science and society. To help researchers analyse the science-society nexus across different geographical and cultural contexts, we undertook a cross-sectional population survey resulting in a dataset of 71,922 participants in 68 countries. The data were collected between November 2022 and August 2023 as part of the global Many Labs study “Trust in Science and Science-Related Populism” (TISP). The questionnaire contained comprehensive measures for individuals’ trust in scientists, science-related populist attitudes, perceptions of the role of science in society, science media use and communication behaviour, attitudes to climate change and support for environmental policies, personality traits, political and religious views and demographic characteristics. Here, we describe the dataset, survey materials and psychometric properties of key variables. We encourage researchers to use this unique dataset for global comparative analyses on public perceptions of science and its role in society and policy-making.

One way to cope with crises is by attributing their ultimate causes to malevolent conspiracies. As crises are rarely simple, and may involve an interplay between multiple, co-occurring threats, we suggest that conspiracy thinking mainly occurs among individuals who experience conditions of threat complexity – such as socioeconomic vulnerability paired with a sense of helplessness in society, and who are also sufficiently paranoid to infer a conspiracy. In the present study, we focused on financial strain and disempowerment, as two relevant threats which were both dramatically affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, and hypothesized a three-way interaction between financial strain, disempowerment and paranoia in predicting conspiracy thinking. This hypothesis was supported in both cross-national ( N = 64,130) and longitudinal data ( N = 11,159), collected during the COVID-19 pandemic. Implications of the results for understanding the tendency to reduce multiple threats to a single cause are discussed.

This research explores the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and political engagement within the 3N model of radicalization, extending the Significance Quest Theory. We hypothesized that political engagement, both violent and non-violent, results from the interaction between the quest for personal significance (QFS), conspiracy beliefs (CB), and network normative influence (NI). In Study 1 (N = 609), conducted with a general sample of the U.S. population, we found that violent political engagement was individually predicted by QFS, CB, and NI, and resulted from the interaction between QFS and NI. Non-violent political engagement was similarly influenced by these main effects, but also resulted from the interaction between CB and NI. However, the hypothesized three-way interaction was not significant for any type of political engagement. Study 2 (N = 570) focused on an ideologically homogeneous sample—Republican voters strongly supporting the 45th U.S. President Donald Trump. The findings confirmed the main effects of QFS, CB, and NI on both violent and non-violent political engagement. Additionally, we observed the theoretically hypothesized three-way interaction in predicting violent political engagement. Specifically, the relationship between QFS and violent political engagement was stronger at higher levels of CB and NI. These findings underscore the significant impact of conspiracy beliefs on political engagement. Notably, within an ideologically homogeneous sample, the willingness to engage in violence was heightened at higher levels of personal significance and network influence, in line with the 3N model.

Many social, political, and psychological factors influence the extent to which people put their trust in science. The current article examines recent evidence for the role of conspiracy beliefs about science. The article examines the consequences of such beliefs, focusing on the domains of health (e.g., vaccinations) and the environment (e.g., climate change). Using the COVID-19 context as an example, the article focuses on the epistemic, existential, and social motives that underpin science-related conspiracy beliefs. Finally, the article considers whether science-related conspiracy beliefs satisfy these psychological motives, and what implications there are for future trust in science.

Conspiracy theories are often viewed as a means to externally attribute ingroup sufferings by blaming them on the actions of powerful groups. Building on this assumption, we tested the hypothesis that the threat induced by facing an internal (vs. external) attribution for an ingroup’s sufferings would result in increased endorsement of an alternative, conspiracy attribution. We also examined how being confronted with an internal attribution for an ingroup’s sufferings impacts people’s sympathy for the author of a conspiracy attribution. In five preregistered experiments (Ntotal = 2,695), being confronted with an internal attribution for an ingroup’s sufferings did not increase the endorsement of conspiracy attributions (BF01 = 37.88, very strong evidence for the null), sympathy for the conspiracy advocate (BF01 = 4.38, some evidence for the null), or self-reported agreement with them (BF01 = 17.70, strong evidence for the null). A potential explanation for these results is the social stigma surrounding conspiracy beliefs – which may result in participants being reluctant to endorse conspiracy attributions. In contrast, stable propensities to internally attribute inequalities (political orientation in Study 1, meritocracy beliefs in Studies 2–3) were negatively associated with all three dependent variables.

In the current research, we use network analysis to examine the structure, ideological foundations and correlates of climate change conspiracy theories, distinguishing between denialist and warmist beliefs. Denialist beliefs, typically endorsed on the political right, claim that climate change is exaggerated, whereas warmist beliefs, more prevalent on the left, allege the suppression of climate science and the downplaying of climate change. Across four studies, these beliefs showed a weak and unstable positive correlation but were reliably connected via indirect associations with general conspiracy beliefs and negatively through opposing relationships with denial of anthropogenic climate change (ACC) and conservatism. General conspiracy beliefs and denial of ACC were not directly connected but were instead related indirectly through climate-specific conspiracy beliefs: positively via denialist and negatively via warmist. We found no evidence across studies for an association between climate change conspiracy beliefs and indices of non-rational thinking. Finally, denialist beliefs were negatively associated with pro-environmental intentions, environmental concern, policy support and collective guilt, whereas warmist beliefs were positively related to these outcomes, except for environmental concern, where no significant relationship emerged. These findings highlight the importance of distinguishing ideological variants of climate change conspiracy beliefs to contextualize their psychological significance and potential impacts.

Beliefs in conspiracy theories are related to a diverse set of emotional and behavioral consequences. At the same time, a theoretical model detailing when a conspiracy theory is more likely to elicit confrontation compared to withdrawal, indirect aggression or community-building is missing. We argue that appraisals provide the missing link between conspiracy beliefs and their consequences, proposing the Appraisal Model of Conspiracy Theories (AMCT). Based on appraisal theories of emotions, we outline how the focus on different features that vary between conspiracy theories and the situations in which they are embedded (i.e., focus on secrecy vs. gained knowledge; powerlessness vs. option of confrontation; harm to oneself vs. others) facilitate specific appraisals, resulting in different behavioral outcomes. We also outline how the AMCT helps to reconcile inconsistent research on conspiracy beliefs by providing better predictions about their emotional and behavioral consequences.

As hostility toward immigrants grows, it is essential to explore the psychological factors that contribute to anti-immigrant attitudes. Although the impact of economic hardship, societal anomie, and conspiracy belief on anti-immigration attitudes have all been individually studied, their combined impact remains underexamined. Across six studies (n = 3,643), we investigated how economic hardship and perceptions of societal decline (anomie) predict anti-immigrant attitudes about Non-European immigrants, with anti-immigrant conspiracy beliefs as a potential serial mediator. Study 1a (n = 491, UK participants) found that both perceived and actual economic hardship predicted anti-immigrant sentiment (e.g., support for violence against Non-European immigrants) through anomie and conspiracy beliefs, an effect replicated in Study 1b (n = 493, Irish participants). Study 2 (n = 760) used a quasi-experimental design and found that participants from UK postcode areas with higher income deprivation reported greater anomie, which was linked to belief in Non-European immigrant conspiracy theories and anti-immigrant sentiment. Study 3a (n = 790, UK participants) confirmed these associations with experimentally simulated economic hardship in a virtual society; Study 3b (n = 321, participants from Ireland) replicated this effect. Study 4 (n = 788, UK) demonstrated that individuals experiencing economic hardship, when exposed to conspiracy content, reported significantly higher violent intentions toward immigrants and marginally higher non-violent intentions. Together, these studies, using diverse research designs, provide evidence that economic hardship and anomie may contribute to anti-immigrant sentiment, with conspiracy beliefs potentially mediating these relationships.

Science is crucial for evidence-based decision-making. Public trust in scientists can help decision makers act on the basis of the best available evidence, especially during crises. However, in recent years the epistemic authority of science has been challenged, causing concerns about low public trust in scientists. We interrogated these concerns with a preregistered 68-country survey of 71,922 respondents and found that in most countries, most people trust scientists and agree that scientists should engage more in society and policymaking. We found variations between and within countries, which we explain with individual- and country-level variables, including political orientation. While there is no widespread lack of trust in scientists, we cannot discount the concern that lack of trust in scientists by even a small minority may affect considerations of scientific evidence in policymaking. These findings have implications for scientists and policymakers seeking to maintain and increase trust in scientists.

Social media has become an influential channel for political communication, offering broad reach while enabling the proliferation of misinformation and conspiracy theories. These unchecked conspiracy narratives may allow manipulation by malign actors, posing dangers to democratic processes. Despite their intuitive appeal, little research has examined the strategic usage and timing of conspiracy theories in politicians’ social media communication compared to the spread of misinformation and fake news.This study provides an empirical analysis of how members of the U.S. Congress spread conspiracy theories on Twitter. Leveraging the Twitter Historical API, we collected a corpus of tweets from members of the US Congress between January 2012 and December 2022. We developed a classifier to identify conspiracy theory content within this political discourse. We also analyzed the linguistic characteristics, topics and distribution of conspiracy tweets. To assess classifier performance, we created ground truth data through human annotation in which experts labeled a sample of 2500 politicians’ tweets.Our findings shed light on several aspects, including the influence of prevailing political power dynamics on the propagation of conspiracy theories and higher user engagement. Moreover, we identified specific psycho-linguistic attributes within the tweets, characterized by the use of words related to power and causation, and outgroup language. Our results provide valuable insights into the motivations compelling influential figures to engage in the dissemination of conspiracy narratives in political discourse.

The coronavirus pandemic posed a major challenge to mental health. Existing evidence shows that COVID-19 is related to poor emotional well-being, particularly among women. However, most work on the subject uses single-country samples, limiting the ability to generalize the disparity or explain it as a function of societal variables. The present study investigates the expression of positive and negative emotions during the pandemic as a function of gender and across 24 countries (N = 49,637). Strong gender differences emerged across countries, with women reporting more negative emotions (anxious, depressed, nervous, exhausted) and less positive emotions (calm, content, relaxed, energetic) than men. The gender gap in positive emotions was significantly wider in countries higher in individualism and narrower in countries higher in power distance. For instance, differences in emotions were larger in Western countries high in individualism, such as the USA, the UK, Italy, and France, and smaller in countries with higher collectivism and power distance, such as China, Malaysia, and South Korea, with a few exceptions like Japan and Brazil. These gender differences across countries were not explained by country-level gender inequalities indicators (GGGI and GII). Interestingly, the national severity of the pandemic, an epidemiological factor, reduced gender differences in positive emotions. These results underscore the importance of considering cultural and national factors when assessing gender differences in well-being.

Belief in conspiracy theories has been linked to harmful consequences for individuals and societies. In an effort to understand and mitigate these effects, researchers have sought to explain the psychological appeal of conspiracy theories. This article presents a wide-ranging systematic review and meta-analysis of the literature on conspiracy beliefs. We analyzed 971 effect sizes from 279 independent studies (Nparticipants = 137,406) to examine the relationships between psychological motives and conspiracy beliefs. Results indicated that these relationships were significant for all three analyzed classes of motivation: epistemic (k = 114, r = .14), existential (k = 121, r = .16), and social motivations related to the individual, relational, and collective selves (k = 100, r = .16). For all motives examined, we observed considerable heterogeneity. Moderation analyses suggest that the relationships were weaker, albeit still significant, when experimental (vs. correlational) designs were used, and differed depending on the conspiracy measure used. We statistically compare the absolute meta-analytic effect size magnitudes against each other and discuss limitations and future avenues for research, including interventions to reduce susceptibility to conspiracy theories.

Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to perceptions of collective victimhood. We adopt an individual perspective on victimhood by investigating the relationship between conspiracy beliefs and the individual disposition to perceive and react to injustice as a victim, i.e., victim justice sensitivity (VJS). Data from two German samples (Ns = 370, 373) indicated a positive association between VJS and conspiracy mentality beyond conceptually related covariates (e.g., mistrust). In a multinational sample from 15 countries (N = 14,978), VJS was positively associated with both general and specific conspiracy beliefs (about vaccines and climate change) within countries, though these associations varied across countries. However, economic, sociopolitical and cultural country-level factors that might explain the cross-country variability (e.g., GDP, Human Freedom Index, individualism-collectivism), including indices of collective exposure to direct violence, did not moderate the studied associations. Future research should investigate the relationship between victimhood and conspiracy beliefs, considering both intraindividual and intergroup perspectives.

Prebunking can be used to pre-emptively refute conspiracy narratives. We developed a new approach to prebunking - fighting fire with fire - which introduces a plausible 'meta-conspiracy' suggesting that conspiracy theories are deliberately spread as part of a wider conspiracy. In two preregistered intervention studies, prebunking specific COVID-19 vaccine (Study 1, N = 720) and climate change (Study 2, N = 1077) conspiracy theories (e.g. that climate change is a hoax), with or without this meta-conspiracy framing, did not reduce beliefs in these specific conspiracy theories. However, some notable findings emerged. First, both fighting fire with fire and standard prebunking (Study 2) increased belief in plausible meta-conspiracies that questioned the original specific conspiracy theories. Second, across both studies, specific conspiracy beliefs negatively predicted behavioural intentions, while beliefs in meta-conspiracies positively predicted them. Third, specific conspiracy beliefs were negatively related to belief in plausible meta-conspiracies in both intervention studies (cf: Pilot Study). While this approach did not reduce specific conspiracy beliefs, it increased beliefs that were negatively associated with them and which were positively linked to behavioural intentions. We discuss these null effects and their implications for effective prebunking among conspiracy believers.

Conspiracy beliefs have been related to aversive emotional experiences often accompanying major world events and have also been linked to maladaptive ways of coping with stress. In this research, we examined how different coping strategies (i.e. self-sufficient, social-support, avoidance and religious) predicted the adoption of COVID-19 conspiracy theories. In two studies (Study 1, n = 1000 and Study 2, n = 616) conducted among Polish participants, we found that avoidance and religious coping were positively linked to COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs. In Study 1, conspiracy beliefs also mediated the positive relationships between avoidance and religious coping and adherence to safety and self-isolation guidelines during the COVID-19 pandemic. Study 2 additionally showed that the relationship between fear, induced by reading threatening news on COVID-19, and conspiracy beliefs was the strongest among those high in avoidance coping. These studies highlight the role of coping strategies in the adoption of COVID-19 conspiracy beliefs.