Abstract Kant's 1765 lecture Announcement is a remarkable short document that, per page, amounts to one of the most revealing and pivotal of all his publications.1 Although it does not explicitly use the term “autonomy,” it is the first publication expressing Kant's decision to champion a Rousseauian philosophy of self-determination. The Announcement presents an intricately structured explanation of why the manner in which one teaches philosophy in the modern era is itself a central issue, one that calls for training in autonomy. In its concise form, it raises, but leaves unresolved, several fundamental issues in Kant's new doctrine of absolute freedom.

There is an immense recent literature on issues concerning the development of Kant's philosophy and the relation between theoretical and practical grounds for asserting absolute freedom. One important recent contribution to this issue is a series of writings by Patricia Kitcher. In this context I focus on three closely related works, namely, Chapter 14 from her book, Kant's Thinker, "Is Kant's Thinker (as Such) a Free and Responsible Agent?" and two later essays, "A Kantian Argument for the Formula of Humanity," and "Kant's Practical Proof of the Fact of Freedom."See Kitcher (2011), Kitcher (2017), and Kitcher (2023). It is not possible on this occasion to discuss her other work on related topics, such as Kitcher (2004).I argue in support of Kitcher's general position that Kant shifts away, quite properly, from an emphasis on purely theoretical grounds. In view of the importance and complexity of the notion of transcendental freedom, however, I also point out some remaining problems in Kitcher's work as well as in Kant's final position.

Abstract This book is a systematic and historical study of the nature and reception of Kant’s distinctive conception of dignity. The first chapter discusses contemporary interpretations and defends Kant’s concept of dignity as rooted in a basic capacity of reason for morality, and as an unconditional, all-or-nothing, and inviolable feature of all human beings, one that deserves universal respect. The next four chapters build on this systematic account by explaining how Kant’s notion of dignity was further clarified, or seriously misunderstood or neglected, in five significant contexts: the Baltics (Herder and Prussia's relation to the east), Berlin (the rise of Fascism), Philadelphia (the Declaration of Independence), London (Richard Price and reactions to the American and French Revolutions), and Washington (twentieth-century threats to democracy, in relation to Thomas Mann's career). These chapters stress the surprising fact that Kant ignored the enlightened institutions of the United States. They argue that, in addition to expressing specific racist and anti-Semitic prejudices, Kant held to a general old-world elitist prejudice, in conflict with his own principles. The book concludes with a discussion of Thomas Mann as an especially relevant and influential thinker. At first, Mann advocated a chauvinist misunderstanding of Kantian dignity, but later he promoted a cosmopolitan understanding of dignity that included—unlike Kant—an appreciation of the enlightened aspects of the American tradition. Ironically, when Mann arrived at his later view under the influence of Walt Whitman, this helped him to better appreciate the Kantian features of Early Romantic writings in his own tradition.

Abstract This chapter evaluates serious accusations against Kant and his philosophy as being tied to racism, religious prejudice, and even the horrors of Fascism. The criticisms of Kant by Charles W. Mills, Michael Lackey, and Paul W. Franks are distinguished and assessed. A distinction is made between Lackey’s more radical critique of Kant and Christianity in general as playing a major role in the rise of Fascism, and the critique by Franks, which focuses on specific aspects of the anti-Judaic tradition in German philosophy. Lackey is commended for his detailed documentation of the little-known but significant influence on Fascism of Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s nationalist and racist interpretation of Kant. It is argued, however, that Chamberlain and the Fascists horribly distorted both Christianity and Kant’s real views on duty and dignity. Franks’s criticism of anti-Semitism in Kant and others, however, is argued to be well-founded.

Abstract This chapter defends a “mainline interpretation” of Kant’s basic concept of dignity as an unconditional, all-or-nothing, and inviolable feature of all human beings, one that deserves universal respect. This contrasts with earlier notions of dignity that make it a matter of contingent rank or a certain degree of achievement that can be gained or lost by individuals. Kant’s concept is explained as rooted in a universal human capacity of reason for morality, and specifically duty in a pure sense that is ultimately aimed at the highest good, and with a meaning that is compatible with a form of moral realism. Understandings of dignity in terms of achievement or mere rationality are criticized as inappropriate and not representative of Kant’s own view. The contemporary interpretations of Paul Formosa, Richard Dean, and others are evaluated in this context.

Abstract This chapter treats Thomas Mann as a serious philosophical figure who had an outstanding grasp of the complex development of post-Kantian thought. Mann held Kant and the Early Romantics in the highest regard, but in his early career he was especially fascinated by the trio of Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Nietzsche. An important influence on Mann’s late work was Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel’s excessive rationalism as well as his appreciation of the importance of aesthetics, combined with an incisive critique of an overly aesthetic orientation. Mann had an excellent understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of all of these post-Kantian figures, but only in his later career did he see that it is best to go beyond the whole sequence from Hegel to Nietzsche by returning to Kant’s notion of dignity, and pure and democratic morality, supplemented by the creative insights that he always admired in the Early Romantics.

Abstract This chapter argues that, surprisingly, there is no evidence that Kant endorsed the Declaration of Independence or the widely known ideas of figures such as Thomas Jefferson and John Adams. At the same time that Kant was ignoring the Americans, philosophers such as Richard Price and Jeremy Bentham were vigorously debating and influencing American developments. At that time Kant also did not show an interest in the problems caused by the effects of aggressive German expansion in the Baltic area where Kant himself lived. In his double lack of interest in the progressive side of American politics and the repressive side of Germany’s expansion, Kant’s entrenched elitist attitude resembled, in some ways, the later position of Fascism. Kant’s odd attitude in this case was not a matter of racism, however, and it was inconsistent with his doctrine of universal human dignity and his critique of colonialism.

Abstract This chapter compares and contrasts the careers of Kant and his student, J. G. Herder, and their positions on issues such as dignity, diversity, history, and cosmopolitanism. Kant and Herder have a lot in common, although Kant was especially interested in necessity and universal duties, whereas Herder deserves respect for having introduced a stress on respect for contingency, diversity, and historical developments that are not a matter of linear and completely rational progress. The basic cosmopolitanism of their philosophies is defended against non-progressive interpretations of their work. A special emphasis is placed on Herder’s early time in Riga and Kant’s late Postscript in a German–Lithuanian dictionary. The Postscript exhibits an underlying philosophical friendship between them, based on a common respect for local cultures that are vulnerable to the harmful actions of powerful nations.

Article Ludwig, Bernd, Aufklärung über die Sittlichkeit. Zu Kants Grundlegung einer Metaphysik der Sitten. Frankfurt a. M.: Klostermann Rote Reihe 2020, 226 pp. was published on July 15, 2022 in the journal Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie (volume 0, issue 0).

AbstractDespite their contemporaneity and obvious similarities, Richard Price and Immanuel Kant are rarely discussed together. This essay examines the common background of their work, similarities in their methodology and principles, and their common concern with connecting rationalist philosophical systems with knowledge at the level of ordinary life and politics – all this despite their lack of reference to each other. Their normative principles are assessed in connection with major documents and political events in their revolutionary era. A concluding section evaluates their work in relation to contemporary discussions that concern the relationship between pre-reflective and reflective levels of moral knowledge. The essay draws on the work of contemporary scholars such as Danielle Allen, David Brink, Robert Audi, Sarah McGrath, and Thomas Kelly.

In recent years, Kant views on dignity have been challenged by a wave of attacks from authors, outside and inside of philosophy, who criticize his remarks for their connection with serious evils such as racism and anti-Semitism. I compare and contrast two recent critiques along this line-one by Michael Lackey, on how Kant's terms were used by H.S. Chamberlain and the fascists, and one by Paul Franks, who puts several of Kant's distressing comments in the context of German Idealism and anti-Judaism in general. I also draw on insights by Charles W. Mills and Lucy Allais, which point toward a diagnosis of the kind of "cognitive blindness" that Kant and others have exhibited on these issues. After taking into account his surprising attitude toward people in North America, I argue that Kant's errors are not simply a matter of racism but should be understood as rooted in broader blindnesses about cultures (even ones that he takes to be of the same race) outside his northern European Protestant background.

Abstract The first half of this book concerns issues directly related to a few key Kant texts and recent discussions of them. The Critical philosophy’s conception of subjectivity is the main focus, with special attention given to the features of freedom, autonomy, law, necessity, final ends, an overall human vocation, intentionality, and idealism. The second half contains essays on post-Kantian figures, with an emphasis on Hegel, Schelling, and Hölderlin and their role in introducing a fruitful ‘historical turn’ in philosophical methodology as well as a new conception of being a subject understanding itself as living a period of ‘late modernity.’ This period is still devoted to enlightenment ideals while recognizing limitations in the eighteenth century scientific and political developments that preoccupied Kant. Two major strands of post-Kantian philosophy along this line are distinguished: the more systematic approach of the classical works of German Idealism, and the mixed methodology of the Early Romantics, who also composed their main works in the context of Jena and the highly popular interpretation of Kant that was offered there by Reinhold. Highlights of the first part of the book include new close readings of Kant’s Groundwork and its relation to later thinkers such as Sartre, Murdoch, O’Neill, Prauss, and Brandom. The second part develops a post-Kantian philosophy of history, as outlined by Novalis and Schlegel, and connects this with a close reading of a number of texts by Hölderlin, who is argued to be the most Kantian and philosophically the most satisfying of the post-Kantians.

This chapter responds in detail to two recent discussions of Kant’s notion of freedom. Jörg Noller’s book argues, in part against Kant, for a graduated concept of degrees of freedom that might help make sense of the phenomenon of evil. Owen Ware, in articles on the notions of “fact” and “will,” revisits Kant’s transition from his argument in the Groundwork to his reliance, in the Critique of Practical Reason, on the notion of a “fact of reason.” I agree with most of Noller’s nuanced historical approach but do not endorse his view on degrees of freedom as a needed improvement of Kant. In reaction to Ware, I agree that there are many elements of continuity between Kant’s Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason, but I disagree with his argument against the now common view that the latter work involves a significant “reversal” in Kant’s methodology in arguing for freedom.

This chapter gives an account of the transition from Kant’s publishing of the first edition (“A”) of his Critique of Pure Reason and his decision to focus on the topic of morals by suddenly writing a book called the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. The interpretation of this transition contrasts with the stress on Christian Garve in recent work by Eckart Förster, in a chapter called “Critique and Morals,” but it agrees with him about the significance in this era of the project of establishing philosophy as a science. A special emphasis is placed on Kant’s intense concern with absolute freedom during this period and with his desire to show that he can present a better account of the realms of “nature” and “grace” than can other philosophers.

This chapter responds primarily to a recent criticism of Kant by Stephen Houlgate. Like many other recent Hegelian accounts, Houlgate’s severe critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy contends that, in contrast to Hegel, Kant’s Critical system, especially because of its doctrine of transcendental idealism, presupposes a subjectivist and therefore inadequate position. On the basis of a moderate interpretation of Kant’s idealism and his general Critical procedure, the chapter defends Kant from the charge of subjectivism, and also gives an account of how subjectivist interpretations in general can arise from a series of understandable misunderstandings of difficult passages in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.

This chapter discusses a recent systematic book by the Kant scholar Gerold Prauss. Here Prauss discusses the connection of subject and object primarily in terms of the relation between an unextended subject and a three-dimensional world that is constructed within an infinite continuous field of space and time. Kant’s notion of pure intuition is critically and creatively adopted in Prauss’s development of a kind of transcendental geometry, which characterizes the basic three-dimensionality of our experience in an a priori manner. I compare Prauss’s approach to earlier work in Kant scholarship, such as by P. F. Strawson, and also note that Prauss’s holistic approach has some similarities with later German Idealism.