The relationship between attention and consciousness has been debated for decades. Observing attentional biases induced by visual stimuli below the conscious threshold is one way of providing evidence for the independence of attention and conscious perception. Among such studies, Jiang et al. (2006) found a strong priming effect below the objective conscious threshold with high sensitivity, in showing attentional biases to nude images suppressed by continuous flash suppression (CFS). In our replication, we found moderate Bayesian evidence for the unconscious attraction from opposite sex nude images below the subjective conscious threshold in heterosexual participants. This supports the theory that attention and consciousness are dissociable, and the idea that sexually attractive visual stimuli capture attention even when rendered unconscious. The results have been checked for computational reproducibility by an independent statistician, full report at https://osf.io/dr35v/files/te58h.

Severe theory testing is greatly facilitated by concisely laying bare before the study is run the essence of the scientific process. (See for example the Study Design Template of Peer Community In Registered Reports.) Testing a theory involves testing a nexus of claims each of which plays an inferential role in deciding whether the evidence counts for or against a substantial theory. Each claim should be explicitly stated in a way that shows what is at stake in testing that claim. The substantial theory is the most general claim that could have evidence count against it - and ideally should be explanatory (having an internal structure that is not free to vary). Psychologists have not been very good at explicitly stating what claim is actually at scientific stake. It should be made clear what theory is being tested by each stated prediction. Predictions should be statistically modelled with a specified test that allows evidence both for or against the prediction. The study should be shown to have a size that could show the theory wrong. How the test will be used to draw conclusions for or against each theory should be specified. This whole structure should be stated so concisely and systematically there is no verbiage to hide behind - the skeleton of the scientific process laid naked so that its integrity can be easily evaluated. The structure can be debated, then the inferential chain nailed down as data collection commences. Researchers can change their mind later - but in full transparency of what is happening.

Since 18th century experiments demonstrated that the effects of mesmerism arose from belief rather than magnetic fluid, there has been evidence that situational cues can drive change in experience. Across four studies (total N = 2,042), we investigated the degree to which experiences in psychological experiments may arise from participants controlling their experience to satisfy their goals, i.e., phenomenological control. Trait phenomenological control predicts some experimental measures of changes in experience when demand characteristics are not controlled. Here, we investigated the reach of phenomenological control as a demand effect by contrasting relationships between Phenomenological Control Scale scores (PCS) and effects presumed to either be highly sensitive to beliefs (visually evoked auditory response or vEAR; tingling in the scalp or ASMR) or less sensitive to beliefs (Müller Lyer and vertical-horizontal illusions). Phenomenological control accounted for much of the effect for the posited belief-sensitive effects but not for the classic visual illusions (Study 1). This pattern of results remained after controlling for context effects (Study 2) and measurement differences across procedures (Study 3). Finally, Study 4 presents causal evidence that vEAR and ASMR can be modulated by high PCS participants in response to demand characteristics delivered by direct suggestion. When an effect is substantially predicted by trait phenomenological control and can be caused by phenomenological control following demand characteristics, this domain-general mechanism should be ruled out before appealing to domain-specific explanations. This presents a previously unrecognised threat to validity in psychology experiments analogous to that of placebo effects in medicine.

After two attempts of replicating Jiang et al. (2006) with continuous flash suppression (Chen et al., 2026a) and gaze-contingent crowding (Chen et al., 2026b), we found evidence for attraction towards suppressed opposite-sex nude images in heterosexual individuals below the subjective, instead of the objective threshold of consciousness, as claimed by Jiang et al. The contrast between previous studies suggests that the attention effect we seek might depend on how suppression is established. Switching to a more direct visual suppression approach, the present study used backwards visual masking across four experiments. Experiment 1 found evidence for attraction towards sexually preferred images below the objective conscious threshold in heterosexual participants, as well as evidence for sex-specific selection in the observed effect. Experiment 3 obscured the faces of the nude stimuli and returned strong evidence in heterosexual females that body-feature information alone is sufficient to drive the effect. Experiments 2 and 4 served as standalone subliminality controls, confirming that perception remained below the objective threshold with and without the attention task. Read against previous findings (Chen et al., 2026a, b), the current results indicate that the unconscious attention effect generalises across distinct routes to invisibility and is content-selective at the level of body features, rather than solely relying on low-level image properties.

Across four studies (total n = 2,042, two preregistered, one partly preregistered), we investigated the degree to which experiences in psychological experiments may arise from participants controlling their experience to satisfy their goals, i.e., phenomenological control (PC). Trait PC has previously been shown to predict some experimental measures of changes in experience when demand characteristics are not controlled. Here, we investigated the reach of PC as a demand effect by contrasting relationships between Phenomenological Control Scale scores (PCS; a test of direct imaginative suggestion) and effects presumed to either be sensitive to beliefs (visually evoked auditory response or vEAR; tingling in the scalp or ASMR) or insensitive to beliefs (the Müller Lyer illusion; the vertical-horizontal illusion). PC accounted for much of the effect for the posited belief-sensitive effects but not for the classic visual illusions (Study 1). This pattern of results remained after controlling for context effects (Study 2) and measurement differences across procedures (Study 3). Finally, we present the first causal evidence that two established psychological effects which are predicted by PC (vEAR and ASMR) can be modulated by participants high in PC in accordance with demand characteristics delivered by direct suggestion (Study 4). PC may account for the effects of psychological experiments when an effect is sensitive to belief, but not where it is not. This presents a previously unrecognised threat to validity in psychology experiments analogous to that of placebo effects in medicine.

The micro-phenomenological interview is a technique for investigating phenomenology in detail during an activity lasting seconds to minutes. Here, we applied it to understanding the moment-to-moment experiences of subjects responding to imaginative suggestions that were aimed at temporarily altering perceived reality through deployment of phenomenological control. Our intention was to generate novel hypotheses that could be tested in a future study. We presented three suggestions individually to seven participants, and then interviewed them about their experiences, with the qualitative findings generating four independent hypotheses. We repeated the process with six new participants and found that the data supported three of the hypotheses. These were that while moderate responses involved goal-directed fantasies, high responses appeared to not; that responses scored low did not involve reports of active sabotage; and high and moderate responders do not appear to be aware that they are generating the suggested behaviour and cognitions. These hypotheses will need confirming for generalisability with a quantitative study. If confirmed, these results will bear on the mechanisms underpinning phenomenological control.

This was a conceptual replication of Jiang et al. (2006) and Chen et al. (2026), who found nude images suppressed by continuous flash suppression (CFS) drew heterosexual viewers' spatial attention without awareness. The present study exploited gaze-contingent crowding, in which nude images and neutral blobs were displayed bilaterally in peripheral vision, crowded by neutral flankers, and replaced when gaze departed central fixation. Sixty-six participants completed a modified dot-probe task with a 1°-tilted Gabor probe; perceptual awareness was indexed by a perceptual awareness scale. No attentional priming was found in trials without reported visual experience, contrary to previous results obtained under CFS. Heterosexual females showed moderate evidence of gaze shifts toward male images in trials without reported visual experience, suggesting early oculomotor capture before crowding consolidated. A follow-up manipulation check confirmed that peripheral visual suppression was an artefact of visual crowding rather than eccentricity. The findings indicate that unconscious attentional priming is sensitive to the mechanism by which subliminality is induced, informing the broader debate on the dissociation between consciousness and attention.

Hypnosis is shown to be one of many ways a general capacity for phenomenological control shows itself. Phenomenological control is an evolved capacity to deceive ourselves so as to support socially useful beliefs. It allows one to strategically construct subjective experiences that misrepresent reality despite contradictory evidence in order to meet goals. It is so good at its evolved function that researchers of it have often found themselves being deceived: The participants in their studies feel energies, special states or parts of themselves that are taken to be constitutive of the mechanism of construction rather than what the mechanism constructs. Key points: •Hypnosis is just one context in which phenomenological control is used; others include spirit possession, many spiritual experiences, esoteric martial arts, everyday experiences and psychology experiments •Phenomenological control is a metacognitive trick one plays on oneself: No other abilities are gained nor lost •For example, hypnosis does not improve memory, strength, nor attentional capacity •It can nevertheless be clinically useful in, for example, making pain go away by itself, precisely because it involves the motivated transformation of subjective experience •No special state is needed to explain how or when phenomenological control is used •There are enduring individual differences in the capacity for phenomenological control that have yet to be explained

In the rubber hand illusion (RHI), participants report ownership of a fake hand which is stroked in synchrony with their own concealed hand, with lower ownership ratings for asynchronous stroking. This effect has been historically attributed to multisensory integration. However, such a pattern of results is consistent with experimental demand characteristics, and an alternative theory proposes that the RHI is an effect of phenomenological control (PC; the trait ability to change experience to satisfy goals). To date, support for a PC theory of the RHI has been limited to correlational evidence. Here we conduct a pre-registered causal test of the relative contribution of these two proposed mechanisms in RHI effects. 25 high PC participants (top 15%) were tested in an RHI procedure and the classic effects of greater response for synchrony than asynchrony were replicated. The procedure was then repeated following imaginative suggestions for a reversal of the classic effect (i.e. greater synchrony than asynchrony effects). Ratings of ownership and proprioceptive drift were modulated by suggestion. Effects for ownership and drift were reversed. Exploratory analysis showed the same pattern of results for referred touch ratings. Participant beliefs arising from demand characteristics dominate over multisensory mechanisms in RHI ownership of a fake hand and proprioceptive drift. Multisensory synchrony is neither necessary nor sufficient for the rubber hand illusion. Claims of an illusion beyond that attributable to demand characteristics and phenomenological control require experimental evidence from controlled experiments

Phenomenological control is the stable trait ability to alter subjective experience according to one’s goals. Although voluntary, experiences arising from phenomenological control are experienced as involuntary and may be incorrectly attributed to external causes. Such experiences may influence related beliefs about the world. In a large sample preregistered study (n = 497), we tested predictions arising from the theory that this ability evolved to promote experiences of a spirit world in order to support religious beliefs. Reports of three types of unusual experience and associated beliefs were measured: of past lives, of being outside one’s body and of contact with incorporeal beings. Demand effects were minimised by the presentation of measures in separate procedures, run by multiple researchers. Consistent with predictions, linear regression of reports of both these unusual experiences and of their related beliefs on Phenomenological Control Scale (PCS) scores showed positive relationships with small intercepts. These results are contrasted with weaker relationships with large intercepts for regression on PCS scores of flow experience reports, which are not posited to depend on phenomenological control. Finally, the relationship between phenomenological control and belief in a spirit world was partially mediated by the tendency to have related unusual experiences. These results are consistent with the theory that paranormal experiences of a spirit world depend on phenomenological control, and that these experiences support belief in a spirit world; corroboration of these predictions in turn supports the theory that phenomenological control evolved to support and take advantage of the spiritual beliefs of a community.

Phenomenological control is the stable trait ability to alter subjective experience according to one’s goals. Although voluntary, experiences arising from phenomenological control are experienced as involuntary and may be incorrectly attributed to external causes. Such experiences may influence related beliefs about the world. In a large sample pre-registered study (n = 503), we tested predictions arising from the theory that this ability evolved to promote experiences of a spirit world in order to support religious beliefs. Reports of three types of unusual experience and associated beliefs were measured: of past lives, of being outside one’s body and of contact with incorporeal beings. Demand effects were minimised by the presentation of measures in separate procedures, run by multiple researchers. Consistent with predictions, linear regression of reports of both these unusual experiences and of their related beliefs on Phenomenological Control Scale (PCS) scores showed positive relationships with small intercepts. These results are contrasted with weaker relationships with large intercepts for regression on PCS scores of flow experience reports, which are not posited to depend on phenomenological control. Finally, the relationship between phenomenological control and belief in a spirit world was partially mediated by the tendency to have related unusual experiences. These results are consistent with the theory that paranormal experiences of a spirit world depend on phenomenological control, and that these experiences support belief in a spirit world; corroboration of these predictions in turn support the theory that phenomenological control evolved to support and take advantage of the spiritual beliefs of a community.

A recommendation of: Chiara Leu, Sébastien Forest, Valéry Legrain, Giulia Liberati The effect of stimulus saliency on the modulation of pain-related ongoing neural oscillations: a Registered Report https://osf.io/c9b4p

Psychologists often take statistical hypothesis testing to be a procedure that detects whether effects do or do not exist; the output of this procedure can then be used to inform theories, which should predict the effects that do exist, and not those effects that do not. Call this the modular view of statistics: Statistics can do their job relatively separately from the theories that are being tested, just so long as the right effects are being tested. The interface between statistics and science can be called the pragmatics of statistical inference. The modular view declares that interface is simple for hypothesis testing: It consists of science telling statistics what to test for; and statistics telling science whether it exists or not. One reason why there has been a credibility crisis may be that the modular view is dominant yet unhelpful. If statistics cannot in an atheoretical way declare what does and does not exist, then psychologists have not been genuinely testing their theories. In this chapter I reject the modular view. One might reject the whole concept of getting evidence of whether or not there is an effect; instead, I accept this aspect of current practice but argue one can only get evidence for a relevant effect being there or not given a theory of what size effect could be expected on that theory.

In the rubber hand illusion (RHI), participants report ownership of a fake hand which is stroked in synchrony with their own concealed hand, with lower ownership ratings for asynchronous stroking. This effect has been historically attributed to multisensory integration. However, such a pattern of results is consistent with experimental demand characteristics, and an alternative theory proposes that the RHI is an effect of phenomenological control (PC; the trait ability to change experience to satisfy goals). To date, support for a PC theory of the RHI has been limited to correlational evidence. Here we conduct a pre-registered causal test of the relative contribution of these two proposed mechanisms in RHI effects. XX high PC participants (top 10%) were tested in an RHI procedure and the classic effects of greater response for synchrony than asynchrony were/were not replicated. The procedure was then repeated following imaginative suggestions for a reversal of the classic effect (i.e. greater synchrony than asynchrony effects). Ratings of ownership and proprioceptive drift were/were not modulated by suggestion. Effects for ownership and drift were/were not reversed. Participant beliefs arising from demand characteristics do/do not dominate over multisensory mechanisms in RHI ownership of a fake hand and proprioceptive drift.

The scope of unconscious processing has long been, and still remains, a hotly debated issue. This is driven in part by the current diversity of methods to manipulate and measure perceptual consciousness. We provide here ten recommendations and nine outstanding issues about designing experimental paradigms, analyzing data, and reporting the results of studies on unconscious processing. These were formed through dialogue among a group of researchers representing a range of theoretical backgrounds. We acknowledge that some of these recommendations naturally do not align with some existing approaches and are likely to change following theoretical and methodological development. Nevertheless, we hold that at this stage of the field they are instrumental in evoking a much-needed discussion about the norms of studying unconscious processes and helping researchers make more informed decisions when designing experiments. In the long run, we aim for this paper and future discussions around the outstanding issues to lead to a more convergent corpus of knowledge about the extent – and limits – of unconscious processing.

A non-significant result against an H0 of no effect does not distinguish evidence for no effect from no evidence at all one way or the other. Thus, a researcher engaged primarily in significance testing may decide to follow up just the non-significant results with a test from another system of inference, such as equivalence tests (more generally, inference by intervals) or Bayes factors. However, selectively using two systems of inference in this way, can lead to inferential inconsistency because different tests are based on different principles, and therefore a researcher can be tempted to select the way each system is used to get the results the researcher wants for just the tests that system is applied to. For a related set of tests, one system of inference should be consistently used.

In psychology, we often want to know whether or not an effect exists. The traditional way of answering this question is to use frequentist statistics. However, a significance test against a null hypothesis of no effect cannot distinguish between two states of affairs: evidence of absence of an effect, and absence of evidence for or against an effect. Bayes factors can make this distinction; however, uptake of Bayes factors in psychology has so far been low for two reasons. Firstly, they require researchers to specify the range of effect sizes their theory predicts. Researchers are often unsure about how to do this, leading to the use of inappropriate default values which may give misleading results. Secondly, many implementations of Bayes factors have a substantial technical learning curve. We present a case study and simulations demonstrating a simple method for generating a range of plausible effect sizes, i.e. a model of H1, for treatment effects where there is a binary dependent variable. We illustrate this using mainly the estimates from frequentist logistic mixed-effects models (because of their widespread adoption), but also using Bayesian model comparison with Bayesian hierarchical models (which have increased flexibility). Bayes factors calculated using these estimates provide intuitively reasonable results across a range of real effect sizes.