According to the theory of cultural transmission in minorities (Mchitarjan & Reisenzein, 2014a), sociocultural groups desire to maintain their cultural system and transmit it to the next generation. We report a factorial survey experiment that tested a central assumption of the theory: The culture-transmission motive is activated by perceived threats to cultural transmission and motivates pedagogical actions designed to cope with those threats. Young adults imagined that they decided to emigrate to a fictitious country with their partner and child. The degree of threat to cultural transmission was manipulated by varying the description of the immigration country on six dimensions representing favorable or unfavorable conditions for cultural transmission, while the strength of the participants’ culture-transmission motive was measured. As predicted, (1) obstacles to cultural transmission (e.g., different values and norms) increased participants’ anxiety about losing the culture of origin and their intentions (behavioral self-predictions) to engage in culture-preserving actions (e.g., living cultural values in the family); (2) the effects of the obstacles generally increased with the strength of the culture-transmission motive; (3) the combined effects of obstacles and the culture-transmission motive on intentions to engage in culture-preserving actions were partly mediated by anxiety about the loss of culture.

In my commentary I expand on the theory-based approach to animal emotions by examining what appraisal theories of emotions suggest about them. I argue that if we assume that core appraisal mechanisms of humans - I focus on the appraisals of motive-congruence and unexpectedness - plus the mechanism underlying the generation of adaptive action goals by appraisals, are innate, then we are implicitly committed to assuming a much larger set of innate components of the human mind. These components include a propositional belief-desire representation system, complete with a basic vocabulary and likely a basic set of beliefs, as well as mechanisms for desire-derivation, action selection and action execution, and a set of basic motives. Because these innate components of the mind are candidates for trans-species continuity, appraisal theory suggests that at least closely related species, and possibly all mammals, share a subset of emotions with humans. Other animal species likely possess nonpropositional analogues of appraisal mechanisms that generate emotion-analogue states. At the same time, even shared "propositional" emotions are expected to show substantial differences between humans and nonhuman animals due to several uniquely human adaptations. These include a far greater number and much more complex concepts, the existence of natural language, and cultural transmission.

We describe a theoretical framework for the measurement of the intensity of emotional experiences and summarize findings of a series of studies that implemented this framework. Our approach is based on a realist view of quantities and combines the modern psychometric (i.e., latent-variable) view of measurement with a deductive order of inquiry for testing measurement axioms. At the core of the method are nonmetric probabilistic difference scaling methods, a class of indirect scaling methods based on ordinal judgments of intensity differences. Originally developed to scale sensations and preferences, these scaling methods are also well-suited for measuring emotion intensity, particularly in basic research. They are easy to perform and provide scale values of emotion intensity that are much more precise than the typically used, quality-intensity emotion rating scales. Furthermore, the scale values appear to fulfill central measurement-theoretical axioms necessary for interval-level measurement. Because of these properties, difference scaling methods allow precise tests of emotion theories on the individual subject level.

This special section of Emotion Review is devoted to the discussion of a recent philosophical emotion theory, the theory of emotions as affective position-takings (Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality, Palgrave MacMillan, 2019). The aims of the special section are to provide readers with a spotlight view of recent research in the philosophy of emotion, to advance emotion theory, and support the interdisciplinary dialogue. To increase the accessibility of the special section texts to a nonphilosophical readership, we first discuss the relationship between the philosophy and the psychology of emotions and give a brief review the main types of theories of emotional experience.

According to the semantic primacy hypothesis of emotion generation, stimuli must be semantically categorized to evoke emotions. This hypothesis was tested in two speeded reaction time experiments that also explored the processes underlying valence judgments. Participants viewed pleasant and unpleasant pictures. In different blocks of trials, they pressed a key as soon as they experienced the feeling evoked by a picture, recognized the depicted object, or detected the valence (pleasant/unpleasant) of the picture. Object recognition was significantly earlier than affect onset, and the two latencies were positively correlated. The latency of valence detection was in between the latencies of object recognition and affect and correlated with both. Experiment 2 additionally found that blurring the pictures delayed the onset of affect and that this effect was partially mediated by delayed object recognition. In contrast, false-coloring the pictures was found to delay affect mainly by reducing its intensity. Coloring also delayed valence judgments of pleasant pictures. The findings provide further chronometric support for the semantic primacy hypothesis of emotion generation and shed light on the processes underlying valence judgments. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

According to the semantic primacy hypothesis of emotion generation, stimuli must be semantically categorized to evoke emotions. This hypothesis was tested for the subjective component of emotions in four chronometric experiments in which the conscious recognition of emotion-eliciting objects and the onset of affect was timed using temporal order judgments (TOJs, Exp. 1a, 1b, and 3) and simultaneity judgments (SJs, Exp. 2). Participants viewed pictures that elicited pleasant or unpleasant feelings. At varying intervals before and after picture onset, a visual probe stimulus was presented. In separate blocks of trials, the participants judged when they recognized the object shown in the picture and noticed the feeling evoked by the picture: Before or after the probe (TOJs), or simultaneously/not simultaneously with the probe (SJs). Psychometric functions were fitted to the data of the individual participants to determine the point of subjective simultaneity (PSS) of the target events and the probe. In both tasks, the mean PSS of affect occurred significantly later than the PSS of object recognition, with an average delay of about 120 ms. A positive lag between object recognition and affect was found for nearly all participants and pictures. In addition, the latencies of object recognition and affect were positively correlated. The found temporal order of object recognition and affect is consistent with the findings of previous studies using speeded reaction time tasks. Implications of the findings for the cognition-emotion debate and for bodily feedback theories of emotional experience are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

In the first part of the article, the central role of theory in emotion psychology is underscored and reasons are given why more theoretical psychology of emotion is needed. In the second part, nine tasks for the theoretical psychology of emotion are defined, by refining and extending three of the general tasks of theoretical psychology proposed 70 years ago by Sigmund Koch [Theoretical psychology, 1950: An overview. Psychological Review, 58(4), 295. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0055768]. The nine tasks are: (1) Analysis, rational reconstruction and critique of existing emotion theories. (2) Comparison of different theories. (3) Systematization and integration of theories. (4) Reconstruction of the development of theories over time. (5) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of theory-data and data-theory inferences. (6) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of the complete set of arguments for and against specific emotion-theoretic assumption and whole theories. (7) Analysis, reconstruction and critique of measurement theories for emotions. (8) Development of new emotion theories and theories of emotion measurement. (9) Information about theoretical and methodological developments of interest to emotion psychology in other subdisciplines of psychology and in neighbouring sciences, and export of theories and methods to other disciplines.

The theory of emotions as affective position-takings (PT) is investigated from the perspective of a computational model of the belief-desire theory of emotions (CBDTE) proposed by the author. Both theories assume that a core subset of typical emotion episodes are the products of an evaluation process in which cognized states of affairs are evaluated for their congruence with the person's desires; and that emotions are, on the conscious level, feelings of pleasure and displeasure. However, according to PT the evaluation is a concern-based construal and emotional feelings are intrinsically object-directed, whereas according to CBDTE, the evaluation is performed by a hardwired mechanism that produces nonintentional feelings. Furthermore, CBDTE suggests that hedonic feelings are simultaneously reactions to the detection of value, and representations of the detected value.

According to the semantic primacy hypothesis of emotion generation, stimuli must be semantically categorized to evoke emotions. This hypothesis was tested in two chronometric studies, using the rotating spot method of timing subjective events. Participants saw pleasant and unpleasant pictures while a spot rotated around the edge of the picture. In different blocks of trials, they indicated when they experienced the pleasant or unpleasant feeling evoked by the pictures, or recognized the depicted objects, by reporting the position of the spot at the time when these mental events occurred. In both experiments, the latency of object recognition was found to be shorter than the latency of affect for nearly all participants and pictures, and the two latencies were positively correlated across participants. Experiment 2 replicated these findings and additionally showed that an experimental manipulation that delayed object recognition, blurring the pictures, also delayed the onset of affect. A mediation analysis suggested that this effect was at least partly mediated by the delayed recognition of the objects. The findings support the semantic primacy hypothesis. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Zusammenfassung: In früheren Untersuchungen zu den «scheinbar paradoxen» Fahigkeitsinferenzen aus Lob und Tadel wurde gefunden, daß Versuchspersonen nur selten spontan die Anstrengungsattributionen nennen, die nach dem attributionstheoretischen Modell (Meyer, 1984) diese Fahigkeitsinferenzen vermitteln sollen. Diese Befunde wur- den von Blickle (1990) als wesentlicher Einwand gegen das attributionstheoretische Modell interpretiert. Die Ergebnisse des hier berichteten Experiments sprechen jedoch dafür, daß die früheren Befunde hauptsachlich darauf zurückzuführen sein durften, daß die Vpn die Anstrengungsattribution in ihren Antworten implizit «mitgemeint» hatten. «Spontaneous» effort inferences in apparently paradoxical effects of praise and blame Summary: Prior studies of the «apparently paradoxical» effects of praise and blame on ability inferences found that subjects rarely spontaneously mentioned the effort attribu- tions that, according to the attributional model of these effects (Meyer, 1984), mediate the ability inferences. These findings were interpreted by Blickle (1990) as constituting crucial evidence against the attributional model. Data ob- tained in the present experiment suggest, however, that the previous findings were mainly due to the fact that subjects regarded the effort attributions as being implicitly present in their answers.

The death of Jon Snow at the end of the fifth season of the TV serialGame of Thronesprompted an intense reaction among the fans of the serial on social media. Thousands of viewers all over the world contributed to the discussion of the meaning and implications of this event, turning it into a global event in the participatory culture of contemporary seriality. In this article, we propose an explanation of this remarkable cultural phenomenon. Based on a theory of plot twists as surprise structures, we argue that the reactions of fans can be understood as concrete, contextually adapted realizations of the characteristic cognitive reactions evoked by the emotions of surprise and shock caused by unexpected negative events. Our analysis focuses in particular on the contributions of viewers to the establishment of the beliefs disconfirmed by the plot twist and on the cognitive activities that served to adapt their minds to the new reality revealed by the twist, which also included reflections on the aesthetic aspects of the plot twist and the narrative in which it was embedded. By providing a public platform for these reflections, the fan forums allowed the individual attempts to adapt to the plot twist to become a collective endeavor. The study illustrates how universal cognitive mechanisms interact with culturally produced contents to generate similar reactions to a fictional event across the globe.

Since its beginnings as a subdiscipline of psychology (e.g., Allport, 1937; Shand, 1914), personality psychologists have pursued two different, though related goals (see e.g., Cervone, 2005; Mischel & Shoda, 1998). The first goal is to construct a general theory of the person, understood as the integrated whole of the several subsystems of the mind. The second goal is to describe and explain the important psychological differences between individuals, that is, those relatively stable psychological attributes of individuals that allow us to uniquely characterize them and to distinguish them from each other. Most psychologists would agree that the emotion system is a central subsystem of personality, and that interindividual differences traceable to this system are important for describing individuals. However, if one accepts this, then it follows immediately that, to attain its goals, personality psychology must consider the emotions. In accordance with this conclusion, (1) most classical personality theorists proposed an affective (or affective–motivational) system as a core system of the mind (see, e.g., Shand, 1914; Murray, 1938), and emotions also play a prominent role in recent theories of personality (e.g., Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Furthermore, (2) most taxonomic models of stable and general (transsituational) psychological dispositions (usually called personality traits) include a subset of dispositions that refer directly or indirectly to emotions (see the second part of this chapter). Nonetheless, the in-depth investigation of emotions from a personality perspective has only begun comparatively recently, in the wake of an upsurge of interest in emotions that arose in the 1980s and continues to this day. Since that time, the previously largely separate fields of personality psychology and emotion psychology – the latter being the subdiscipline of psychology that studies emotions – are becoming increasingly integrated, to the benefit of both fields.

Moral dilemmas often concern actions that involve causing harm to others in the attempt to prevent greater harm. But not all actions of this kind are equal in terms of their moral evaluation. In particular, a harm-causing preventive action is typically regarded as less acceptable if the harm is a means to achieve the goal of preventing greater harm than if it is a foreseen but unintended side-effect of the action. Likewise, a harm-causing preventive action is typically deemed less acceptable if it directly produces the harm than if it merely initiates a process that brings about the harmful consequence by its own dynamics. We report three experiments that investigated to which degree these two variables, the instrumentality of the harm (harm as means vs. side-effect; Experiments 1, 2, and 3) and personal force (personal vs. impersonal dilemmas; Experiments 2 and 3) influence deontological (harm-rejection) and utilitarian (outcome-maximization) inclinations that have been hypothesized to underly moral judgments in harm-related moral dilemmas. To measure these moral inclinations, the process dissociation procedure was used. The results suggest that the instrumentality of the harm and personal force affect both inclinations, but in opposite ways. Personal dilemmas and dilemmas characterized by harm as a means evoked higher deontological tendencies and lower utilitarian tendencies, than impersonal dilemmas and dilemmas where the harm was a side-effect. These distinct influences of the two dilemma conceptualization variables went undetected if the conventional measure of moral inclinations, the proportion of harm-accepting judgments, was analyzed. Furthermore, although deontological and utilitarian inclinations were found to be largely independent overall, there was some evidence that their correlation depended on the experimental conditions.

Research on surprise relevant to the cognitive-evolutionary model of surprise proposed by Meyer, Reisenzein, and Schützwohl (1997) is reviewed. The majority of the assumptions of the model are found empirically supported. Surprise is evoked by unexpected (schema-discrepant) events and its intensity is determined by the degree if schema-discrepancy, whereas the novelty and the valence of the eliciting events probably do not have an independent effect. Unexpected events cause an automatic interruption of ongoing mental processes that is followed by an attentional shift and attentional binding to the events, which is often followed by causal and other event analysis processes and by schema revision. The facial expression of surprise postulated by evolutionary emotion psychologists has been found to occur rarely in surprise, for as yet unknown reasons. A physiological orienting response marked by skin conductance increase, heart rate deceleration, and pupil dilation has been observed to occur regularly in the standard version of the repetition-change paradigm of surprise induction, but the specificity of these reactions as indicators of surprise is controversial. There is indirect evidence for the assumption that the feeling of surprise consists of the direct awareness of the schema-discrepancy signal, but this feeling, or at least the self-report of surprise, is also influenced by experienced interference. In contrast, facial feedback probably does contribute substantially to the feeling of surprise and the evidence for the hypothesis that surprise is affected by the difficulty of explaining an unexpected event is, in our view, inconclusive. Regardless of how the surprise feeling is constituted, there is evidence that it has both motivational and informational effects. Finally, the prediction failure implied by unexpected events sometimes causes a negative feeling, but there is no convincing evidence that this is always the case, and we argue that even if it were so, this would not be a sufficient reason for regarding this feeling as a component, rather than as an effect of surprise.