The complete, or almost complete, absence from the Theaetetus of any unequivocal reference to Platonic Forms is a problem, the solution of which appeared to many scholars to have been found and convincingly presented in the late Professor Gornford's book Plato's Theory of Knowledge, published in 1935. Put briefly, his contention was that the main purpose of the dialogue is to show that no acceptable definition of knowledge can be reached if the Forms are left out of account, that there are a number of passages in which any reader of the middle dialogues would see that they were deliberately being left out of account, and one or two, namely in the famous digression on the philosophic life, and in the discussion of ‘common terms’ , where they are actually brought in, though not indeed under the name of
Plato . Philebus and Epinomis. Translation and Introduction by (A. E.) Taylor. Ed. by R. Klibansky with the co-operation of G. Calogero and A. C. Lloyd. London: Thomas Nelson, 1956. Pp. vi + 272. 21s. - Volume 77 Issue 2
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Plato on the Imitation of God - Gilbert Gerow Rutenber: The Doctrine of the Imitation of God in Plato. Pp. 115. New York: King's Crown Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1946. Paper, 8s. 6d. net. - Volume 62 Issue 3-4
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Plato - Alexandre Koyré: Discovering Plato. Translated by L. C. Rosenfield. Pp. ix+119. New York: Columbia University Press (London: Oxford University Press), 1945. Cloth, 10s. net. - Volume 61 Issue 1
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It is universally agreed that Plato inherited from Socrates, and consistently maintained to the end, the doctrine that no man does evil of set purpose—οὐδε⋯ς ⋯κὼν ⋯μαρτ⋯νει—but because he mistakes evil for good. All moral evil, therefore, for Plato, involves ignorance. There are, however, two passages, one in the Sophist, the other in Laws ix, which on the face of them appear to recognize a type of moral evil in which ignorance is not involved, a type which is indeed contrasted with that arising from ignorance. These passages have not, of course, been overlooked by scholars: they are regularly referred to in the best-known accounts of Platonic ethical theory; yet I do not think they have been sufficiently considered, nor is a clear answer forthcoming to the question whether or no in these later dialogues Plato really intends, as he seems to intend, a modification of his earlier ethical doctrine. My purpose is to show that he does not, and to account if possible for his apparent inconsistency.
Plato's examination of False Statement (Sophist 259 D–263 D) is, like many of his discussions in the later dialogues, a mixture of complete lucidity with extreme obscurity. Any English student who seeks to understand it will of course turn first to Professor Cornford's translation and commentary; and if he next reads what M. Diès has to say in the Introduction to his Budé edition of the Sophist he will, I think, have sufficient acquaintance with the views of modern Platonic scholars on the subject. For myself, at least, I have not gained any further understanding from other writers than these two.
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The Philebus - Platon: Œuvres completès. Tome IX, 2e Partie: Philèbe. Texte établi et traduit par Auguste Diès. (Collection Budé) Pp. cxiii+94. Paris: ‘Les Belles Lettres’, 1941. Paper, 40 fr. - Volume 59 Issue 2
This famous sentence, which opens the address of the Demiurge to the created gods, has puzzled commentators both ancient and modern. We must, I think, agree with Taylor and Cornford, who both discuss it at length, that no sense can be got out of θεọἰ θε⋯ν taken together, i.e. with a comma after θε⋯ν: I need notreproduce their arguments on this point. Accordingly they punctuate after θεọἰ. Taylor, however, thinks that even so the sentence cannot be translated, and accepts Badham's proposal to read ộδων in place of θε⋯ν ⋯ν. He then takes ộδων ἒπγων as an instance of ‘inverse relative attraction’ and translates ‘Ye gods, works whereof I am maker and father, seeing they were fashioned by my hands, are indissoluble without my consent’. Cornford objects to ộδων on the grounds that it creates an objectionable hiatus between the first two words (and it is true that the Timaeus is very sparing of hiatus), and also that it destroys what he finds to be the dominant rhythm of the whole speech, and particularly of this first sentence. That rhythm is Cretic: θεọἰ θε⋯ν ⋯ν ẻγὠ δημωνπγ⋯ς πατ⋯π ἒπγων: which he compares the famous opening of the De Corona τοῖς θεοῖς ε⋯χομα π⋯δ κα⋯ π⋯δς. I am, however, doubtful about the cogency of this argument from rhythm, as I have noticed a number of places in the dialogue where a similar rhythm occurs to all appearance naturally:58 A κα⋯ ππ⋯ς αὐτὐν πεφνκνῖα βοὑλεδθα.66 C ⋯δὺ κα⋯ ποδφλ⋯ς παντ⋯ π⋯ν.70 A τ⋯ν τε δ⋯ καπδ⋯αν ⋯μμ⋯των.77 A τ⋯ς γ⋯π ⋯νθπωπ⋯νης δνγγεν⋯81 δ⋯γκλεν αὐτ⋯ν ππ⋯ς ἂλληλα κ⋯κτηα.
