Platonism about properties holds that there are uninstantiated properties. For properties do not depend on their instances, whereas their instances depend on them. In this paper, I shall discuss two ‘heterodox’ versions of Platonism about properties: Meinongian Essentialist Platonism about Properties and Mutualist Essentialist Platonism about Properties. In Section 1 I shall introduce what I label ‘Orthodox Platonism about Properties’, its virtues and problems. In Section 2 I shall present a weaker form of Platonism, i.e., Essentialist Platonism about Properties (EPP), which only takes into account the essential dependence relations between Platonic properties and their instances. In line with this view, in Section 3 and Section 4 two versions of EPP will be presented: Meinongian EPP and Mutualist EPP. The former roughly consists in claiming that Platonic properties do not have the sort of existence that is typical of substances, though they are endowed with essences. The latter roughly consists in claiming that Platonic properties existentially depend on their instances but their instances essentially depend upon them. In Section 5 and in Section 6 I shall reconsider the problems that affect Platonism about properties and show how Meinogian EPP and Mutualist EPP can successfully cope with them.

I shall argue that one necessary condition for entities to weakly emerge from their own emergence bases is that such bases include external relations. In Sect. 1 I shall introduce weak emergence and the distinction between internal and external relations, as well as three strategies to prove the externality of a relation. In Sects. 2 and 3 I shall provide inductive support for my thesis by showing that several versions of weak emergentism entail that the emergence bases of weakly emergent entities need to include external relations. In Sect. 4 I shall construct an inference to the best explanation: my thesis provides the best explanation for some data about weakly emergent entities and their own bases. Finally, in Sect. 5, I shall consider another formulation schema for weak emergence, i.e., that illustrated by Jessica Wilson.

Is Homer’s Ulysses the same character as Dante’s Ulysses? How many characters are involved in Sauron’s orcs army? And what about fictional people featuring in inconsistent stories? These and similar conundrums regard the identity of the mysterious inhabitants of fictions: fictional characters (ficta, for short). This book tackles such issues from the standpoint of three major metaphysical perspectives – objectual realism (ficta as objects), non-objectual realism (ficta as properties),anti-realism – and in interplay with literary interpretive practices.

I shall present a new theory of the distinction between facts and events that is based on taking events as occurrent modes. Roughly, I shall argue that facts are the modes that are involved in events and that they are not further occurrent modes. First, I shall introduce some data concerning the distinction between facts and events. Later on, I shall recall the view of events as occurrent modes and some tools that may be exploited for the task of drawing the distinction between facts and events. Finally, within this perspective, I shall account for data and motivate every relevant departure from them.

There is an ongoing debate on the ontology of relations, which features four main competing approaches: directionalism, positionalism, anti-positionalism, and primitivism. This paper focuses on a particular version of positionalism, namely role positionalism, and proposes the results of an experimental philosophy research concerning aspects of it. We tested the intuitions of ordinary subjects regarding the inter-relational generality of the roles typically assumed for spatial and kinematic relations, namely source, destination, theme, location. According to a 2014 paper by Orilia, this generality is rather wide, as it encompasses relations of temporal order, causation, quantitative order, transaction, possession, and parthood. Our findings do not support this proposal, except for parthood, and, in a limited way, for temporal order. We also tested the intuitions of ordinary subjects regarding the contrast between the pro-converses option, according to which non-symmetric relations split into distinct converse relations, and the anti-converses option, according to which non-symmetric relations have no distinct converses. Although traditionally positionalism is associated to the latter option, in recent works by Orilia role positionalism is associated to the former option for at least some relations, while remaining anchored to the latter option for other relations. Our findings support this mixed line to some extent, but not quite in the way suggested by Orilia in such works.

In this article, I shall examine Jessica Wilson's schema for weak emergence in connection with two questions: why are only certain proper subsets of the powers borne by lower-level features associated with higher-level, weakly emergent features? Why is a certain proper subset of the powers borne by a given lower-level feature associated with a certain higher-level, weakly emergent feature, and vice versa? I shall consider and criticize four possible answers to these questions, including Wilson's own view. Finally, I shall suggest my own solution, which is based on something akin to grounding categoricalism. I shall also explore some consequences of accepting my view.

In this article, I argue that life is a strongly emergent phenomenon. For the project of drawing a real distinction between living and non-living beings cannot but appeal to strongly emergent powers. First, I introduce some features whose possession is typically taken to be sufficient for possessing life, i.e., Life-Sufficient Features (or LS-Features). I also clarify what I mean by "strongly emergent powers". And I fully develop and illustrate my argument. Subsequently, I examine no less than 17 possible reactions to my argument. I show why all of such reactions turn out to be troublesome or inadequate.

I shall refine in this article Jaegwon Kim's theory of events by appealing to modes, i.e., particular properties that also depend on their 'bearers' for their identity. Events will turn out to be occurrent modes, i.e., relational modes having further modes and times as their relata. In Section 1 I shall briefly present Kim's theory and some difficulties that affect it. In Section 2, after having made some preliminary assumptions on modes and universals, I shall introduce occurrent modes. In Section 3 I shall show how my theory can deal with the difficulties discussed in Section 1.

I defend the thesis that, if there are substances, substance causation (i.e., causation by substances) is the only sort of causation in the universe – or the only fundamental sort. Subsequently, I develop an account of substance causation that is partly grounded on a peculiar interpretation of absolute change (i.e., of entities’ coming and ceasing to be) and qualitative change, on some ontological assumptions about modes (i.e., individual properties that ontologically depend on their bearers) and powers. Finally, I reply to some objections against substance causation in general (e.g., C. D. Broad’s objection against causes’ being non-essentially-dated entities) and to some possible objections against my own account and I briefly explore three advantages given by the acceptance of the latter.

Neo-Aristotelian views of goodness hold that the goodness of something is strictly connected with its goal(s). In this article, I shall present a power-based, Neo-Aristotelian view of goodness. I shall claim that there are certain powers (i.e., Goodness-Conferring Powers, or GC-powers in short) that confer goodness upon their bearers and upon the resulting actions. And I shall suggest that GC-powers are strongly teleological tendencies. In Section 1, I shall present the kernel of Neo-Aristotelian conceptions of goodness. In Section 2, I shall introduce strongly teleological powers and tendencies. In Section 3, GC-powers will be characterized. I shall also examine a number of options with regard to their number and features and how to single out their goodness value. In Section 4, I shall focus on good agents and on three distinct ways in which they may be good: tendential goodness, actual goodness, and purely actual goodness. Relatedly, among the actions connected with a certain GC-power, I shall also distinguish between primary and secondary actions and between pure and impure actions. In Section 5, good actions will be examined. Actions may be good in three distinct ways. Indeed, actions may be endowed with primary goodness, secondary goodness and preventative goodness. In Section 6, I shall face the remaining problems.

At least since Russell, mainstream analytic philosophy has distinguished internal and external relations and acknowledged the existence of both. This seems in line with both the manifest and scientific images of the world. However, there is a recent deflationary trend about relations, which focuses on the truthmakers of relational statements in order to show that putative external relations are in fact internal, and that internal relations do not really exist. Lowe's posthumous 2016 paper is a thorough presentation of this line of thought. This article critically analyzes Lowe's arguments in that paper, and some related arguments in recent works. It finds them wanting and thus reaffirms the irreducible reality of relations.

I shall present in this article a double negation account of the distinction between causes and background conditions. Such an account will be based on the idea that, unlike causes, background conditions allow for certain effects by way of double prevention. In Sect. 1 I shall introduce objective and non-objective theories of the causes-background conditions distinction and I shall discuss and reject some non-objective theories. In Sect. 2 I shall examine some existing objective theories and argue that they need to be supplemented in two relevant respects. In Sect. 3 I shall present my double negation account. Background conditions will be taken to allow for their effects by acting as early double preventers, late double preventers or effect double preventers. In Sect. 4 I shall deal with two main problems, i.e., the possibility of interpreting background conditions as purely indirect causes and the introduction of negative entities in my account, and with further issues.