As intelligence studies has grown as a multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary field, publication venues have proliferated. This article surveys journals that publish primarily intelligence studies articles to provide scholars and researchers with an understanding of where to submit their papers for publication. It could also provide librarians, students, and the public with an understanding of how to access knowledge about intelligence. It does so by constructing a typology of different kinds of journals that publish intelligence studies articles and evaluates the tradeoffs of each kind of publication outlet.

On November 23, 2021, Dr. Stephen Marrin, program director at James Madison University, presented on The Changing Nature of Intelligence Education at the 2021 CASIS Vancouver West Coast Security Conference. This presentation was followed by a question and answer period and a breakout room session with questions from the audience and CASIS Vancouver executives. The key points discussed included the nature of intelligence studies, the importance of having diverse perspectives in the intelligence and national security space, and the importance of bridging gaps between scholars and practitioners.

Analytic objectivity as a standard for the US Intelligence Community appears to have been drawn from idealized conceptualizations of the scientific method as a kind of value-neutral epistemological framework used to develop knowledge "objectively." But this embrace of objectivity provides a poor foundation for contemporary conceptualizations of the applied epistemology of intelligence analysis, as well as performance standards. Instead, intelligence analysts should embrace a more realistic goal of aspiring to but never actually achieving analytic objectivity through the reduction of subjectivity while embracing the values of honesty, neutrality, and integrity encapsulated in the phrase "calling it as you see it".

This article evaluates the current state of play regarding the growing number of references to intelligence theory in the intelligence studies literature, with preliminary observations as follows: while most new contributions are extensions or enhancements of existing theories, new intelligence theories have been quite valuable in terms of enhancing understandings of intelligence as a function of government, with additional theories being developed outside the intelligence studies literature. Looking ahead, the development of schools of thought for theories built around particular kinds of questions would help enhance intelligence studies scholarship through debates over definitions, ontological understandings, epistemological frame-works, and theories.

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Why does strategic intelligence analysis have limited influence on American foreign policy? Intelligence analysis is frequently disregarded, this paper contends, because it is a duplicated step in the decision-making process and supplements but does not supplant policy assessment. Many intelligence analyses will confirm policy assessments and be redundant or - if the assessments are different - policy-makers will choose their own interpretations over those of intelligence analysts. The findings of this paper provide scholars with important insights into the limits of intelligence analysis in the foreign policy process as well as recommendations for increasing its positive impact on policy.

Intelligence organizations acquire, evaluate, assess, and disseminate information to support national security and foreign policy decision-making. It is part of a government's efforts to get as close to complete information as possible about both the operating environment as well as other actors. The methodologies employed by intelligence analysts are similar to yet different from those used in many other academic disciplines and professional fields. This discussion about methodology - a form of comparative applied epistemology - can be used to better understand intelligence analysis as a function of government and improve the performance of intelligence analysts.

Common thinking strategies can be used by both intelligence analysts and medical doctors to improve decision-making and produce positive outcomes. Best practices can flow in both directions between professions since medicine shares strong parallels with intelligence analysis. Improving performance in both fields involves an assessment of key problems and current efforts to overcome them. Perhaps the most important issues affecting both fields are related to cognition. In medicine and intelligence analysis, errors are often triggered by cognitive biases that appear during the decision-making process. Identifying and preventing these errors would contribute towards improving performance and results in both fields.

Strategic intelligence analysis frequently does not influence the creation and implementation of American foreign policy. This is contrary to an expectation that intelligence analysis should matter in the making of foreign policy and national security. Better intelligence analysis should lead to better policy. Ideally, independent and objective intelligence analysts provide the information and assessments that decisionmakers use to make the best possible decisions.

As the field of intelligence studies develops as an academic complement to the practice of national security intelligence, it is providing a base of knowledge for intelligence practitioners to interpret their past, understand their present, and forecast their future. It also provides the basis for broader understanding of intelligence as a function of government for other government and security officials, academicians, and the general public. In recent years there has been significant growth in the numbers and kinds of intelligence-related educational and training opportunities, with the knowledge taught in these courses and programs derived from the body of intelligence studies scholarship. The question posed here is: to what extent is this body of knowledge sufficient as a basis for the development of intelligence studies as an academic discipline?

Many people point to high profile failures like 9/11 and Iraq as indicators that CIA's analytic performance is inadequate or flawed. Flawed by design.11Amy B. Zegart, Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999). A legacy of ashes.22Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007). A culture of failure.33John M. Diamond, The CIA and the Culture of Failure: U.S. Intelligence from the End of the Cold War (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). Or so goes the conventional wisdom. Fortunately this conventional wisdom is wrong. These so-called failures more accurately represent the perennial dilemmas and tradeoffs associated with the analytic function and, most importantly, the inappropriate expectation that these observers hold of CIA's ability to prevent surprises. As a matter of fact, there is much that people do not fully understand about the CIA.

The relationship between intelligence and policy has its ups and downs. Sometimes the relationship is a good one; communication flows and both sides benefit from the interaction. The optimal outcom...

Politicization as a term used in intelligence studies is poorly defined, conceptualized and operationalized. Despite the negative connotations associated with the word politicization that equate it with a form of corruption, it is not entirely clear what it is a corruption of. In short, the concept of politicization is for the most part analytically useless. This article critiques the existing status quo conceptualization for being overly broad and insufficiently nuanced, explores the nature of analytic politicization as a subset of politicization writ large, and replaces it with a narrower conceptualization that explains what makes analytic politicization bad and deserving of condemnation. Based on this evaluation, one can conclude that much of what is considered to be politicization in a corrupted sense is really just a naturally-occurring consequence of analysis and interpretation in a policy or political context

This book on intelligence analysis written by intelligence expert Dr. Stephen Marrin argues that scholarship can play a valuable role in improving intelligence analysis. Improving intelligence analysis requires bridging the gap between scholarship and practice. Compared to the more established academic disciplines of political science and international relations, intelligence studies scholarship is generally quite relevant to practice. Yet a substantial gap exists nonetheless. Even though there are many intelligence analysts, very few of them are aware of the various writings on intelligence analysis which could help them improve their own processes and products. If the gap between scholarship and practice were to be bridged, practitioners would be able to access and exploit the literature in order to acquire new ways to think about, frame, conceptualize, and improve the analytic process and the resulting product. This volume contributes to the broader discussion regarding mechanisms and methods for improving intelligence analysis processes and products. It synthesizes these articles into a coherent whole, linking them together through common themes, and emphasizes the broader vision of intelligence analysis in the introduction and conclusion chapters. The book will be of great interest to students of intelligence studies, strategic studies, US national security, US foreign policy, security studies and political science in general,as well as professional intelligence analysts and managers.