This article examines the Royal Navy ( rn ) in the aftermath of the Falklands War of 1982, focussing on the long-standing disparity between commitments and resources in UK defence planning. Two central arguments are developed. First, it is argued that the 1981 defence review failed to address the disparity between UK commitments with resources. Second, despite victory in the Falklands War, the UK naval lobby failed to reverse the long-term decline in the size of the rn although, in the long-term, the 1982 war reinforced the case for enhancing rn maritime aviation capabilities. This article presents a case of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the rn seeking, and failing, to resolve an insoluble problem. This analysis of UK naval policy demonstrates that British defence planning remains torn between a maritime strategy and a continental commitment to the present day.

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Correction StatementThis article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.Notes1. Brian Rowan, “Stakeknife: Truth about our dirty war just too shocking to ever be revealed”, Belfast Telegraph, 22 October 2015.2. Scappaticci, who died in 2023, denied being the agent codenamed Stakeknife – who successfully infiltrated the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) whilst working for the British Army’s Force Research Unit (FRU). It has been claimed that Stakeknife worked for the security forces whilst arranging for the murder of several dozen ‘informers’ by the PIRA’s Internal Security Unit (the ‘nutting Squad’). The British, meanwhile refrained from interfering in such activities in order to maintain Stakeknife’s cover. Media reports identified Scappaticci as Stakeknife in 2003 – causing him to move to England. Although arrested in 2018, he was never prosecuted. Scappaticci died in April 2023 maintaining his innocence to the end. Rory Carroll, “Man suspected of being Stakeknife, Britain’s top spy in IRA, dies,” The Guardian (London), 11 April 2023. On Stakeknife, see Greg Harkin and Martin Ingram, Stakeknife: Britain’s secret agents in Ireland (Dublin: O’Brien Press, 2004).3. Patrick Radden Keefe, “Letter from Belfast: Where the Bodies Are Buried Gerry Adams has long denied being a member of the I.R.A. But his former compatriots claim that he authorized murder,” The New Yorker, 9 March 2015.4. See, for example, Mark Urban, Big Boys’ Rules: SAS and the Secret Struggle Against the IRA (London: Faber and Faber, 1993), 26; Peter Taylor, Provos: The IRA & Sinn Féin (London: Bloomsbury, 1997), 140; Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA (London: Penguin, 2002), 140; Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Pan, 2003), 110.5. BBC News, “Boston tapes: Q&A on secret Troubles confessions”, 17 October 2019, Accessed July 7, 2023. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-272387976. Commanded by Pat McClure. Patrick Radden Keefe, Say Nothing: A True Story of Murder and Memory in Northern Ireland (London: William Collins, 2019), 103–4.7. BBC News, “Boston College project: PSNI get Dolours Price interview transcripts,” July 7, 2013, Accessed 7 July 2023. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-northern-ireland-23216615Additional informationNotes on contributorsBrendan SomersBreandan Somers is originally from Mullingar, County Wexford, in the Republic of Ireland. He worked in Dublin for many years as a party-political adviser and print journalist. He is now retired and lives in Aberystwyth in the UK.R. Gerald HughesR. Gerald Hughes from Rhosneigr, Ynys Môn, is Reader in Military History and Director of the Centre for Intelligence and International Security Studies at Aberystwyth University. His publications include ‘Carl von Clausewitz and his Philosophy of War: The Evolution of a Reputation, 1831-2021’, History, 105/368 (2020): 773-805; ‘Journeys back along the roads to Mandalay, Imphal and Kohima: recent contributions to the history of the Burma theatre in the Second World War’, Intelligence and National Security, 37/1 (2022), 126-144 (with Stephen Hanna); 'Timely memoirs and the ‘British invasion’: two trends in the historiography of the CIA', Journal of Intelligence History, https://doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2022.2051920 (2022, with Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones); Germany and the Cold War: The Search for a European Détente, 1949–1967 (2007/2014); and The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (2014). His edited books include: The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal (2016, with Len Scott). R. Gerald Hughes is a member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society (FRHistS).

The four scholars whose pieces comprise this section on 'Christopher Andrew and the myriad worlds of intelligence. are R. Gerald Hughes, Loch K. Johnson, David Robarge and Peter Jackson. As his contribution R. Gerald Hughes has written articles introducing, analysing and contextualising the life's work and achievements of Christopher Andrew. He demonstrates how Andrew's activism in campaigning and lobbying for open government has been intimately associated with his scholarship in the field of Intelligence Studies. Loch Johnson and David Robarge focus on Andrew's magisterial global history, The Secret World: A History of Intelligence. The section is concluded by Peter Jackson's appraisal of Christopher Andrew as scholar, teacher and mentor.

This article explores recent literature on the often-overlooked Burma theatre of the Second World War. The brutal contest in Burma, which took place in the most hostile of climates, was never a priority for any of the belligerents in the global war. Despite this, a re-examination of the men who fought in the jungles, hills, and plains of Burma from myriad nations and cultures - and who bled and died in their thousands - adds a number of dimensions to our understanding of the war in the Far East. The twenty-first century has seen an expansion of the literature on the Burma theatre which has added both depth and colour to this truly unique arena of war. These contributions are invaluable in the realms of logistics, airpower, intelligence, politics, and soldiery. This fresh wave of literature includes the re-publication of certain first-hand examinations of some of the most disastrous moments in British military history; the longest fighting retreat conducted by the British Army; the reforging of that army into a victorious fighting force; and accounts of some of the greatest special operations units in history. Such accounts, in tandem with a number of recent scholarly monographs and edited volumes, argue strongly for the rediscovery of this 'forgotten' war.

This article examines the evolution of the discipline of Intelligence Studies by evaluating how academics have woven scholarship with activism targeting prevailing cultures of state secrecy. Christopher Andrew has been in the vanguard of these efforts, and it is argued here that he pursued these goals for three reasons. First, the old cultures of secrecy hampered historical scholarship. Second, these cultures represented an obstruction to public understanding of the mission of intelligence agencies. Third, obsessive secrecy inhibited the ability of the intelligence agencies to benefit from a very real engagement with the past. Andrew has been instrumental in melding the causes of democratic accountability with that of academic freedom, successfully arguing for reforming cultures of secrecy.

The 9/11 and WMD controversies have encouraged new trends in CIA historiography. The writing of timely leadership memoirs means that in-house viewpoints now tend to precede outside assessment, eliminating one of intelligence historiography’s distinctive quirks. At the same time, former CIA personnel are far more willing to go on the record with journalists and scholars thus ensuring that their version of events reaches the widest possible audience. Finally, an invasion of British scholars into the field comes with the promise of objectivity conferred by distance. It is argued that, because of that distance, there has been a disposition to rely on the kind of source material that lends itself to a cultural approach to CIA history.

This article is concerned with the evolution of the reputation of the Prussian soldier and philosopher of war, Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831). It examines developments in debates about the reception, and relevance, of Clausewitz's work for strategic thought in both the historical and contemporary contexts. This article takes note of many of the misperceptions and misinterpretations directed at Clausewitz's work since his death. It argues that much of the criticism directed at Clausewitz is rooted in a visceral dislike of past proponents of Clausewitz for their aggressive and militaristic policies. An appreciation of this history is nevertheless useful for facilitating accurate interpretations of Clausewitz's work. Finally, the article argues that the notion of Clausewitz as advocate of militarism and aggressive war has been largely discredited. Indeed, in today's Federal Republic of Germany, the reformers masterminding the Wars of Liberation against Napoleon, of whom Clausewitz was one, and the resistance involved in the bomb plot of 20 July 1944, have now come to represent a useable historical tradition.

The term ‘Securitization’ refers to a sub-field of Security Studies. It refers to a ‘speech act’ whereby states deem given policy areas to be primarily defined as being in the realm of responsibili...

‘We cannot allow [Nasser], who has neither the authority of a throne nor of a parliament to destroy our base and threaten our rear’ Harold Macmillan, diary entry for 23 September 19551 ‘The ‘Nasser...

‘The noblest part of a man is his passport’ Ziffel to Kalle in Bertolt Brecht’s Conversations in Exile.1‘What is a refugee?’ and ‘What is a refugee crisis?’ are key questions vexing policy makers, ...