The aim of this paper is to analyze the apparent radicality of recent ‘post-modern’ or ‘post-philosophical’ critiques of philosophy. The key features of this radicality singled out here are: (a) its deliberate search of paradox; (b) its ostensive insensibility to tu quoque counter-arguments; (c) its promotion of a flattening of all levels of discourse, as well as of a removal of all barriers between kinds of discourse, both of which yield a sort of pluralistic holism, which may be called ‘discourse egalitarianism’; (d) its uncompromising rejection of all the categories, distinctions, strategies and methods of [classical] Reason, including dialectics; (e) its peculiar notion of ‘criticism’, not to be confused with ‘rejection’, ‘denial’, or ‘demolition’, all of which make room to the position criticized, but rather to be seen as radical deconstruction or suppression. In the light of this analysis, an attempt is made to explain the radicality of this critique in terms of a cyclic model of increasingly sharper confrontations between ‘constructionists’ and ‘deconstructionists’ in the course of the history of philosophy. What accounts for the need for increasing radicalization is the fact that, at each confrontation, the opponent has strengthened his position by having learnt from previous criticism. Seen in this broad perspective, the current ‘crisis’ in philosophy can be interpreted as one more episode in the Great Critical Tradition, to be located not outside philosophy, as it contends, but rather at its very core.

En este texto se desarrolla un argumento en favor de la tolerancia que se basa en una crítica deI modelo "semántico ingenuo" de la comprensión deI lenguaje. Este modelo, como lo ilustraron tanto Popper como Mao Tse-Tung, supone la objetividad y la independencia del contexto de la comprensión deI discurso (incluyendo los textos). Desde este punto de vista, la crítica de las concepciones 'erróneas' es un problema puramente lógico, que tiene que ver con la detección de inconsistencias, la falta de evidencia, u otras insuficiencias lógicas de las concepciones criticadas. En contra de esto se afirma que las regIas semánticas deI Ienguaje resultan siempre insuficientes para determinar eI "significado" de un texto o de cualquier otro fragmento de discurso. No hay duda de que la semântica desempena un papel en la determinación de ese significado, pero siempre debe complementarse con una interpretación pragmática. Esta última, a diferencia de la semántica, se encuentra sometida no a regIas algorítmicas, sino a regIas heurísticas. En consecuencia, sus resultados son siempre tentativos y están sujetos a revisión. El "significado" de un texto o discurso, por lo tanto, no es un "hecho dado" objetivo e inobjetable, sino algo que depende de la actividad y los supuestos interpretativos de quienes leen eltexto y buscan criticarIo. A pesar de su carácter heurístico, la interpretación pragmática no es aleatoria ni totalmente subjetiva, ya que se basa en normas y tradiciones interpretativas. No obstante, el reconocimiento de su papel y de su naturaleza proporciona un argumento adicional en favor de la tolerancia de concepciones aparentemente 'erróneas'. Este argumento difiere de los argumentos de Mill en que se apoya explícitamente en la falibilidad de la comprensión del lenguaje, mientras que Mill se apoya en la falibilidad del juicio.

En este trabajo propongo un marco de referencia, relativamente sencillo y tosco, como punto de partida para la comparación y evaluación de las posiciones, a menudo contrapuestas, tocantes a la relación entre lenguaje y pensamiento. El marco consiste en una serie de expediciones imaginarias por el escenario de los mundos posibles, en búsqueda de “parlantes” (gente que tiene lenguaje, pero no pensamiento) y de “pensantes” (gente que tiene pensamiento pero no lenguaje). Los cuatro posibles resultados de una primera expedición de este tipo, representan las cuatro perspectivas posibles con respecto a la dependencia conceptual entre el lenguaje y el pensamiento. Todas las perspectivas están ilustradas abundantemente en la literatura del presente y del pasado. Se muestra que, prestando atención a los argumentos aducidos por los defensores de estas perspectivas, es posible llegar a comprender mejor los grados de centralidad y la estructura lógica de las diferentes características usadas generalmente para “definir” los conceptos de lenguaje y pensamiento. Algunas expediciones imaginarias ulteriores, más complejas, llevan a refinar el marco original, permitiendo, entonces, la discusión de otras cuestiones relativas a la relación entre lenguaje y pensamiento, v.gr., la cuestión de la “dirección de explicación” que se da entre ellos. En el transcurso del artículo, se analizan las posiciones de Locke, Cordemoy, Sellars, Davidson, Searle, Vigotski y otros. [M.D.]

On November 10–11, 2010, Marcelo Dascal’s 40 years of academic scholarship were commemorated by an international conference held at Tel Aviv University and the Peres Center for Peace in Tel Aviv/Jaffa. Marcelo’s colleagues from Israel and other countries, former and current students, family, and many friends, as well as the Dean of the Faculty of Humanities and the chair of the Department of Philosophy, welcomed the lecturers who contributed to the intensive program of those two exciting days. I wish to express my gratitude to my University, to my family, to the participants, and especially to all those who helped to organize the moving event in cooperation with Dr. Noa Zauderer-Naaman, whose tireless efforts assured its success.

The paper challenges the received view regarding rationality Rational, rationality and dialogue Dialogue . According to Leibniz, different kinds of rationality Rational, rationality not only co-exist but also do not exclude each other or attempt to render the other acceptable or intelligible only in one’s own terms. The relevant distinction for the construal of conflicting rationalities Rational, rationality is that between hard and soft rationality.

The above experiences were indeed experienced by me while writing this piece. Yet, none of them is idiosyncratic to Marcelo Dascal. Anyone who has engaged in writing has certainly experienced them, albeit perhaps without acknowledging and naming them as I suggested above. Nor are these phenomena typical of this particular kind of intellectual activity.

This article addresses the question of whether listeners attend to the kinds of gestures that people produce spontaneously while conversing; more specifically, whether information that is conveyed gesturally is integrated into the listener's understanding of what is communicated by a speaker. We show that listeners do attend to information presented in the gestural modality, and claim on the basis of this evidence that gesture and speech are integral parts of understanding—that they give rise to one unified representation in the listener, and can be drawn on as one unified representation. A growing body of evidence shows that people unwittingly produce gestures along with speech in many different communicative situations. These gestures have been shown to elaborate upon and enhance the content of accompanying speech (Cassell and McNeill 1991; McNeill 1992; Bavelas 1994, analyzing narrative or …

We describe and analyze an important cognitive obstacle in inter- and intra-community ar- gumentation processes, which we propose to call 'Cognitive Systemic Dichotomization' (CSD). This social phenomenon consists in the collective use of shared cognitive patterns based upon dichotomous schemati- zation of knowledge, values, and affection. We discuss the formative role of CSD on a community's collec- tive cognition, identity, and public discourse, as well as the challenges it raises to reasoned argumentation, and how different approaches to argumentation undertake to face this obstacle to the reasonable debate of issues of public concern.

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