This chapter is Mary Whiton Calkins' articulation and defense of the personalistic conception of reality. IIThe conception of the world,achieved in the first division of this paper, as made up in part, at least, of conscious beings, or selves, is not yet a fully personalistic conception of nature.For a completely personalistic doctrine must maintain, not that selves exist along with other real though non-mental beings, but that the world consists wholly of persons, or selves; and that so large a part of the world is accounted impersonal simply because the selves in whom it consists are undistinguished and uncomprehended.This paper espouses the fully personalistic conception of the universe as consisting in innumerable selves, or persons, of different levels and degrees, more or less closely related to each other.To establish this conception would demand the proof (1) that supposedly non-mental beings are really mental; (2) that mental beings are inevitably personal; (3) that more than one self may be known to exist.In negative terms, the thorough-going personalist, before he has a philosophic right to his cosmology, must successfully maintain (1) idealism against both dualism and materialism; (2) personalism against ideistic idealism; (3) a non-solipsistic, a non-subjective, form of personalism.The limits of this paper prohibit the adequate carrying out of any part of this program, but the following may serve to suggest the main outlines of the personalistic argument.

This chapter is Mary Whiton Calkins' discussion of, and support for, the identification of philosophy with speculative metaphysics.

Con cada año que vivo, con cada libro que leo, con cada observación que inicio o confirmo, estoy más profundamente convencida de que la psicología debería ser concebida como la ciencia del self, o persona, como relacionada con su entorno físico y social.(...) Con selves