The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine structurally changed the geopolitical situation on the European continent, turning Ukraine into a border state of the Western security architecture. The European Union reacted by according it candidate status for membership. The geopolitical ramifications of the war range much further, however, as Russia is outflanking the EU and NATO toward the south, building a presence from the Mediterranean and the Gulf to Central Africa. In the Caucasus and Central Asia, however, Russian influence may be waning. Meanwhile, Russia has become even more dependent on China, which refrains from actively supporting its war effort. This is evidence of a multipolar world: Each of the great powers prioritizes its national interests, while other states increasingly are hedging. In that context, the EU must base its strategy on more explicit geopolitical analysis.

The EU and its Member States have taken unprecedented collective steps to support Ukraine militarily. That has not yet translated into a stronger momentum to further cooperation between their own defence forces, however. Ideally, Member States would integrate national capabilities into large multinational formations. NATO's New Force Model could provide an extra stimulus to that end.

EU Member States have agreed on a grand strategy, the 2016 Global Strategy (EUGS). However, the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), where Member States define the EU’s foreign, security and defence policies, has failed to fully implement it. In fact, neither the Member States nor the European Commission feel ownership of the EUGS. However, the need to leverage the internal competences of the Commission in order to maintain the EU’s position in the competition between the great powers, may forge more grand strategic unity. Nevertheless, introducing majority decision-making remains imperative – but unlikely. What the EU could and ought to do immediately, however, is to introduce a regular strategic review. Strategy, CFSP, CSDP, High Representative, EEAS

This chapter explains why grand strategy is inherently competitive: because the other party has a strategy too. Competition and cooperation are inherent to international politics; rivalry, on the contrary, is the conscious choice to adopt a strategy against another power. Multipolarity is therefore the normal state of affairs in international politics. A new bipolarity or a new “cold war” is less likely than it seems. The chapter analyses how today’s great powers, the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union, are dealing with multipolarity.

This chapter explains why the implementation of grand strategy requires agility: the capacity to take decisions rapidly, and to translate them into practice, so as to adapt to changing circumstances. A strategy that does not adapt fast becomes unstrategic. US grand strategy since the turn of the century lost agility, whereas China flexibly adapted to the changing balance of power and established itself as a great power. The focus of Russian grand strategy leaves little room for agility. The EU is handicapped as compared to the other great powers, because it lacks centralised decision-making in foreign and defence policy.

This chapter explains why grand strategy must be comprehensive: because every issue in international politics has a political, economic and military dimension, the great powers need to pursue a comprehensive approach that combines political, economic and military power. Russia’s over-reliance on an exclusively military approach is showing its limits, even though the EU and the US overestimate the innovation of its “hybrid warfare”. China makes better use of its different sources of power, and remains reluctant to use military power unless what it defines as the national territory is at stake. The US is prone to use the military instrument, whereas the EU’s military power is too limited, for lack of an integrated European defence, to project power without American support.

It is not only the possible relative decline of the United States as the bedrock of the so-called ‘rules-based international order’ (RBIO) in the Trump era that has caused consternation in Europe and Asia. The international system has also been shaken by a number of rising powers that are often less wedded to the norms and principles of the old RBIO. Changes in the underlying structures of the international order, as well as the ideas and practices that were associated with American dominance, present a major challenge for policymakers everywhere. This chapter compares the responses in Europe and East Asia to similar challenges because they highlight the different historical circumstances and capacities that will shape policies of adjustment in both regions. Geopolitical and newly important geoeconomic forces are both constraining and empowering different actors in a period of dramatic transformation.

This chapter explains why grand strategy must be simple: a grand strategy that is too complicated to explain will not be implemented. The chapter describes how grand strategy is made by a strategic establishment that holds a certain strategic culture. It then sketches the key points of the current grand strategies of the great powers of the 21st century: the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union – and finds that competition and rivalry have increased.

This chapter explains that making grand strategy is a rational process – religion, ideology, and emotion are bad counsellors and lead to ineffective strategy. The chapter assesses the rationality of Russian grand strategy, which aims at creating a buffer zone or sphere of influence on its western borders. It is at risk of becoming dogmatic, however, using its nuisance power against the US and the EU whenever possible. The contrast with China’s pragmatic grand strategy is great, except when China reckons its national territory to be at risk. US and EU grand strategy, however, is not as rational as they perceive it to be.

This chapter explains why grand strategy requires the great powers to be proactive: nobody will defend their interests for them. Can today’s great powers establish a consensual agenda for a rules-based order? An analysis of the interbellum period shows that an international order cannot be created against one of the great powers of the day; that if violations of the rules-based order go without consequences, the order will be hollowed out; that great powers must abide by the rules that they want others to obey; and that no state seeks to be dominated by another. The chapter then analyses the grand strategies of today’s great powers and concludes that while competition is strong, permanent and systematic rivalry is not yet unavoidable.

The introduction explains how great powers continue to shape the course of international politics. Therefore, understanding their grand strategies is important. It is easy to draw a black and white picture of great power politics. Instead, the introduction shows how one must analyse the great powers from their own perspectives and arrive at a nuanced picture.

El presidente de Estados Unidos haciendo tratos con el presidente ruso a espaldas de Europa: este es solo uno de los problemas de los que la Union Europea podra despreocuparse por un tiempo, gracias a la victoria de Joe Biden. Por un tiempo, porque el trumpismo ha sido derrotado pero esta lejos de haber sido destruido; no cuando Donald Trump ha sobrepasado el 47% del voto popular. Mas de 73 de los 150 millones de votantes estadounidenses estan de acuerdo con las propuestas de Trump –o con las suficientes como para haber votado por el– o, si no las comparten, de algun modo abominan hasta tal punto de una posible presidencia democrata que se tapan las narices y votan por Trump. Si el Partido Republicano queda en manos de individuos como el secretario de Estado, Mike Pompeo, convencidos de que en EEUU el presidente esta por encima de la ley y de que puede imponerla tambien fuera del territorio nacional, muy bien podria ganar la Casa Blanca en las elecciones de 2024 otro lider populista y autoritario. Probablemente, cualquier futuro mandatario trumpista sera mucho mas peligroso que el propio Trump, desde el momento en que, mas alla de los tuits y las veleidades, se muestre capaz de traducir los instintos politicos de aquel en metodo y estrategia. Asi pues, seria bastante miope por parte de la UE renunciar a su objetivo de autonomia estrategica. La Estrategia Global de la UE establecio formalmente esta meta en junio de 2016, cuando aun se creia que Hillary Clinton ganaria las elecciones estadounidenses de aquel ano. En efecto, la busqueda de la autonomia estrategica no fue una reaccion a la victoria de Trump, y no debe abandonarse debido a su derrota electoral. Se trata de un proyecto europeo para las proximas decadas, no sometido…

This book introduces ten key terms for analysing grand strategy and shows how the world's great powers - the United States, China, Russia and the European Union (EU) - shape their strategic decisions today and shows how the choices made will determine the course of world politics in the first half of the 21st century.

This chapter explains how grand strategy is “dirty”: strategists have to act in the world as it is, and will be faced with situations in which there are neither entirely “good” nor entirely “clean” options – every course of action will clash to some extent with interests and values. Grand strategy must stay true to the values of the state, but Realpolitik demands that states cooperate with those who share their interests even if not their values. The democratic great powers must maintain the discourse of human rights, even if their leverage to create short-term change is limited; they must not aim at the democratisation of the other great powers.

This chapter explains why great powers have alliances – however, you need allies but cannot always choose them. Russia and China have few allies. The partnership of convenience between them is unlikely to become a true alliance, but neither is it likely to fall apart. Transatlantic relations between the US and the EU run deep, but the NATO alliance has undergone severe shocks. The EU’s quest for strategic autonomy will shape the future of NATO.

The European Union (EU) is carefully repositioning itself in international politics. As the coronavirus has aggravated tensions between the great powers, this nascent EU Grand Strategy will be vital for the defence the Union's interests. However, it is not equally shared by all EU Member States or even by all EU institutions, nor has it yet been incorporated into all relevant strands of the EU policy. The EU risks ending up in a permanently ambivalent position: more than a satellite of the US, but not a really independent power either. Will 2021 see the EU muster the courage to fully implement the choices that it has started to make? Keywords: Civilian power; European Union; Multilateralism; NATO; Regionalism; Security architecture; Westphalian state

The concluding chapter warns not to create a dynamic that would lead to a rivalry without end. Therefore, the great powers must accept that multipolarity is normal and that they will have peer competitors. They must invest in multilateralism and agree on the core of the rules-based order. They ought to respect the sovereignty of all other states and abstain from seeking a sphere of influence. Finally, they must maintain their own sovereignty and power basis in order to be able to confidently engage, rather than confront, each other. In the end, predicting war is easy; building peace is difficult.

This chapter explains why strategists must be courageous: in spite of imperfect information and the consequences of failure, they must dare to act, or not to act, as their interests demand. Military intervention, that is making war, is the most sensitive decision that a state can make. Although Russia is prone to use force, it dare not confront the growing presence of China in its near abroad. China remains reluctant to use force outside its territory. The US and the EU cloak all interventions in the protection of human rights and democracy (“humanitarian intervention”); a sincere assessment of the interests at stake may limit their “interventionism”.