Primitivism about the direction of time is the thesis that the direction of time does not call for an explanation because it is a primitive posit in one's ontology. In the literature, primitivism has generally come with a substantival view of time according to which time is an independent substance. In this paper, we defend a new primitivist approach to the direction of time-relational primitivism. According to it, time is primitively directed because change is primitive. By relying on Leibnizian relationalism, we argue that a relational ontology of time must be able to distinguish between spatial relations and temporal relations to make sense of the distinction between variation and change. This distinction, however, requires the assumption of a primitive directionality of change, which ushers in the direction of time. Relational primitivism is attractive for those who want to avoid substantivalism about time but retain a primitive direction of time in a more parsimonious ontology.

The paper makes a novel case to vindicate social sciences as substantially a priori, against the mainstream view that rejects apriorism as unscientific. After a brief review of the state of the art and the open options to defend a science that is a priori, we lay out a methodological dualism according to which human action is not accessible to the methods of empirical science but requires a normative stance to identify its subject matter as the expression of intentional action. Against this background, we then bring the apriorism of Mises, Rothbard, and Hoppe together with the normative turn in philosophy established by the Pittsburgh school of philosophy, resulting in normative apriorism as a firmly established scientific method that is specific to the social sciences. In brief, the strategy is to bring in normativity as a characteristic trait of human action in order to show why a science of human action has to be a priori in order to capture its subject.

The aim of this paper is to apply the methodology of minimal ontological commitments to moral and political philosophy. As minimal metaphysics in the philosophy of science endorses scientific realism, so we subscribe to moral realism, arguing that the presumption of liberty is the fundamental assumption defining a person. What needs to be justified then are restrictions to liberty and, in particular, the application of coercion upon persons. In examining knowledge claims about normative facts going beyond the presumption of liberty, such as, for instance, facts about a common good, we show that an ontological commitment to such normative facts is at odds with minimal metaphysics. We thus show how minimal metaphysics vindicates a Kantian deontological stance in moral and political philosophy: moral realism is limited to the obligations that follow from extending the presumption of liberty to all human beings in virtue of them being rational animals, hence to respect every person as an end in itself.

The paper shows how Bohmian mechanics fits into modern science as conceived by Descartes. The primitive ontology of particle positions only vindicates the Cartesian conception of matter as res extensa also in the domain of quantum physics. Finally, I briefly sketch out how Bohmian mechanics can also be construed as respecting the limits that Descartes set for modern science: there is no conflict between the ontology and dynamics of matter as set out in Bohmian mechanics and a Cartesian stance that takes the mind to be irreducible to matter.

In this paper, we put forward an alternative interpretation of time-reversal symmetry in philosophy of physics: Humean time-reversal symmetry. According to it, time-reversal symmetry is understood as a heuristic, epistemic virtue of the best system, not as a property of the Humean mosaic. One of the consequences of this view is that one of the main arguments against a primitive direction of time is rendered harmless, which paves the way for primitivism about the direction of time.

The argument of this paper is that the rationale, potential and limits of modern science are evident in Descartes, and in respect of its basic Cartesian features are still valid today. Its rationale is objectivity, its potential is a great improvement in human living conditions, and its limit is that, due to its striving for objectivity, modern science cannot in principle encompass human thought and action. Cartesian dualism is therefore well grounded, and can be elaborated on without any commitment to two autonomous types of substances.

Im letzten Jahrzehnt hat sich, was die Wertschätzung und Definition von Wissenschaftsfreiheit betrifft, eine wachsende Kluft an Hochschulen aufgetan. Auf der einen Seite stehen diejenigen, für die Wissenschaftsfreiheit ein grundsätzlich schützenswertes individuelles Grundrecht ist. Ihnen gegenüber stehen diejenigen, die den Schutz von Forschung und Lehre unter einen weltanschaulichen Vorbehalt stellen. Insbesondere identitätspolitisch motivierte Hochschulangehörige greifen zu den Mitteln der moralischen Diskreditierung, sozialen Ausgrenzung und institutionellen Bestrafung, um ihre Weltsicht durchzusetzen. Dieser Band analysiert die Erscheinungsformen und Folgen dieser politisierten und moralisierten Wissenschaftsausrichtung.

The paper spells out an argument to the effect that rejecting what Sellars denounces as the “myth of the given” has a bearing not only on epistemology, but also on ontology: we get to recognizing persons as ontologically primitive. We spell that argument out by drawing on what is known as left-wing Sellarsianism, although our aim is not the exegesis of Sellars’s texts. Our aim is to show how one can get from this argument to a social ontology in the guise of a synoptic view that recognizes both persons and matter in motion as ontologically primitive and that employs the conceptual tools of ontic structural realism.

This paper has three objectives: (i) arguing against levels of reality by employing the Lewis-Jackson method for doing metaphysics, also known as the Canberra plan; (ii) showing how this method renders the idea of levels of reality incoherent, but nevertheless leaves the conceptual space open for dualism; (iii) sketching out a concrete proposal for a dualism of mind and matter that relies on normativity and that employs ontic structural realism.

The paper points out the relevance of Popper's seminal work on The open society and its enemies for the current situation of the handling of the corona crisis. It shows how studies that were employed to justify coercive policies committed two well-known mistakes that were pointed out notably by Popper: (i) they promoted as actual predictions model simulations that set initial parameters in such a way that pessimistic outcomes are produced; (ii) they applied methods of natural science to social science without paying heed to the fact that humans spontaneously adapt their behaviour to new information they receive. The paper then argues, following Popper, that there is no knowledge that enables social engineering with the aim of realising one particular value such as health protection. The paper concludes with a suggestion how to deal with negative externalities that is based on human freedom.

We appreciate the systematic analysis of scientific evidence on the routes of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) transmission and the effect of preventive measures published by Bak et al., resulting in some general and specific recommendations [[1]Bak A. Mugglestone M.A. Ratnaraja N.V. Wilson J.A. Rivett L. Stoneham S.M. et al.SARS-CoV-2 routes of transmission and recommendations for preventing acquisition: joint British Infection Association (BIA), Healthcare Infection Society (HIS), Infection Prevention Society (IPS) and Royal College of Pathologists (RCPath) guidance.J Hosp Infect. 2021; https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhin.2021.04.027Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF Scopus (32) Google Scholar]. After a careful compilation of scientific evidence, the authors recommend that the general population should 'adhere to regulations currently imposed by your government'. This general recommendation is, from our point of view, not evidence-based, as the authors fail to provide a single study to show that adhering to government regulations significantly reduces the number of COVID-19 cases, especially when the frequent changes in regulations and local peculiarities are taken into account. The international readership of this journal may also question this general recommendation and may regard it as quite unbalanced. An example from Germany may help to explain our concern. The use of face masks in public was regarded as unnecessary in January 2020. Three months later, however, it was implemented that people should wear a face mask of any type in shops and on public transport. In January 2021, it was made compulsory to wear a surgical mask or an FFP2 mask in shops and on public transport. In April 2021, the rules were changed again so that people had to wear an FFP2 mask on local public trains or buses. It is obvious that these fast and incomprehensible changes in regulations cannot be supported by sound scientific evidence because evidence is lacking [[2]Jefferson T. Del Mar C.B. Dooley L. Ferroni E. Al Ansari L.A. Bawazeer G. et al.Physical interventions to interrupt or reduce the spread of respiratory viruses.Cochrane Database Syst Rev. 2020; https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.CD006207.pub5:CD006207Crossref PubMed Google Scholar]. Is it better for the public to follow the scientific evidence as described by Bak et al. ['There is no evidence which suggests that respirator masks (e.g. N95, FFP2/3) offer additional protection outside the healthcare settings'] and use any type of mask or maybe no mask at all when the local government imposes the use of FFP2 masks, or should the public follow the official regulations even where is no convincing evidence to support it nor any expected health benefit? Another aspect of concern is that government regulations only look at the expected health benefits of a measure to control the spread of SARS-CoV-2, and do not weigh this against its associated health risks or its negative effect on many short-term and long-term health outcomes [[3]Kampf G. Kulldorff M. Calling for benefit-risk evaluations of COVID-19 control measures.Lancet. 2021; 397: 576-577Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (16) Google Scholar]. The government lockdowns in the UK will probably result in substantial increases in the number of avoidable cancer deaths in England as a result of diagnostic delays [[4]Maringe C. Spicer J. Morris M. Purushotham A. Nolte E. Sullivan R. et al.The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on cancer deaths due to delays in diagnosis in England, UK: a national, population-based, modelling study.Lancet Oncol. 2020; 21: 1023-1034Abstract Full Text Full Text PDF PubMed Scopus (1054) Google Scholar]. The national lockdown also led to a significant decrease in acute stroke admissions and transient ischaemic attack evaluations at a stroke centre [[5]D'Anna L. Brown M. Oishi S. Ellis N. Brown Z. Bentley P. et al.Impact of national lockdown on the hyperacute stroke care and rapid transient ischaemic attack outpatient service in a comprehensive tertiary stroke centre during the COVID-19 pandemic.Front Neurol. 2021; 12: 627493Crossref PubMed Scopus (24) Google Scholar]. These two examples show that some governmental measures can have major health consequences beyond coronavirus disease 2019. As such, we clearly refute the general recommendation in any evidence-based guideline to simply adhere to regulations imposed by a government. The scientific community should never stop questioning government regulations, although this does seem to be more difficult and risky at the present time [[6]Pullmann J. CDC punishes 'superstar' scientist for COVID vaccine recommendation the CDC followed 4 days later.Federalist. 2021; (Available at: https://thefederalist.com/2021/04/28/cdc-punishes-superstar-scientistfor-covid-vaccine-recommendation-the-cdc-followed-4-days-later/ [last accessed May 2021].)Google Scholar]. GK has received personal fees from Dr. Schumacher GmbH, Germany, for presentation and consultation. ME reports no conflicts of interest. None.

The chapter argues for a metaphysics in the vein of the Canberra plan, namely to single out a minimal, basic set of entities and then to show how everything else is located in that set by being identical with something in that set and how the propositions that describe the basic entities entail all the other true propositions. The chapter conceives the Canberra plan for the domain of the natural sciences as a naturalized metaphysics that is not committed to a priori entailment. The proposal is that the minimal set of entities is defined by the following two axioms: (1) There are distance relations that individuate simple objects, namely matter points. (2) The matter points are permanent, with the distances between them changing. Finally, the chapter explains how the Canberra plan sets a clear standard for ontological issues that go beyond the natural sciences.