The article aims to interpret Blaustein’s phenomenology of aesthetic experiences from the perspective of the philosophy of technology. In order to do this, I sketch some parallels between today’s inquiries into the nature of technology and Blaustein’s accounts of experiences of the cinemagoer or the phenomenon of listening to the radio. The study is divided into 5 sections. In section 1, I explore the question of why the framework of the philosophy of technology can be useful in reading Blaustein’s writings. Section 2 presents Blaustein’s two main research strategies, while analyzing the phenomenon of technology, i.e., the humanistic and phenomenological methods. Moreover, the question of the compatibility of both approaches is examined. Next, in section 3, different phenomena from the field of the aesthetics of media are analyzed, in order to show to what extent technology mediates one’s conscious experiences. Section 4 turns toward the question of the body and environment in technologically determined experiences. Finally, in section 5, the main elements of Blaustein’s philosophy of technology are examined.

This article explores the intersection of the Brentanian theory of mind and the Lvov–Warsaw School, focusing on the question of how to understand feelings and acts of volition within Brentano’s classificatory program of mental phenomena. Brentano famously argued in favor of three classes of mental phenomena, i.e., presentations, judgments, and love-and-hate phenomena; the third class encompasses both feelings and the will. Brentano’s arguments in favor of the unitary third class, however, are questionable. They were critically assessed by, among others, Ehrenfels and Twardowski. This article presents a survey and a critical analysis of all three approaches. In particular, Brentano’s arguments are analyzed, followed by their critical assessment formulated by Ehrenfels, including his account of feelings and desires, and Twardowski’s view of the classificatory program. In addition, Twardowski’s idea that desires are based upon feelings is analyzed, and his account of volitions is discussed. Against this background, the article examines to what extent the arguments of Ehrenfels and Twardowski contribute to recent scholarship on the Brentanian theory of mind.

The article explores Blaustein's phenomenology of media formulated in the 1930s as an output of his research in the field of descriptive psychology. The article discusses the historical background of Blaustein's research in light of a growing interest in cinema and radio in the 1920s and 1930s. Furthermore, this study addresses the question of Blaustein's understanding of the method of phenomenology which was, for him, a form of descriptive psychology. This method serves to explore first-person experiences in which the correlated objects manifest themselves. The study analyzes the main points of Blaustein's account of the cinemagoer's experience by exploring his account of phantoms and the question of emotions. Finally, Blaustein's account of listening to the radio is presented. One of the central topics discussed here is his idea of 'acousion' as a form of perceiving acoustic space, and as an act which generates the relevant world (of a certain radio drama).

AbstractLeopold Blaustein (1905–1942 [or 1944]) was educated at Jan Kazimierz University in Lvov and graduated under Kazimierz Twardowski (1866–1938), a student of Franz Brentano (1838–1917) in Vienna. Blaustein’s academic activity covered almost two decades—the 1920s and 1930s—when philosophy in Poland was renewed as a scientific discipline and dominated by (but certainly not reducible to) the Lvov–Warsaw School. Roman Ingarden (1893–1970), who was also Blaustein’s teacher in Lvov, once described this renewal as a change in the “philosophical atmosphere” in Poland; for him, Twardowski “[…] did in fact outline in a certain sense a new period of Polish philosophy. Namely, he imposed on philosophical research in Poland a new style of work.” Ingarden explains that this renewal consisted in an attempt to have clear-cut philosophical notions and well-defined language, in addition to solid justifications for discussed theses. To that extent, Twardowski’s efforts can be regarded as a broad meta-philosophical project which was developed in diverging directions, including logic, ontology, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, etc.

AbstractThis chapter discusses the basics of Blaustein’s aesthetics, which is seemingly one of the main fields of his original philosophical project. Some scholars, e.g., Roman Ingarden, Stanisław Pazura, Bohdan Dziemidok, or, more recently, Wioletta Miskiewicz and Zofia Rosińska, have claimed that Blaustein should be regarded first and foremost as an aesthetician. Indeed, aesthetics is not so much the terminus a quo of his philosophy but rather its terminus ad quem. In this regard, in Chap. 4, it was suggested that Blaustein redefined Kazimierz Twardowski’s theory of presentations to address the question of diverse aesthetic experiences. Moreover, Chap. 6 proposed the 1928 book on Husserl as the key to understanding Blaustein’s aesthetic theory, since in this book he argued that sensations are the basis of lived experiences, including aesthetic experiences. On the whole, aesthetics denotes a philosophical theory or theories concerning beauty and, for the most part, art. More specifically, it raises questions about, among other things, aesthetic values, taste, the aesthetic object and its relation to artworks, particular experiences that are described as aesthetic, or the attitude employed in such experiences; finally—starting from Immanuel Kant and his legacy—it asks about aesthetic judgment. Blaustein referred to a variety of traditional aesthetic topics, but all the listed topics were not equally important to him precisely because of the different traditions that inspired him. Whereas the question of aesthetic experience was central in his writings, the problems of aesthetic values or taste were rather marginal. Additionally, the issues of aesthetic objects and the specific attitude are important for understanding his approach. In turn, the topic of aesthetic judgment is simply absent in his writings. This clear shift in focus from beauty (as in the classic definition of aesthetics) and judgment (as in Kant’s philosophy) to an emphasis on experience seemingly followed from Blaustein’s theoretical background. The list of authors to whom he referred in his aesthetic writings is rich and diverse; in addition to Husserl, Ingarden, and Twardowski, he also mentioned, among others, Karl Bühler, Max Dessoir, Moritz Geiger, Karol Irzykowski, Konrad Lange, Zofia Lissa, Alexius Meinong, Stanisław Ossowski, Wilhelm Schapp, Emil Utitz, Johannes Volkelt, Mieczysław Wallis-Walfisz, Stefan Witasek, and Tadeusz Witwicki. More generally, Blaustein’s account of aesthetics was shaped in a critical discussion with different traditions: the Gestaltists (Bühler, Dessoir), German aesthetics (Lange, Utitz, Volkelt), the Graz School (Meinong, Witasek), phenomenology (Geiger, Husserl, Ingarden, Schapp), Polish aesthetics (Irzykowski) and, of course, the Lvov–Warsaw School (Lissa, Ossowski, Twardowski, Wallis-Walfisz, Tadeusz Witwicki). Admittedly, the contexts are varied, but two traditions seemed to be dominant: his references to the Brentanian tradition and the phenomenological heritage. The Brentanian line in his thought leads—through Twardowski and his students—to the theory of presentations as the basis of aesthetics. In turn, the phenomenological inspiration that came from Husserl and Ingarden covers the question of the ways of givenness (Gegebenheitsweisen) of the aesthetic object. Against this background, the aim of the present chapter is to discuss Blaustein’s aesthetics as a descriptive analysis of aesthetic experiences that are correlated with their object or objects. My ultimate task is to present his general model of aesthetic experience. I begin with the question of how Blaustein used descriptive psychology in his aesthetics. Next, I address the problem of understanding aesthetic objects. Before considering whether they are purely intentional or real, I analyze Blaustein’s a few exemplary descriptions of aesthetic experiences. Finally, I examine some detailed problems discussed by Blaustein, including the phenomena of perception, attitudes, the body, intersubjectivity, and judgments. In doing so, I attempt to present a model of aesthetic experience in Blaustein’s philosophy.

AbstractIn his works, Blaustein used a complex analytical method to describe psychic life. He explicitly called this approach “descriptive psychology” (psychologia deskryptywna), and he noted on many occasions that he did research “on the borderline of psychology.” This should come as no surprise, as he was trained in philosophy by Twardowski, a direct student of Brentano. The presence of Brentano’s thought in the school of Twardowski is well described by, for instance, Liliana Albertazzi, Arianna Betti, Jan Woleński, and others. Indeed, after his arrival in Lvov in 1895, in his early writings, Twardowski developed—as I attempt to show in this chapter—a Brentanian notion of philosophy based on psychology and focused on “mental phenomena.” By claiming that philosophy examines mental phenomena, Twardowski set the psychological trend of the Lvov–Warsaw School, which included, in addition to Blaustein, Władysław Witwicki (1878–1948), Bronisław Bandrowski (1879–1914), Ludwik Jaxa-Bykowski (1881–1948), Stefan Baley (1885–1952), Stefan Błachowski (1889–1962), Salomon Igel (1889–1942), Mieczysław Kreutz (1893–1971), and Walter Auerbach (1900–1942 [?]). In this chapter, I discuss Teresa Rzepa’s idea that Blaustein can be considered a part of this group of scholars. Psychology was still a popular field of research in Lvov during Blaustein’s studies in the 1920s. Following Twardowski, Blaustein indeed used a variety of descriptive-psychological tools in his investigations. Nonetheless, his view of psychology cannot be reduced only to the Brentano–Twardowski legacy. After all, he referred to Gestalt psychology or to the conception of psychology put forward by Dilthey, not to mention Husserl’s phenomenological psychology. Whereas I will discuss Blaustein’s polemic against Husserl’s method in Chap. 5, here I attempt to show that he combined a variety of detailed ideas and procedures that had been developed by, for instance, Brentano, Twardowski, Stumpf or Dilthey. By claiming this, I will argue against Krzysztof Wieczorek, who holds that Blaustein overcame Brentano’s heritage by adapting Husserl’s phenomenology. If Wieczorek was right, Blaustein’s descriptive psychology was a mere introduction to his phenomenology. Accordingly, the latter can be understood in Blaustein’s writings without the former, which—as I will show in this chapter—is false. In this regard, I will argue that philosophical psychology is one of the cornerstones of Blaustein’s method; as such, it cannot be excluded from Blaustein’s writings or reduced to his account of phenomenology.

AbstractThis chapter is an attempt to analyze the main ideas presented and developed by Blaustein in his early work, Husserlowska nauka o akcie, treści i przedmiocie przedstawienia [Husserl’s Theory of Act, Content and Object of Presentation], which was originally published in 1928. The book is a revised version of Blaustein’s doctoral thesis and is important for several reasons. First, it seems that the arguments and at least some of the theoretical solutions put forward in it provided the basis for Blaustein’s later reflections. This can be illustrated with two clear examples. One has to do with Blaustein’s use of the tripartite structure of content (which can be understood as quality, matter and presenting content) that he developed in discussion with Husserl and that laid the ground for his original classification of presentations. Another example is his 1930s study on the structure of perception in cinemagoers, in which he reflected on whether a cinemagoer’s experiences are the objects presented on the screen or rather sensations. In direct reference to the results of his previous work, Blaustein eventually opted for the latter. Thus, the book is an important step on the way to understanding how the concepts he used evolved. It is also worth mentioning that, in the global literature, it was perhaps the first extensive monograph devoted to Husserl’s theory of content, a conception which is well known to be very complex. In his interpretation, Blaustein advanced an interesting thesis whereby the conceptions from Logische Untersuchungen and the idea of the matter of an act presented therein are best understood within the framework of a tradition that can be traced back to Bolzano’s and Brentano’s philosophies. This tradition related the issue of content to the understanding of psychic phenomena or, more precisely, to the problem of their structure and the objects to which they refer: what is the relationship between the intentional object and the content of lived experience? Could it be that the object of psychic phenomena is just content? Additionally, how should the content of lived experience be understood here? According to Blaustein, when grappling with these questions, Husserl formulated an original conception of content. However, saying that the main intention of Husserlowska nauka… [Husserl’s Theory…] is to ground phenomenology in the tradition of Brentano would not do full justice to the complexity of the arguments developed in the book. Therefore, what was the novelty of its approach?

AbstractThe psychological themes in the method employed by Blaustein are pervasive, as shown in Chap. 3. In my analysis of these themes, I put forward the hypothesis that this attachment to psychology determined his view of phenomenology as an empirical discipline, rather than a priori eidetics or transcendental philosophy. Basically, Blaustein assumed that if phenomenology indeed concerns essences, this would mean that it abandons its proper object, i.e., lived experiences. For this reason, according to him, phenomenology ought to become, contra Husserl, an empirical discipline, which seems to suggest that it is possible only as a Brentanian-style descriptive or empirical psychology. Accordingly, Blaustein’s struggles with the phenomenological method can be viewed from a broader perspective. After all, as shown by, e.g., Theodore De Boer, Herbert Spiegelberg, or, more recently, by Andreea Smaranda Aldea and Denis Fisette, phenomenology emerged in a dispute with and in a critical assessment of the heritage of Brentano. Some may claim that Husserl’s break from Brentano was the cornerstone of his original philosophical project, i.e., transcendental phenomenology, which justified its claims as opposed to descriptive psychology. This, it seems, inspired Krzysztof Wieczorek to draw a parallel between Husserl and Blaustein; like Husserl, Blaustein discovered difficulties, inaccuracies, and even aporias in Brentano, and he “naturally” took the position of phenomenology. However, contrary to Wieczorek, I have argued that the psychological themes in Blaustein’s method are irreducible, and it is precisely for that reason that he was a proponent of descriptive psychology.

AbstractBlaustein’s analyses contained in Husserlowska nauka… [Husserl’s Theory...] took a wide perspective on the problems discussed in the book. This enabled Blaustein to clearly define the value of Husserl’s theories compared to the traditions of Bolzano as well as Brentano and Twardowski. However, rather than stopping at the presentation and discussion of the theory of content, Blaustein raises interesting objections to it. As I have stressed in the preceding chapter, these objections resulted in part from his original findings that he later used in other object-oriented and systematic research. In the present chapter, I want to ask to what extent his critique of the theory of content in Husserl may be considered valid. I want to define the elements in Blaustein’s interpretation that seem to diverge from Husserl’s position. What comes to the fore in this context is the issue of psychologism and the related problem of understanding reduction. I want to address these two problems at the beginning of the chapter. Next, I will try to formulate a phenomenological, i.e., metaphysically neutral, interpretation of the phenomenal world to which Blaustein referred, as he analyzed the theory of content in Husserl. Finally, I will assess the interpretative proposal made by Blaustein, identifying its strong and weak points.

AbstractIn his aesthetics, as shown in Chap. 8, Blaustein formulated a sophisticated theory of the aesthetic experience and the aesthetic object. However, the value of his approach was evidenced not only by theoretical examinations but also by detailed and rich descriptions of different aesthetic phenomena. Whereas in the previous chapter I was interested in the basics of Blaustein’s aesthetic theory, the present chapter concerns its concrete applications; more precisely, I will outline his phenomenology of media as an example of the application of descriptive tools in the analysis of cinema and radio experiences. In doing so, I want to discuss Paul Majkut’s thesis that “[p]henomenological media studies begin with Roman Ingarden’s investigations into the ontology of a literary work, but extensions of ideas that were confirmed to print media are easily made to other media.” I attempt to show that Majkut did not take into account Blaustein’s contribution to the field, which was developed in the same period as Ingarden’s theory and which (contrary to Ingarden) directly addressed media (film and radio) experiences. Blaustein’s input was noticed by, for instance, Jan Czerkawski (together with Antoni B. Stępień and Stanisław Wielgus), Zofia Rosińska, Wioletta Miskiewicz, Jagna Brudzińska and, more recently, by Joanna Pluta. Czerkawski et al. called Blaustein “a pioneer in psychology pertaining to film and radio.” In this vein, Rosińska and Pluta also described him as a “pioneer” in studies on the reception of media and its influence on the human mind. Miskiewicz noted that Blaustein “[…] kept an active interest for research in […] media communication” and his research “[…] anticipated (with great subtlety) many theories, such as Wollheim’s ‘seeing-in’ in aesthetic theory and McLuhan’s ‘the medium is the message’ well known in media study.” In her text on aisthēsis and phantasma, Brudzińska identified Blaustein as the author of the “[…] first phenomenological theory of media,” in which he analyzed “[…] the mediating function of imaginative consciousness.” These views require a brief comment.

AbstractBlaustein’s project of philosophical psychology, for which he used the term “descriptive psychology” (psychologia deskryptywna), was—as already stated in Chap. 3—deeply rooted in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century heritage of psychology; however, Blaustein was a critical reader of this rich legacy. He elaborated different approaches and sought efficient tools to analyze psychic life. Psychology was, for him, a descriptive method which accounted for mental phenomena as wholes that ought to be analyzed or described as a combination of the simplest parts. The general purpose of this discipline was to classify mental phenomena. Nonetheless, whereas Brentano or Twardowski attempted to address a unified and complete taxonomy of mental phenomena, including presentations, judgments, emotions and (eventually defined as a separate class) will, Blaustein instead focused solely on presentations. Of course, in his writings, one finds some clues that he preferred Twardowski’s four-class taxonomy over Brentano’s three-part division; however, again, there is no in-depth discussion of this categorization. Instead, Blaustein formulated an interesting and original analysis of different classes of presentations. With these ideas in mind, the present chapter aims to introduce the basics of Blaustein’s descriptive psychology by discussing the sources, main ideas, arguments, and development of his theory of presentations. By doing so, I will explore the theoretical background of his philosophy, but a few remarks are necessary here.