A new integrated testing system for the validation of stochastic vehicle-snow interaction models is presented in this paper. The testing system consists of an instrumented test vehicle, vehicle-mounted laser profilometer and a snow micropenetrometer. The test vehicle is equipped on each tire with a set of 6-axis wheel transducers, and a GPS-based data logger tracks vehicle motion. Data is also simultaneously acquired from the sensors from the test vehicle’s Electronic Stability Program. The test vehicle provides measurements that include three forces and moments at each wheel center, vehicle body slip angle, speed, acceleration, yaw rate, roll, and pitch. The profilometer has a 3-D scanning laser and an Inertial Measurement Unit to compensate for vehicle motion. Depth of snow cover, profile of snow surface and wheel sinkage can be obtained from the profilometer. The snow micropenetrometer measures the strength of the snow cover before and after vehicle traversal. Preliminary results, including traction, drawbar pull, vehicle states, snow profiles and snow material properties from recent field tests on natural snow cover are presented, demonstrating the capability and potential of the testing system.

This article assesses Afghanistan's Presidential Election of 2019. Analyzing official data from the Afghan Independent Election Commission (IEC), it examines voting patterns at both the national and provincial levels and compares these results with those of past elections. It draws on statistical methods to evaluate Afghan electoral procedures, focusing in particular on the practice of ballot invalidation and voter suppression as well as the role of ethno-linguistic voting blocs. The analysis reveals highly unusual voting patterns and other dynamics that point to significant irregularities and fraud. The article concludes with a number of recommendations for future Afghan elections.

This article’s primarily focus concerns Afghanistan’s ‘democratic’ electoral processes and procedures. Fraud and other critical aspects of the 2018 election for the Wolesi Jirga, Afghanistan’s lower house of parliament, are systematically assessed and official election data and results are examined in depth. As witnessed in earlier Wolesi Jirga elections, this legislative election was duplicitous and unrepresentative. By definition, a democratic legislature serves as the voice of a country’s population. Assessing the voting results in Kabul, the largest and most important province, can summarise the problems of the election. The leading ‘vote getter’ in the Kabul Province got a mere 2.0 per cent of the vote—11,158 out of 666,478 votes cast. Twenty-six of the elected Wolesi Jirga legislators received less than 1 per cent of the vote. Only 23.5 per cent of Kabuli voters voted for a winning candidate. Overall, this article paints a bleak picture of the state of democracy in Afghanistan. The already restricted Afghan environment is further hindered by operational mismanagement by the Independent Election Commission (IEC) throughout the electoral process. The single non-transferable voting (SNTV) system again proved to be a disaster resulting in the vast majority of Afghans voting for losing candidates and winning candidates receiving few votes.

This is the first in a series of chapters that explicitly examines different Taliban narrative and story delivery means. Specifically this chapter discusses Afghan insurgent periodicals and newsletters. Specific periodicals examined include – Al Somood (Resistance), Srak (Beam of Light), Tora Bora Magazine, Shahamat (Courage/Bravery), In Fight, Elham (Inspiration/Revelation), Murchal (Trench), Mesaq-i-Esaar (Covenant of Sacrifice), Ihsas (Feelings), Resalat (Duty), Zamir (Conscience), Hittin, Wahdat, Nawa-I Afghan Jihad (Voice or melody of the Afghan Jihad), Likwal’ Hewad, and Khabroona. Variables such as content, length, languages used, frequency of publication, and origination are discussed for each periodical and newsletter.

Chapter 5 focuses on a traditional Afghan means to communicate at the Afghan village level – Shabnamah or Night Letters. The tropes of this Taliban IO device include: impact of “foreign invaders” on Afghanistan and how they have traditionally been defeated, Kabul’s “puppet regime.” “cosmic conflict nature of Taliban’s battle, “crusaders promoting the destruction of Islam and Afghan life, the power of “martyrdom,” and revenge and honor. Numerous actual Taliban Shabnamah are presented and translated and assessed relative to their explicit stories. Table 5.1 presents the thematic lines of operation for Taliban night letters including: counter-collaboration, counter-education, counter-reconstruction, counter-mobility, and counter-stability. The rest of the chapter analyses a wide variety of night letters and their associated stories.

This is one of the more important chapters in that it explicitly compares the U.S. information campaign in Afghanistan to the Taliban’s campaign. The explicit stated goals and strategic communication themes of the U.S. Operation Enduring Freedom are assessed during two distinct time frames – 2001-2006 and 2007-2011. In assessing and comparing the U.S. information operation efforts versus the Taliban, a detailed analysis of different U.S. messaging techniques such as leaflets. As suggested above, these leaflets were assessed for early U.S. engagements to later in the conflict. Later U.S. IO efforts were examined using the U.S. PSYOP Book from 2009. The analyses concluded with the notion that the U.S. had to basically surrender to Taliban dominance in narratives and associated stories. The U.S. efforts basically refused to accept Afghan cultural reality, especially the Afghan peasant mental space. This had a devastating impact on U.S. and NATO rural counter-insurgency efforts. The U.S. had to concede a major portion of the Afghan battle space because the U.S. could not credibly respond to Taliban Islamic mores and troupes.

This chapter focuses on a variety of Taliban IO delivery systems some of which have not had scholarly assessments. The Taliban have had a major presence on the internet since their development of their main webpage – Alemarah. This site has become quite sophisticated over the years and is published in Pashto, Dari, Urdu, Arabic and English languages. Hence, the site targets a variety of audiences including the international community in addition to Afghans, Arabs, and Pakistanis. The Taliban also have a significant presence on social media to include sites on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. They also use videos and DVDs to project their messages. They have affiliated “media studios such as Mana-ul Jihad, al Hijrat, and El Emarah which are described in detail in the chapter. They also use regular “spokesman” to interact with both local and international media. Finally they use a variety of radio stations to present their narratives and associated stories. Lastly they use graffiti to communicate with target audiences.

Why has the Taliban been so much more effective in presenting messages that resonate with the Afghan population than the United States, the Afghan government and their allies? This book, based on years of field research and the assessment of hundreds of original source materials, examines the information operations and related narratives of Afghan insurgents, especially the Afghan Taliban, and investigates how the Taliban has won the information war. Taliban messaging, wrapped in the narrative of jihad, is both to the point and in tune with its target audiences. On the other hand, the United States and its Kabul allies committed a basic messaging blunder, failing to present narratives that spoke to or, often, were even understood by their target audiences. Importantly, the book systematically explains why the United States lost this "battle of the story" in Afghanistan, and argues that this defeat may have cost the US the entire war, despite its conventional and technological superiority.

This chapter introduces the reader to the Master Narratives of the Taliban or those key themes that drive their narratives and associated stories. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the background of Taliban IO and its key themes or elements – religious concepts, cultural concepts, and political concepts. Each of these themes are discussed relative to their Afghan cultural significance and target audiences.

Poetry has long been a central pillar of Afghan Literature and the Taliban have used it extensively in their IO campaign. Poetry is important to the Taliban and Afghans in general because it is essentially a spoken, not written art, so it accessible to the illiterate, especially rural Afghan population. The chapter examines a wide variety of Taliban poetry and also poetry written by those sympathetic to the Taliban. Each poem also includes an explanation of the story associated with it. An analysis of Taliban poetry to those of moderate Afghan poets. The chapter also focuses on 8 or poetic chants that have traditionally played an important role in the communication of local afghans. Numerous chants and their associated stories are examined that often reflect the manipulation by the Taliban of Afghan traditions, narratives, collective memory of events, and culture. These chants focus on themes such as: Taliban victory is inevitable, Islam can never be defeated, the Taliban are national heroes, Afghans have a long history in defeating invading foreign “infidels”, and all Afghans have an obligation to join the jihad to defeat invaders and apostates.

While the vast majority of this book examine Taliban narratives and associated stories, the chapter focuses on the propaganda of Hezb-e-Islami (Gulbuddin) and its variety of IO delivery mechanisms: Oqab (Eagle) Website; EID messages, printed media (Shahadat – Martyrdom; Tanweer – Enlightenment), internet and social media, DVDs and videos. The major themes of HIG’s propaganda include: exploiting collateral damage by the U.S. Coalition, HIG’s inevitable victory, permanent of coalition military bases in Afghanistan, fraudulent Afghan elections, and a HIG peace proposal. The chapter also assesses the very significant role of Pakistan in the development of HIG narratives and associated stories.

This chapter assesses the explicit target audiences of Taliban narratives and associated stories. These targets include – Local populations that are neutral/undecided toward the Taliban cause (Figure 3.20), local supports and sympathizers (Figure 3.2), local opposition (Figure 3.3), neighboring populations (Figure 3.4), and international population (Figure 3.5). The chapter introduces means of delivery for each of the audiences suggested and examines their respective messages’ strengths and weaknesses.

This chapter examines and compares a variety of Taliban’s Layeha or “codes of conduct. While these codes of conduct present explicit procedures as well as rules and regulations that Taliban leadership demand that their followers/insurgents follow relative to tactical and strategic objectives, these codes also represent sophisticated Taliban information operations. The Layeha presents how the Taliban, as an organization, plan to pursue their short- and long-term objectives. Chapter 8 explicitly compares and contrasts the codes of conduct published in 2010 and 2009 (and some discussion of the 2006 Layeha). An overview of these comparisons is presented in Tables 8.1 and 8.2. The chapter also presents the explicit Mullah Omar statements on the Layehas (Table 8.3). In addition the chapter presents an organizational analysis of the Taliban. Figure 8.1 presents the provincial military force structure of the Taliban and Table 8.4 presents the Taliban’s chain of command.

This article systematically assesses the 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election, the first transfer of power from President Hamid Karzai to an elected successor, using provincial voting data as well as explicit data from polling centers. The analysis finds unusual voting results in the April election, where no candidate received 50%+1 votes required by the Afghan constitution, versus the voting results realized for the June 'runoff election.' As in other Afghan voting analyses, this article finds voting based on ethno-linguistic preferences, and interestingly found Dr. Ashraf Ghani receiving almost all the swing votes in the runoff election even though the other leading candidate from the April election all endorsed Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. More importantly, however, the research presented here clearly finds extremely strange voting patterns. For example, the polling data center analysis finds 606 polling places where Ghani received all 600 votes and Abdullah received none and another 900 polling centers that gave virtually all its votes to Ghani. These results in combination with other analyses raise the very real possibility that the election results were illegitimate. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research to future Afghan elections and their processes as well as to the long-standing conflict in the country.

This article is the latest in a series of published articles systematically examining Afghan Presidential and legislative elections. Structural problems including fraud, ethno-linguistic block voting, and the Single Non-Transferable Vote have had significant impacts on the development of Afghan democratic elections. The challenge now facing the current Afghan government and future elections is the daunting task of uniting the Afghan people while not repeating the electoral mistakes of the past. The tricky balancing act of fostering an overarching national identity without being perceived as privileging particular identities requires strong leadership and a willingness to challenge traditional ethnic, linguistic, and religious norms when need be. Karzai and Ghani Administrations have seriously failed relative to this dynamic.

Early Mistakes and Lessons Learned in Running a Group: The Former Prisoner of War Therapy Group Thomas Johnson1 issn 0362-4021 © 2016 Eastern Group Psychotherapy Society group, Vol. 40, No. 2, Summer 2016 165 1 Supervisory Social Worker–Mental Health, Veterans Administration, and private practice. Correspondence should be addressed to Thomas E. Johnson, lcsw, cgp, va HealthCare System, 365 West 28th Street, 9c, New York, ny 10001. E-mail: thomasjohnson365@live.com. In 1983, the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) was attempting to reach out to World War II and Korean former prisoners of war (POWs) to determine their well-being and to encourage them to utilize the VA health/mental health services. They created the role of former POW coordinator, and I volunteered to take on this outreach at the then New York Veterans Administration Medical Center (now known as the New York Harbor VA HealthCare System). To say the least, I had no idea what I was getting myself involved in. I was selected for this add-on role and handed a printout of approximately 1,500 names of men who had been POWs and who now resided in the New York City metropolitan area. Still relatively new to the field of social work, I needed to invite these veterans in to meet with me for an initial “social history interview.” I was provided with an elegant elderly volunteer, who was a widow of a veteran and who typed up all the letters of invitation for these potential appointments. This was a paper-intensive process, long before the days of computers and e-mail. The VA had the impression that the traumatic experience of being in a POW camp may have had various psychosocial effects on the veterans and their families many years after the experience. My interviews were meant to determine if such ideas were accurate and to what degree. I was surprised by the large number of men who responded positively to meeting with me. In a sense, these interviews would serve as a screening process to invite a number of these former POWs to a weekly group. I could easily tell that they had much to say, because this was a first-time experience for them, to share their stories with a professional at the VA. I had no idea at the time that I would later create a group. GROUP 40.2 interior.indb 165 8/7/16 3:45 PM 166 johnson The former POWs whom I met presented with a vast array of histories since leaving the service. They had served during World War II in both the European and Pacific theaters, and each theater exposed them to differing levels of trauma and deprivation. This was also an opportunity to meet some of the wives and adult children of these men. The interviews informed me that many of these veterans had experienced substantial success in their civilian lives. I also had the opportunity to interview the playwright and author Edmund Trzcinski, who, along with Donald Bevan (a fellow POW), wrote the play (which later became a movie and TV series) Stalag 17. (Neither of these former POWs became a member of the group under discussion.) But most of the veterans told stories of more isolated and less rewarding life experiences and of less gratifying interpersonal/family attachments. After several months of conducting these social history interviews, I became aware that a group would be effective for these men, as they had much in common and might appreciate the opportunity to meet one another and see what might happen . I believed this group would bring together a group of men who were somewhat isolated, living a bit in the shadows of society and experiencing weaker attachments in general. A group could be a safe place to share stories they were reluctant to share with their loved ones and to build self-esteem and a better sense of connection. There was still residue over being “caught” and separated from their troops, which was reflected in self-blame in many of them. Though I was determined to lead such a group, I was still left not knowing what to expect. In retrospect, I realize that...

: The security relationship between the United States and Afghanistan will undergo significant change over the next year. Domestic issues in both countries will shape that new relationship, as well as regional issues within and between key neighbors of Afghanistan. During the 2014 State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama said: After 2014, we will support a unified Afghanistan as it takes responsibility for its own future. . . ., a small force of Americans could remain in Afghanistan with NATO allies to carry out two narrow missions: training and assisting Afghan forces, and counterterrorism operations to pursue any remnants of al Qaeda.1 This statement will inform U.S. policy and the new security relationship with Afghanistan from a U.S. perspective. From an Afghan perspective, the transition of the presidency from Hamid Karzai to one of the two final candidates (Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai or Abdullah Abdullah) who competed in the June 14, 2014, second round elections will be the defining event shaping the new relationship. This monograph offers insightful analysis and practical recommendations for a strategy to shape the new U.S. Afghanistan relationship. As part of their research design, Dr. Larry Goodson and Dr. Thomas Johnson augmented their personal analysis with insights gathered from a wargaming workshop conducted at the U.S. Army War College s Center for Strategic Leadership and Development (CSLD) in January 2014. Subject matter experts representing military, academic, and policymaking perspectives offered thoughts on the research questions posed by the authors as they were led through the wargaming scenarios by CSLD facilitators. This broad-based exchange of ideas deepened and enriched the analysis and recommendations presented here.

Book review: The Thistle and the Drone: How America's War on Terror Became a Global War on Tribal Islam by Akbar Ahmed, Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2013. Reviewed by Thomas H. Johnson