Genetic modification of non-human animals for use in human activities, including farming and research, may result in animals with reduced (or absent) capacity to experience stress and suffering compared to conspecifics currently used for the same purposes. It seems that creating "Cartesian animals" is a possibility that should be considered as a potentially desirable outcome, since reducing or eliminating suffering seems to be a goal shared by almost every ethical perspective, not just utilitarianism.Although initially appealing, such a perspective needs to be critically examined to ensure that its many implications are fully understood. One possible approach is to determine whether it is consistent with existing frameworks for defining and assessing animal welfare. It is clear that using these techniques can be beneficial where there is a greater risk to animal welfare. However, to the extent that the concept of animal welfare requires animals to be considered as agents and these techniques would either limit or remove their capacity for agency, a number of critical issues can arise. Over-reliance on the potential of genetic editing may preclude achieving moral progress that would lead to a deeper rethinking of the relationship between humans and non-human animals. These techniques are undoubtedly promising. In certain contexts of human-animal interaction, they are worth recommending. However, they need to be carefully evaluated when implemented within the broader framework of human-animal relationships.

The overall aim of the 'Improving the Quality of Biomedical Science with 3Rs Concepts' (IMPROVE) COST Action (CA21139) is to establish an interdisciplinary network dedicated to refining, harmonising and promoting the adoption of the Three Rs concepts, to enhance the quality of biomedical research. The 'IMPROVE' COST Action has assembled an Ethics Crossover Group composed of volunteer members from each of IMPROVE's four established Working Groups: 'Quality and translatability of science', 'Implementation', 'Dissemination' and 'Education'. This report relates to a two-day workshop, held in Acibadem University in Istanbul on 2-3 September 2024. The workshop was organised by the Ethics Crossover Group in line with the aims and the scope of the 'IMPROVE' COST Action, to address the ethical dimension of research and experiments on laboratory animals.

Many scientific breakthroughs have depended on animal research, yet the ethical concerns surrounding the use of animals in experimentation have long prompted discussions about humane treatment and responsible scientific practice. First articulated by Russell and Burch, the 3Rs Principles of Replacement, Reduction, and Refinement have gained widespread recognition as basic guidelines for animal research. Over time, the 3Rs have transcended the research community, influencing policy decisions, animal welfare advocacy and public perception of animal experimentation. Despite their broad acceptance, interpretations of the 3Rs vary substantially, shaping statutory frameworks at various levels, with both technical and practical impacts.

Climate change entails consequences also for non-human animals (from now on just “animals”). Since the 1970s of the twentieth century, moral status of animals has been the topic of “animal ethics”. This chapter will deal with the relation of this field of analysis with climate change and the challenges raised by environmental crisis for animal ethics. A multidimensional approach to the question of animal moral status is required. The case of animal-based food production and consumption is paradigmatic of the need for such a new multidimensional approach in animal ethics. Furthermore, the analysis of moral responsibilities toward wild animals is deeply affected by the new status of nature (“hybrid nature”) in the epoch of Anthropocene. The new status of wilderness makes the notion of conservation slippery and problematic, especially in the framework of a genuine Darwinian understanding both of life in general and human responsibilities toward the non-human world.

Beside its enormous and invaluable scientific merits, Charles Darwin’s scientific revolution entails many profound effects on the philosophical understanding of human nature, our place in the world, and the relations between us and all other living beings. A totally new understanding of non-human animals is among those effects. Thanks to ethology, the scientific research on animals’ behaviors and minds, a field of research emerged from Darwin’s revolution, humans can have access to a new image of non-human animals. From ethology the picture of animals as agents emerges, which is the recognition of the agentive nature of animals and the continuity of that agency with that of humans. Describing animals as agents can produce many important changes in how animal moral status is understood and in human responsibilities attached to it. In particular, the agentive nature of animals can lead to new developments of the concept of animal welfare, one of the key notions in the ongoing process of transformation of human/animal relationships.

Since its beginnings Bioethical analyses and debates have been mostly aimed at discussing the permissibility of new practices such as New Reproductive Technologies (NRTs). NRTs are no longer “new”: they are part of human ordinary life and contribute to human flourishing, allowing people to build families that could have not been built otherwise. Bioethics should take this fact into account and modify its agenda accordingly. NRTs should be regarded not as a matter of “Frontiers Bioethics” but rather of “Everyday Bioethics” even when genetic interventions aimed at “choosing” the identities of future people are at stake. A 21st Century Reproductive Bioethics should be focused on how to improve the right of every human being to access NRTs and not on a general discussion about their permissibility.

Abstract The topic of this contribution is the moral justification of the use of non-human animals in scientific research. First, we will discuss the position of leading antispeciesist approaches of animal ethics, arguing that a radical position is not tenable and justification of some animal use in research can be given based on the importance of science for human civilization. Such use must be justified case by case. Therefore, the harm-benefit analysis will be introduced, as an example of a case-by-case scenario. We will describe the challenge encountered by the evaluators of project proposals, and possible ways of considering harms and benefits in basic, translational and regulatory research, minimizing harms and possible future scenarios. Our approach can be regarded as a virtue consequentialist view of the ethics of human/animal relationships in scientific use, where the development of a morally appreciable character is a key topic for the education of scientists.

Emanuela Scribano, Simone Polio and Francesco Ferretti discuss Frans de Waal's Are We Smart Enough to KtiGU, How Smart Animals Are? The authors critically analyze and discuss the book 'from different points of view. Scribano traces back the interest for animal cognition to philosophers of modern age and confronts their views with de Waes research acliievements. Polio puts the book into the 'framework of the development of the science of animal behavior and argues in favor of a role of ethology in transforming moral ideas about non-human animals. Ferretti stresses the importance for evolutionary cognition of focusing on differences between humans and animals and not just on similarities.

In his latest book, Sul senso della vita, Eugenio Lecaldano discusses an experience that is both most common among human beings and difficult to catch by philosophical analysis, that is the various ways in which human beings reflect on how to give meaning to their lives. The article discusses Lecaldano's analysis and tries to critically highlight the difficult link between giving meaning to life and the pursuit of happiness. The controversial character of this link is presented also through examples from famous autobiographies such as J.S. Mill's, C. Darwin's, J. London's and H.D. Thoreau's. Finally, some hints from J. Cercas' theory of the novel will be used to discuss the difficulty for philosophical analysis to manage the topic of the meaning of life.

In recent years moral philosophers have increasingly paid attention to the development of scientific researches about the functioning of moral mind. Placed into the framework of Darwinian evolutionary theory the cognitive science of morality aims at discovering the core mechanisms of the moral faculties and the evolutionary path that produced them. The intertwinement of cognitive science and philosophical ethics has led to a new understanding of metaethics. Embedding cognitive science in such an investigation switches the focus from the more traditional analysis of the language of morals to the functioning of moral mind. Whereas the contribution of such empirical researches to metaethics is clear and considerable, the role of cognitive science with regard to normative ethics is much more difficult and obscure. Even if the fact/value separation ought to be intended in a soft and non dogmatic way, the normative "use" of empirical findings about human moral minds is a puzzling and slippery task. Rather than being a direct source of norms and values, the understanding of moral psychology carried out by cognitive science contributes to the task of moral reflection insofar as it is a form of self-understanding. Part of the practice of moral reflection that is critically weighing up and evaluating one's own habits, attitudes and moral responses - is the understanding of one's own nature, both as a specific individual and as a member of the human species. My aim will be to discuss whether the cognitive science of morality could be regarded as a modern answer to the ancient exhortation "know thyself" and, therefore, whether advancements in such science could lead to moral progress.

Teorie etyki zwierzęcej głównego nurtu, reprezentowane np. przez Singera i Regana, opowiadają się za zachowaniami żywieniowymi wykluczającymi spożywanie jakichkolwiek produktów pochodzenia zwierzęcego. Zgodnie z takimi ujęciami tematu, w naszych społeczeństwach i w obecnych warunkach życia, rezygnacja z żywności pochodzenia zwierzęcego jest obowiązkiem w świetle wymogów normatywnych teorii etyki. W niniejszym artykule zaprezentuję inne spojrzenie na problem refleksyjnego wegetarianizmu moralnego (definiowanego w bardzo szerokim znaczeniu). Przechodząc od niektórych bardzo krytycznych sformułowań do argumentów reprezentowanych przez główny nurt, zaproponuję stwierdzenie, że bardziej celowym jest rozpatrywać wegetarianizm jako element samorozwoju i troski o samego siebie uprawianych przez ludzi będących uczciwymi czynnymi podmiotami moralnymi. Wegetarianizm, który jest owocem osobistych refleksji na temat moralności relacji między ludźmi i innymi istotami, powinien być rozpatrywany w taki sposób, w którym czynne podmioty moralne kształtują i kultywują swój własny charakter. Taki sposób ujmowania wegetarianizmu pozwala uniknąć trudności argumentów głównego nurtu i pozwala trafniej ujmować bogactwo i różnorodność rzeczywistych wyborów ludzi w kwestii wegetarianizmu w sferze zwyczajowych doświadczeń natury moralnej.