Many people care more about humans than non-human animals, and also believe that more is owed to family members than to strangers. However, recent research has found that children have different moral intuitions than adults. Here, across two studies (N = 453), we compared how American 6- to 10-year-olds and adults differ in their prioritization of different lives on the grounds of species and familial relationship. Participants judged sinking boat dilemmas trading off varying numbers of humans and animals who were described as either family or strangers (e.g., one human stranger vs. five pet dogs). We asked participants to make third-party judgments that were normative evaluations (i.e., who is morally right to save) or emotional responses (i.e., who others would feel sadder about losing). Consistent with past work, adults prioritized humans over animals. This held regardless of kinship, and was especially pronounced for judgments of what is morally right compared to sadness judgments. By contrast, children showed a relatively weaker tendency to prioritize humans over animals, and the discrepancy in their judgments about what is right and what would make others feel sad was less pronounced—particularly in a between-subjects context. We also found that those who scored higher on a measure of cognitive reflection were more likely to prioritize humans over animals when making moral judgments, but not sadness judgments. These findings tentatively suggest that children’s moral decisions in this context may be guided more by emotion, consistent with broader patterns in moral development.

AI's greatest strength—removing friction from work and relationships—is also a liability. Prioritizing outcome over process, it eliminates desirable difficulties that drive growth. By subtracting effort from life, AI risks removing the struggles that teach us, the loneliness that connects us, and the labor that makes life meaningful.

Across three studies (N = 896), we examined the effects of perceived deliberation and political (dis)agreement on moral character judgments. We tested whether targets who agree or disagree with the participant on a political issue are evaluated more positively when they are described as deliberating (vs. not deliberating). Results showed that in cases of agreement, there was no effect of deliberation on moral character judgments. This was because deliberators were seen as less certain (which was associated with more negative evaluations) but also more thoughtful (which was associated with more positive evaluations). However, in cases of disagreement, deliberation led to more positive moral character judgments. This was because deliberators were again seen as less certain and more thoughtful, but both perceptions were associated with more positive evaluations. These findings suggest that perceived deliberation makes disagreement more palatable and that people are less concerned with how like-minded people reach their conclusions.

Contextual affective information can influence recognition memory. However, the influence of the order of this information on memory has rarely been studied. To investigate this, a series of faces were shown along with contextual person-based information. Each face was shown twice, manipulating the order of the affective contextual information: (1) emotional then neutral, (2) neutral then emotional, or (3) neutral and then neutral. The first study included negative contextual information and the second included positive information. One week later a recognition test was given for the faces. In both the negative study and the positive study, recognition memory was uninfluenced by condition, suggesting that the order in which affective information is presented is largely irrelevant. Further, exploratory Bayesian analyses revealed that faces paired with the highest arousal sentences at encoding were the least likely to be recognized at retrieval, which may represent a biasing of attention towards the high-arousal sentence and away from the low-arousal face.

Children morally prioritize humans over animals less than adults do. Is this because children are less speciesist-meaning they place less moral weight on mere species membership? Or is it because they give less weight to differences in cognitive capacity between humans and other animals? We investigated this in two experiments, presenting children and adult participants in the United States and Spain with moral trade-off dilemmas. These dilemmas involved individuals who varied in species membership (human vs. monkey) and cognitive capacity. Across both cultures, children were less likely than adults to prioritize humans over animals, regardless of cognitive capacity. In addition, participants tended to prioritize individuals with higher cognitive capacities, regardless of species membership-though this effect was less robust in children. Our findings suggest that children in these Western contexts are indeed less speciesist than adults, though they do not rule out developmental changes in the moral weight assigned to cognitive capacity.

Third-party intervention is a cornerstone of cooperative societies, yet we know little about how children develop an understanding of this social behavior. The present work generates a cross-cultural and developmental picture of how 6-, 9-, and 12-year-olds (N = 447) across four societies (India, Germany, Uganda, and the United States) reason about third-party intervention. To do so, we measured children's obligation judgments and unstructured descriptions of third-party intervention. Although some cultural differences emerged, 6-year-olds largely considered bystanders as obligated to respond to wrongdoing, regardless of the bystander's social position. In contrast, 9- and 12-year-olds were more likely to exclusively ascribe this social responsibility to people in positions of authority. Despite these age differences, children of all ages generated role-specific descriptions of third-party intervention, with authority figures intervening in distinct ways from peers. For authority figures, children in India and Uganda described third-party intervention as involving corporal punishment or unspecified punishment, whereas children in the United States described such intervention as involving only verbal intervention (i.e., telling someone to stop). For peers, children in all societies described third-party intervention as involving reporting misdeeds to an authority. Collectively, these data show that early conceptualizations of third-party intervention are rooted in shared notions of obligation yet are also subject to cultural and contextual influences.

BACKGROUND: Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) is a gold-standard approach for treating major depressive disorder in adolescents. However, nearly half of adolescents receiving CBT do not improve. To personalize treatment, it is essential to identify objective markers that predict treatment responsiveness. To address this aim, we investigated neurophysiological processes related to self-referential processing that predicted CBT response among female adolescents with depression. METHODS: At baseline, female adolescents ages 13 to 18 years (N = 80) completed a comprehensive clinical assessment, and a self-referential encoding task was administered while electroencephalographic data were recorded. Baseline electroencephalographic data were utilized to identify oscillatory differences between healthy adolescents (n = 42) and adolescents with depression (n = 38). Following the baseline assessment, adolescents with depression received up to 12 weeks of CBT. Baseline differences in electroencephalographic oscillations between healthy adolescents and those with depression were used to guide CBT prediction analysis. Clusterbased event-related spectral perturbation analysis was used to probe theta and alpha event-related synchronization (ERS)/event-related desynchronization (ERD) response to negative and positive words. RESULTS: Baseline analyses showed that, relative to the healthy adolescents, adolescents with depression exhibited higher levels of frontal theta ERS and greater posterior alpha ERD. Multilevel modeling identified primary neural pretreatment predictors of treatment response: greater theta ERS in the right prefrontal cortex after the onset of negative words and lower alpha ERD in both the right prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex. ERS and ERD associations with treatment response remained significant, with baseline depressive and anxiety symptoms included as covariates in all analyses. CONCLUSIONS: Consistent with prior research, results highlighted that relative to healthy adolescents, adolescents with depression are characterized by prominent theta synchronization and alpha desynchronization over the prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex, respectively. Cluster-based event-related spectral perturbation analysis also identified key mechanisms underlying depression-related self-referential processing that predicted improved symptoms during the course of CBT. Ultimately, a better characterization of the neural underpinnings of adolescent depression and its treatment may lead to more personalized interventions.

Developmental and experiential heterogeneity associated with caregiving-related early adversities (crEAs) poses a major challenge to identifying replicable, generalizable findings. Here conditional random forests evaluated the importance of unique crEA experiences for estimating risks to mental health in 306 children, 6–12 years of age, with heterogeneous crEA experiences (different forms of caregiver-involved abuse and/or neglect or permanent/substantial parent–child separation). The better that crEAs improved the accuracy of symptom estimates in held-out, never-before-seen children, the more important and generalizable they were considered. Here we show that earlier timing and longer duration of crEAs was especially important for elevated general psychopathology (p-factor scores). The mere presence (versus absence) of crEAs was more valuable for estimating symptom risk than were specific adversities in a broad sample. Specific adversities became more important when only looking within the crEA-exposed subsample, with adversities of an interpersonal-affective nature being the most likely to increase transdiagnostic symptom risk. Concurrent consistent caregiving also had high importance, motivating consideration of later-occurring environmental experiences in future studies of early adversity. Using a machine learning approach to improve risk estimates across heterogeneous samples, the authors demonstrate patterns of increased transdiagnostic symptom risk in children who have experienced caregiving-related early adversities.

ImportanceSuicide rates among adolescents continue to rise, but there are a lack of clinical tools to predict when youths may be at risk for suicidal behaviors.ObjectiveTo identify whether geolocation metrics, assessed through an app installed on adolescents’ personal smartphones, could detect the risk of next-week suicidal events and clinically meaningful suicidal ideation.Design, Setting, and ParticipantsThis case series study included high-risk adolescents aged 13 to 18 years reporting a current affective and/or substance use disorder, oversampled for suicidal thoughts and behaviors (STB). Participants were recruited from the greater New York City and Pittsburgh communities through psychiatric outpatient programs, emergency departments, medical center research registries, and social media. Participants installed the Effortless Assessment Research System (EARS) software application onto their personal smartphones, which obtained passive sensor data, including geolocation metrics (via the global positioning system [GPS]), as well as weekly experience sampling data probing STB for the duration of the 6-month study. Adolescents also completed clinical assessments at baseline as well as during the 1-, 3-, and 6-month follow-up assessments. Statistical analysis was performed from March 2023 to November 2024.Main Outcomes and MeasuresRepeated measures mixed-effects logistic models estimated whether weekly aggregates of geolocation features (ie, entropy, homestay, distance traveled) were associated with next-week suicidal events (ie, suicide attempts, psychiatric hospitalizations, emergency department visits for suicide concerns) and clinically meaningful ideation (via weekly experience sampling).ResultsOverall, 186 participants were included in this study (148 [79.6%] female; 19 [10.2%] Asian, 23 [12.4%] Black, and 106 [57.0%] White), with a mean (SD) age of 16.4 (1.7) years. Greater homestay (amount of time spent at home) on a given week, relative to one’s own mean, was associated with 2-fold greater odds of suicidal events during the subsequent week (odds ratio, 1.99 [95% CI, 1.15-3.45]). Results were not significant for entropy and distance traveled metrics. However, using leave-future-out validation, the accuracy of the homestay model was modest (area under the receiver operating characteristic curve, 0.64 [95% CI, 0.50-0.78]).Conclusions and RelevanceAdvancements in smartphone technology afford unique opportunities to capture affective and behavioral dynamics that presage suicide risk. This case series study found that greater homestay obtained through smartphone GPS data over the course of a week, relative to one’s own mean, was associated with greater odds of a suicidal event in the subsequent week. Although accuracy was modest, these findings offer a novel starting point for suicide prevention research, particularly as smartphone sensor data may have the capacity to identify who is at risk while also providing an opportunity to deliver clinical tools when that risk is greatest.

Recent research in which individuals are encouraged to share stories of their own charitable giving on social media suggests that such sharing facilitates perceptions of prosocial norms and increases charitable donations. However, we predicted that this sharing might also incur unforeseen emotional costs, diminishing the "warm glow" of altruism. Across 5 preregistered experiments (N = 2840), participants reported that they would feel worse when sharing their own good deeds compared to their achievements, and substantially worse when sharing these stories on social media (compared to telling a friend or not sharing). In contrast, participants reported that others would feel better (i.e., less shame and embarrassment, more happiness and pride) after reporting their own good deeds. These studies suggest that individuals believe that (1) reporting their own good deeds will leave them feeling worse, and (2) others will not suffer similar negative feelings.

BackgroundThere is burgeoning interest in the application of neuroscientific technology to facilitate meditation and lead to beneficial psychological outcomes. One popular approach is using consumer-grade neurofeedback devices to deliver feedback on brain targets during meditation (mindfulness-based neurofeedback). It is hypothesized that optimizing brain targets like alpha and theta band activity may allow meditators to experience deeper mindfulness and thus beneficial outcomes. ObjectiveThis study aimed to systematically review and meta-analyze the impacts of consumer-grade mindfulness-based neurofeedback compared with control conditions. Included studies involved mindfulness practice operationalized as open monitoring or focused attention meditation. This study was preregistered. MethodsA total of 16 randomized controlled training trials, as well as 5 randomized within-participant designs were included, encompassing 763 and 167 unique participants, respectively. Effects were categorized outcomes (ie, psychological distress, cognitive function, and physiological health) and process variables (ie, state mindfulness and brain measures). Study risk of bias, reporting bias, and publication bias were assessed. ResultsSamples were typically small (n=30-50), and the majority of studies used mindfulness apps as controls. To deliver neurofeedback, most studies used the Muse device (11/16 randomized controlled trials [RCTs]). There was a modest effect for decreases in psychological distress compared with controls (k=11, g=–0.16, P=.03), and heterogeneity was low (I2< 0.25). However, there was no evidence for improvements in cognition (k=7, g=0.07, P=.48), mindfulness (k=9, g=0.02, P=.83), and physiological health (k=7, g=0.11, P=.57) compared to controls. Mechanistic modulation of brain targets was not found in RCTs or within-participant designs. Sex (male or female), age, clinical status, study quality, active or passive controls, sample size, and neurofeedback duration did not moderate effects. There was some evidence for reporting bias, but no evidence of publication bias. Adverse effects were not assessed in 19 out of 21 studies and not found in the 2 studies that assessed them. ConclusionsAssertions that consumer-grade devices can allow participants to modulate their brains and deepen their meditations are not currently supported. It is possible that neurofeedback effects may rely on “neurosuggestion” (placebo effects of neurotechnology). Future research should examine more extensive calibration and individualization of devices, larger sample sizes, and gold-standard sham-controlled RCTs.

Intensive longitudinal research–including experience sampling and smartphone sensor monitoring–has potential for identifying proximal risk factors for psychopathology, including suicidal thoughts and behaviors (STB). Yet, missing data can complicate analysis and interpretation. This study aimed to address whether clinical and study design factors are associated with missing data, and whether missingness predicts changes in symptom severity or STB. Adolescents ages 13-18-years-old (N=179) reporting depressive, anxiety, and/or substance use disorders were enrolled; 65% reported current suicidal ideation and 29% indicated a past-year attempt. Passively acquired smartphone sensor data (e.g., GPS, accelerometer, keyboard inputs), daily mood surveys, and weekly suicidal ideation surveys were collected during the 6-month study period using the Effortless Assessment Research System (EARS) smartphone app. First, acquisition of passive smartphone sensor data (with data on ~80% of days across the whole sample) was strongly associated with survey data acquisition the same day (~44% of days). Second, STB and psychiatric symptoms were largely not associated with missing data. Rather, temporal features (e.g., length of time in study, weekends, summer) explained more missingness of survey and passive smartphone sensor data. Last, within-participant changes in missing data over time neither followed nor predicted subsequent change in suicidal ideation and psychiatric symptoms. Findings indicate that considering technical and study design factors impacting missingness is critical and highlight several factors that should be addressed to maximize the validity of clinical interpretations in intensive longitudinal research.

ObjectiveIn the current project, we focus on another group of unusual altruists: people who have taken the Giving What We Can (GWWC) pledge to donate at least 10% of their income to charity. Our project aims to understand what is unique about this population. BackgroundMany people care about helping, but in recent years there has been a surge of research examining those whose moral concern for others goes far beyond that of the typical population. These unusual altruists (also termed extraordinary or extreme altruists or moral exemplars) make great personal sacrifices to help others-such as donating their kidneys to strangers or participating in COVID-19 vaccine challenge trials. MethodIn a global study (N = 536) we examine a number of cognitive and personality traits of GWWC pledgers and compare them to a country-matched comparison group. ResultsIn accordance with our predictions, GWWC pledgers were better at identifying fearful faces, more morally expansive and higher in actively open-minded thinking, need for cognition and two subscales of utilitarianism and, tentatively, lower in social dominance orientation. Against our predictions, they were lower in maximizing tendency. Finally, we found an inconclusive relationship between pledger status and empathy/compassion that we believe warrants further examination. ConclusionsThese findings offer initial insights into the characteristics that set apart those who have made the decision to donate a substantial portion of their income to help others.

Neurofeedback concurrent with mindfulness meditation may reveal meditation effects on the brain and facilitate improved mental health outcomes. Here, we systematically reviewed electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies of mindfulness meditation with neurofeedback (mbNF) and followed PRISMA guidelines. We identified 9 fMRI reports, consisting of 177 unique participants, and 9 EEG reports, consisting of 242 participants. Studies of fMRI focused primarily on downregulating the default-mode network (DMN). Although studies found decreases in DMN activations during neurofeedback, there is a lack of evidence for transfer effects, and the majority of studies did not employ adequate controls, for example, sham neurofeedback. Accordingly, DMN decreases may have been confounded by general task-related deactivation. EEG studies typically examined alpha, gamma, and theta frequency bands, with the most robust evidence supporting the modulation of theta band activity. Both EEG and fMRI mbNF have been implemented with high fidelity in clinical populations. However, the mental health benefits of mbNF have not been established. In general, mbNF studies would benefit from sham-controlled RCTs, as well as clear reporting (e.g., CRED-NF).

We live in an age where robots are increasingly present in the social and moral world. Here, we explore how children and adults think about the mental lives and moral standing of robots. In Experiment 1 (N = 116), we found that children granted humans and robots with more mental life and vulnerability to harm than an anthropomorphized control (i.e., a toy bear). In Experiment 2 (N = 157), we found that, relative to children, adults ascribed less mental life and vulnerability to harm to robots. In Experiment 3 (N = 152), we modified our experiment to be within-subjects and measured beliefs concerning moral standing. Though younger children again appeared willing to assign mental capacities — particularly those related to experience (e.g., being capable of experiencing hunger) — to robots, older children and adults did so to a lesser degree. This diminished attribution of mental life tracked with diminished ratings of robot moral standing. This informs ongoing debates concerning emerging attitudes about artificial life.

Our understanding of ownership influences how we interact with objects and with each other. Here, we studied people's intuitions about ownership transfer using a set of simple, parametrically varied events. We found that people (N = 120 U.S. adults) had similar intuitions about ownership for some events but sharply opposing intuitions for others (Experiment 1). People (N = 120 U.S. adults) were unaware of these conflicts and overestimated ownership consensus (Experiment 2). Moreover, differences in people's ownership intuitions predicted their intuitions about the acceptability of using, altering, controlling, and destroying the owned object (N = 130 U.S. adults; Experiment 3), even when ownership was not explicitly mentioned (N = 130 U.S. adults; Experiment 4). Subject-level analyses suggest that these disagreements reflect at least two underlying intuitive theories, one in which intentions are central to ownership and another in which physical possession is prioritized.

Cognitive science has demonstrated that we construct knowledge about the world by abstracting patterns from routinely encountered experiences and storing them as semantic memories. This preregistered study tested the hypothesis that caregiving-related early adversities (crEAs) shape affective semantic memories to reflect the content of those adverse interpersonal-affective experiences. We also tested the hypothesis that because affective semantic memories may continue to evolve in response to later-occurring positive experiences, child-perceived attachment security will inform their content. The sample comprised 160 children (ages 6-12 at Visit 1; 87F/73 M), 66% of whom experienced crEAs (n = 105). At Visit 1, crEA exposure prior to study enrollment was operationalized as parental-reports endorsing a history of crEAs (abuse/neglect, permanent/significant parent-child separation); while child-reports assessed concurrent attachment security. A false memory task was administered online ∼2.5 years later (Visit 2) to probe the content of affective semantic memories-specifically attachment schemas. Results showed that crEA exposure (vs. no exposure) was associated with a higher likelihood of falsely endorsing insecure (vs. secure) schema scenes. Attachment security moderated the association between crEA exposure and insecure schema-based false recognition. Findings suggest that interpersonal-affective semantic schemas include representations of parent-child interactions that may capture the quality of one's own attachment experiences and that these representations shape how children remember attachment-relevant narrative events. Findings are also consistent with the hypothesis that these affective semantic memories can be modified by later experiences. Moving forward, the approach taken in this study provides a means of operationalizing Bowlby's notion of internal working models within a cognitive neuroscience framework. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Affective semantic memories representing insecure schema knowledge (child needs + needs-not-met) may be more salient, elaborated, and persistent among youths exposed to early caregiving adversity. All youths, irrespective of early caregiving adversity exposure, may possess affective semantic memories that represent knowledge of secure schemas (child needs + needs-met). Establishing secure relationships with parents following early-occurring caregiving adversity may attenuate the expression of insecure semantic memories, suggesting potential malleability. Affective semantic memories include schema representations of parent-child interactions that may capture the quality of one's own attachment experiences and shape how youths remember attachment-relevant events.