In claiming that the international distribution of power is the starting point for understanding international politics, realism need not dismiss the importance of domestic politics. The most striking fact about the Cold War period was the preponderance of power enjoyed by the United States. Over time the power of the United States deteriorated-hardly a surprising development given that Europe and Japan were bound to recover from the devastation of World War II. Consistent with realist analysis, the decline in American power has been accompanied by changes in American policy in both the economic and the security areas. The main instruments of power and leverage in Europe in the future will be economic rather than military. The economies of the smaller states of Eastern and Central Europe are changing quickly. The United States is bound in the future to play a less ambitious role in Europe both economically and militarily.

Three different analytic approaches have informed studies of development: modernization theory, institutional capacity, and rational choice institutionalism. For modernization theory, areas of limited statehood would become smaller and smaller over time. For institutional capacity approaches, areas of limited statehood might become smaller over time, but only if the capacity of the state increases, which might or might not happen. Rational choice institutionalism suggests that areas of limited statehood would be normal for most polities. Governance might be provided in areas of limited statehood by actors other than the national state, but only if such service provision does not threaten the position of rulers. If islands of excellence are created by actors other than the national state in areas of limited statehood, they will remain isolated islands that will not diffuse to other parts of the polity where they might be a threat to rulers.

Stephen Krasner took part in the 8 th Congress of Russian Political Science Association in Moscow (December 8-9, 2018) devoted to issues of development policy, state and world order. On the margins of the Congress he was so kind to give an interview to the managing editor of our Journal, Maxim Kharkevich.

Contracting out what are traditionally regarded as core sovereign functions is an iconic example of governance in areas of limited statehood. When national political authorities share sovereign authority with external actors, at least two key questions arise. First, when will such arrangements be accepted as legitimate? Second, how can they boost the capacity and legitimacy of state institutions? We argue that the dominant source of external actors' legitimacy will be their performance. External actors that perform well can help create 'islands of excellence' in the domestic system that can raise the effectiveness and legitimacy of other local institutions. However, this type of virtuous cycle is rare and depends on external, domestic elite, and public support - a formula not easily achieved. We illustrate these arguments with several brief case studies.

In 1939 E. H. Carr published what was to become a modern classic on international relations, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919–1939. Carr has usually been seen as a defender of realism and a debunker of idealism, but his thinking was much more subtle. Three developments, in particular, the rise of universal jurisdiction, the creation of a new International Criminal Court (ICC), and recurring demands for humanitarian intervention reflect a renewed commitment to international idealism. The Princeton Principles reflect conventional wisdom among idealists about the shape and direction that international law should take. The inability of universal jurisdiction prosecutors to weigh judiciously the consequences of their actions distinguishes them from purely domestic prosecutors, and attests to the importance of democratic accountability in the enforcement of criminal law. The ICC and universal jurisdiction sever the link between norm enforcement and political accountability.

Fundamental changes in foundational international institutions, from one kind of structure to another have primarily been precipitated by threats to the core security interests of powerful actors. In the contemporary international system there is no opportunity outside of Europe for a bargaining process that would lead to a transformation of the basic norms and rules of sovereignty. Nevertheless, departures from conventional sovereignty have always been present and will persist, possibly become more frequent. Sovereignty, like every other international system, has always been characterized by organized hypocrisy.

The article will be looking at India’s participation in International arms control and disarmament treaties. What are the reasons for India’s participation in some of such treaties and not others? How has India’s participation and nonparticipation affected India’s national security visa-vis human security of people directly harmed and negatively affected by such weapons. The focus will be specifically on the Ottawa Treaty on the ban on landmines signed in 1997. First, the paper will deal with a short history of the Ottawa Treaty and its adoption. Here an attempt will be made to show how this treaty was a result of an international campaign by non-state actors in a domain of international security. Due to this “International Campaign to Ban Land Mines”, a norm of non-use of land mines emerged, which in 1997 engulfed a total of 122 countries to sign this treaty (UNOG, The United Nations Office at Geneva website). Second, it would be dealing with India’s nonsignature and the reasons it provides for such nonparticipation. It would further go into analysing the reasons given by India for this non-participation. Why does India participate in some international arms control and disarmament treaties and not others? If the ban on land mines is an international norm, how is it that India has been able to shield itself against such a norm, being a democracy with a vibrant civil society? Does this have to with India’s foreign policy decision making? Based on secondary sources, the paper will go on to analyse the impact of such a foreign policy choice by India on the people. The conclusion would be going into the dynamics of national security and human security. Is it a zero sum game or can it also be a positive sum game between the state and its people and between national security and human security? KeywordsOttawa Treaty; India; National Security; Human Security; Disarmament INTRODUCTION In the discourse and domain of International Relations and International Politics, there is a distinction that is usually made in between what is called “high politics” and “low politics”. In the former, that is, in “high politics”, the issues usually deal with state security and affairs of utmost importance, like that of state survival. Hence the atmosphere is that of total de-politicization as one cannot let debate and discussion quagmire such issues. In the latter, that is, “low politics”, the issues usually are of socio-economic, political and cultural in nature. This is located in the level of the „political‟, with issues and areas debated left, right and centre. Decisions here are affected by a whole lot of considerations and diverse voices; hence take a longer time to deliver. The domain of security, especially traditional form of security that is national security or state security is under the domain of “high politics”. Hence issues of national security are not discussed and deliberated upon in the political realm. However during the 1970s and 1980s, there was a considerable “broadening and deepening” of the discourse on the meaning and agenda of security itself (“broadening and deepening” used by Booth, 2007). First the “broadening” of the security agenda came with the publication of Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998) by Buzan, Waever and Wilde, which led to the establishment of the Copenhagen School. This School broadened the security agenda to not only include the military dimension of the state but also issues in the political, economic, social International Journal of Research (IJR) e-ISSN: 2348-6848, pISSN: 2348-795X Volume 2, Issue 08, August 2015 Available at http://internationaljournalofresearch.org Available online:http://internationaljournalofresearch.org/ P a g e | 56 and environmental domains. This broadening of the security agenda under these broad sectors is known as “sectorization”. There was also a move to “deepen” the security agenda. Here, one can bring in the analysis of the meaning of security given by the critical/reflectivist theories of the International Politics discourse like feminism, poststructuralism and others. Notably in this area would be scholars like Anthony Burke (Burke, 2007). Hence came the “deepening” of the security agenda and the establishment of the non-traditional approaches to security. What happened with this evolution and establishment of various approaches to security and the various meanings of security is that, there was a solidification of notions such as “human security”, “environmental security” and others. There have been criticisms against this „broadening and deepening‟ of security on various grounds, by scholars like Stephen Walt (Walt, 1991). In fact, there also has been a move to also establish the notion of “desecuritization” (Waever, 1995) in order to bring such socio-political-economic and cultural issues once again within the domain of politics. With regard to the Ottawa Treaty and the discourse on securitization, the move till now was to “securitize the political” by enlarging the agenda of security, but with movements like the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, a step was taken in the direction to “politicize security” itself in its traditional form (Garcia, 2013). An issue of “high politics”, a traditional form of security that is national military state security was invaded by the advocacy, debate, discussion, and influence of a non-state actor, a coalition of NGOs and the international civil society. The International Campaign to Ban

There is only a short list of major variables that we can deploy to understand social phenomena. For the international environment really only three: material power (military and economic), material interests, and values. The relative weight that analysts and policymakers give to each of these depends on the specific phenomena that they are trying to understand. For any effort to explain the dynamics of international politics and the nature of international regimes, power remains the single most potent factor. For the last hundred years, the United States has been the most important country in the world, the state that determined the outcomes of the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War, and that determined the nature of international regimes. The United States might maintain this position in the coming decades or be displaced by China, but the kind of China that might be remains very much in doubt. The future of the world will depend on China’s economic growth, or the lack thereof, and on the kind of domestic political regime that guides China’s development. The collapse of the Soviet Union gave the United States an unexpected boost in international power and re-affirmed the efficacy of liberal democratic as opposed to communist values. The implosion of the USSR, however, did not guarantee America’s position in the world going forward. The United States has had an extraordinarily successful run as the world’s leading power. The United States shaped the international economic environment after the Second World War. The major institutions created in the 1940s – the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – reflected American values and served American interests. These institutions were durable because they served the material interests of other major power centres as well, especially Western Europe and Japan. Moreover the postwar domestic polities in Western Europe and East Asia were also consolidated

This article introduces the themes and arguments of the special issue. While virtually all polities enjoy uncontested international legal sovereignty, there are wide variations in statehood, that is, the monopoly over the means of violence and the ability of the state to make and implement policies. Areas of limited statehood are not, however, ungoverned spaces where anarchy and chaos prevail. The provision of collective goods and services is possible even under extremely adverse conditions of fragile or failed statehood. We specify the conditions under which external efforts at state-building and service provision by state and nonstate actors can achieve their goals. We focus on the extent to which external actors enhance the capacity (statehood) of authority structures in weak states, or directly contribute to the provision of collective goods and services, such as public health, clean environment, social security, and infrastructure. We argue that three factors determine success: legitimacy, task complexity, and institutionalization, including the provision of adequate resources.

The variation in the efficacy of governance-related authority structures is stunning. The focus among scholars primarily on domestic conditions, and only secondarily on the external environment, to explain patterns of political development conforms to the prevailing assumptions of comparativists, international relations scholars, and international lawyers. Over the past decade, however, some scholars have studied the possibility that political institutions within states can be influenced or determined not only by internal factors and the external environment but also by the explicit policies of foreign actors. An emerging body of scholarship examines the efficacy of different policy tools that external actors might use to change the structure of domestic institutions in target states. We review this literature and reach the following conclusions. First, contracting often works, coercion sometimes works, and imposition rarely works. Second, the motivation of initiators matters: to be effective, intervening states must be committed to institutional change. Third, conditions in the target state are consequential: higher levels of development facilitate institutional change, and elite motivations must be aligned with the goals of external actors.

Recognition plays a multifaceted role in international theory. In rarely communicating literatures, the term is invoked to explain creation of new states and international structures; policy choices by state and non-state actors; and normative justifiability, or lack thereof, of foreign and international politics. The purpose of this symposium is to open new possibilities for imagining and studying recognition in international politics by drawing together different strands of research in this area. More specifically, the forum brings new attention to controversies on the creation of states, which has traditionally been a preserve for discussion in International Law, by invoking social theories of recognition that have developed as part of International Relations more recently. It is suggested that broadening imagination across legal and social approaches to recognition provides the resources needed for theories with this object to be of maximal relevance to political practice.

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Os regimes internacionais são definidos como princípios, normas, regras e procedimentos de tomada de decisões ao redor dos quais as expectativas dos atores convergem em uma dada área-tema. Como ponto de partida, os regimes são conceituados como variáveis intervenientes, estando entre fatores causais básicos e os resultados e comportamentos relacionados. Há três visões a respeito da importância dos regimes: as orientações estruturais convencionais desvalorizam os regimes como sendo, na melhor das hipóteses, ineficazes; as orientações grocianas vêem os regimes como componentes íntimos do sistema internacional; as perspectivas estruturalistas modificadas vêem os regimes como significativos somente em certas condições restritas. Para os argumentos grociano e estruturalista modificado - que concordam com a visão de que os regimes podem influenciar resultados e comportamentos - , o desenvolvimento de regimes é visto como uma função de cinco variáveis causais básicas: auto-interesse egoísta; poder político; normas e princípios difusos; usos e costumes; conhecimento.