Abstract This paper examines whether the contemporary understanding of the Five Modes, as consisting of two groups (one targeting belief and the other targeting justification) and concluding that knowledge and justification are impossible, is an adequate interpretation of what Sextus said about them. One problem is that the contemporary ordering of the Five Modes does not match Sextus’ two orderings thereof. Next, this paper claims that, for Sextus, all Modes target both opinion and justification, and that their relation to epochē varies. It also claims that the first ordering concerns particular justifications for a single topic, whereas the second generalizes this result, showing that they lead to epochē about everything. Finally, it suggests that the Pyrrhonist may use these Five Modes in many ways, either individually or collectively (using some or all, in any order).

This paper criticizes the interpretation that Sextus considered Academic philosophy as a form of dogmatism, either negative or positive. First, it offers an interpretation of Academic philosophy as a third main kind of philosophy distinct from dogmatism. Next, it examines what Sextus says concerning each major Academic: Arcesilaus, Carneades, and Clitomachus. Finally, it holds that Academic philosophy is the closest philosophical neighbor to skepticism by developing a new interpretation of the final part of the Outlines. In each case, it is shown that, for Sextus, both Pyrrhonism and Academic philosophy are non-dogmatic, and that they differ in their specific ways of being non-dogmatic. The main thesis of this paper is that Academic philosophy is closer to skepticism than to dogmatism.

There is a widespread idea that the Philosophy Department at University of São Paulo, has been structuralist since the 1960s. In my opinion, this is a myth, the result of a misunderstanding of what structuralism is. I distinguish between three parts of structuralism: its conception of philosophy, its dogmas and its method for doing history of philosophy. I then discuss, for each of these parts, in what sense structuralism may still have left deep traces, for better or worse, in the Philosophy Department at University of São Paulo. Next, I point out what seems to me to be an ambiguity in the structuralist idea of method: one should distinguish between the philosopher’s method and the method of the structuralist historian of philosophy. Concerning the first, while structuralism offers an argument against all dogmatic methods, I propose the skeptical method as the best one. Finally, I argue that the structuralist rules for doing history of philosophy are good ones, but in many cases insufficient. Thereby I propose a methodological pluralism.

This paper presents and argues for a contemporary version of skepticism: neo-Pyrrhonism. Interest in the history of skepticism engendered a new, more complex and attractive conception of skepticism. Accordingly, many philosophers now claim they are skeptics. In line with what they say, I develop neo-Pyrrhonism as I see it. It has a negative part, in which dogmas are criticized, and a positive one: first, the neo-Pyrrhonist lives his life according to his skeptical principles and following everyday life, and, second, he is able to describe philosophically his skeptical view of the world, thereby offering possible solutions to philosophical problems empirically conceived.

The interpreters divided Hume's philosophy, his "logic," into two parts: the destructive part would be composed of his philosophical analyses, his critique of rationalism, and his skeptical moments; the constructive part would contain its psychological associationism, its empirical science of human nature, and its naturalistic or realistic moments. My intention is to question any interpretation that involves that two-part dichotomy and instead suggest that Hume performs both tasks at the same time, in successive stages. I show the unity of his philosophy in three topics: an examination of the articulation between the principle of copying and the principles of association; a demonstration of how Hume performs different tasks in two distinct stages, one negative and one positive; and a critique of the supposed skeptical and naturalistic moments.

Los intérpretes han dividido la filosofía de Hume, su “lógica”, en dos partes: la destructiva, compuesta por sus análisis filosóficos, su crítica del racionalismo y sus momentos escépticos; la constructiva, que contiene su asociacionismo psicológico, su ciencia empírica de la naturaleza humana y sus momentos naturalistas o realistas. Mi intención es cuestionar cualquier interpretación que suponga esa dicotomía, y mostrar que Hume realiza ambas tareas al mismo tiempo, en etapas sucesivas. Muestro la unidad de su filosofía en tres tópicos: un examen de la articulación entre el principio de la copia y los principios de asociación; un análisis de la estructura de los argumentos de Hume una crítica de los supuestos momentos escéptico y naturalista.

My intention, in this paper, is to elaborate a conception of colors as part of a skeptical view of the world. In order to do that, I examine how some of the major skeptics throughout the history of philosophy conceived colors, in relation both to other sensible qualities and to the physical object. Next, in the light of the exchange between Barry Stroud and John McDowell, I describe what seems to me to be the common conception of color, which the skeptic not only accepts, but goes even further claiming that he may know the color of objects through sense-perception.

Olexandr Lukovyna’s interview with Professor Plínio Junqueira Smith is devoted to skeptic research in Brazilian philosophy, the beginning of skeptic studies in Brazil, Oswaldo Porchat’s and Ezequiel de Olaso’s roles in establishing the tradition of skeptic studies, contemporary studies in skepticism, and the global state of affairs in skeptic research.

Resumo: Neste artigo, pretende-se desenvolver uma concepção sobre as cores como parte de uma visão cética do mundo. Para isso, investiga-se como alguns dos principais céticos, ao longo da história da filosofia, conceberam as cores, seja em relação a outras qualidades sensíveis, seja em relação ao objeto físico. Depois, à luz do debate entre Barry Stroud e John McDowell, descreve-se aquela que parece ser a concepção comum das cores, sustentando-se que o cético não apenas aceita que os objetos são coloridos, mas que ele pode saber qual é a sua cor, por meio da percepção.

The task of this chapter is to explain how the skeptical ability is not only a causal ability, but also a rational one. Though many scholars hold that it leads only causally, not rationally, to suspension of judgment, I claim that the skeptical ability is guided by the skeptical main principle, which ultimately depends on the idea of a skeptical logos. I try to show this point in the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus, in the Mode of Disagreement (and other Agrippan Modes), and also in philosophical investigation in which Sextus argues on both sides of an opposition. Accordingly, there are three rational ways to arrive at suspension: via an argument, in the absence of an argument to justify a dogmatic assertion, and when there is no further argument to incline one towards one side. I also argue that the arguments used by the Pyrrhonist are not only dialectical, but some of them are put forward in his own voice. Some think that, in order to understand the rationality of the skeptical arguments, one needs to postulate ‘principles’ or ‘epistemic norms,’ but it is enough to accept reasonings employed in everyday life. Sextus provides a skeptical explanation of philosophical arguments, which are based on the so-called commemorative signs. Ultimately, philosophical arguments are experienced as persuasive and are reminders of what can be said on both sides of an opposition, thereby exposing our reason as rhetorical, not as demonstrative.

This chapter explains the notions of ataraxia and metriopatheia that are the skeptic’s goals (PH 1.25–30). According to a widespread interpretation, the skeptic is a detached person, both from the world and from himself, and such a life is unattractive. This interpretation misunderstands what ataraxia and metriopatheia are. Paying attention to the disturbances that are to be eliminated, I offer an interpretation of imperturbability as having two aspects, an intellectual and a moral one: the intellectual aspect concerns opinions, and what produces perturbation is the conflict among opinions; the moral one is produced by a single opinion, and it concerns our behavior. Moderation of the affection, on the other hand, depends on not amplifying what one necessarily feels by her opinions or by a deliberate assent to appearances. I interpret the Pyrrhonist as holding the relativity of moral values, since he may assent to values that appear to him in certain circumstances. This belief in values gives meaning to his actions and furnishes to him reasons to act, so that he is engaged in everyday life and is responsible for what he does. The Pyrrhonist aims at a restructuring of one’s life, not only of one’s mind: by not holding any moral opinion or philosophical theory, he will act peacefully in the world.

O artigo responde a duas perguntas: o que Montaigne entende por experiência? Como ele constrói sua ciência de si mesmo com base na experiência? Há diversos tipos de experiência e é preciso compreender como cada tipo permite a construção de sua ciência. Aprende-se da experiência coletiva da prática jurídica pelo contraexemplo; da experiência interna da alma pelo exemplo tomado a contrapelo; e, por fim, pelo exemplo da experiência pura, aprendem-se as regras para a saúde corporal.

This chapter explains how the Pyrrhonist can sincerely go on investigating the truth while at the same time both suspending of judgment and producing again suspension of judgment. I argue that the Pyrrhonist continues his investigation of the truth, doing more or less the same thing as before. But continued investigation has two conditions: suspension of judgment and imperturbability. So, he no longer hopes to arrive imperturbability, for he is already in this condition, but only to preserve it. Next, I try to explain how the skeptical logos directs continued investigation: it both imposes an order through a method and it imposes a rhythm to the investigation dictated by the main principle. This will provide a first description of the skeptical investigation. A proper understanding of the main skeptical principle (PH 1.12) shows not only how this is possible, but also that the Pyrrhonist, far from putting an end to his researches, is to be considered as the guardian of philosophical investigation. The dogmatist is conceived as someone who puts an end to her investigation too soon, thereby not satisfying the very criterion she herself accepts. The skeptic, therefore, is the philosopher who best preserves the philosophical ideal of a careful, patient, and rational investigation.

This chapter focuses on the criterion of action (PH 1.21–24) and argues that the Pyrrhonist can live his life in light of his skeptical way of reasoning, which tells him to follow what appears. It explains the notions of what appears (to phainomenon), affection (pathos), and appearance (phantasia), and how they are connected. Since what appears is to be contrasted to what is non-evident, I turn my attention to clarify this contrast. Next, I argue that the contrast between what appears and what is non-evident does not match the contrast between everyday life and philosophy, as many seem to think. The skeptic suspends judgment about non-evident objects, whether in everyday life or in philosophy, while he assents to what appears, whether in everyday life or in philosophy. This leads me to discuss the formula hoson epi tô logô. Finally, I examine the dispute whether Sextus raised the problem of the external world as Descartes did. Sextus saw that the problem of our knowledge of the external world is a consequence of some dogmatic doctrines about the role played by appearances in the logical criterion of truth (but he suspended judgment about them), and he was able to raise an aporia concerning the physical world as a whole, based on the main skeptical principle.