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# Cryptography from Anonymity

Berkeley, CA, (2006): 239-248

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摘要

There is a vast body of work on implementing anonymous communication. In this paper, we study the possibility of using anonymous communication as a building block, and show that one can leverage on anonymity in a variety of cryptographic contexts. Our results go in two directions. middot Feasibility. We show that anonymous communication o...更多

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简介

- There are many scenarios in which anonymous communication can be implemented at a low cost, either via physical means or by means of special-purpose protocols.
- Private anonymous channels, allowing the adversary to learn only messages sent or received by corrupted players.

重点内容

- There are many scenarios in which anonymous communication can be implemented at a low cost, either via physical means or by means of special-purpose protocols
- We present unconditionally secure implementations of several cryptographic primitives based on anonymous communication over public channels
- There is no obvious way to combine the advantages of non-private but anonymous channels and private but non-anonymous channels
- We suggest the following direct implementation of PrivAnon based on Anon
- (2) If the adversary corrupts only one sender, it cannot violate the privacy or the correct delivery of the message sent by the other sender, nor can it correlate its own message with the other message
- Lemma 4.6 establishes the privacy of the protocol for an arbitrary number of clients, with the same amount of noise as that required for the privacy of a single client: Theorem 4.7 If the CR assumption (Definition 4.5) holds with parameters (F (k), c(k), t(k), n(k)), the above anonymous private information retrieval protocol remains computationally private for an arbitrary number of clients, as long as the total amount of noise contributed by uncorrupted clients is at least n(k)

结果

- One could assume that the adversary only learns messages received by corrupted players; the authors call such a primitive private-anonymous channel and denote the corresponding functionality by PrivAnon.
- The authors show how n ≥ 2 clients can privately compute statistics on their combined inputs by each sending few anonymous messages to a central server.
- The authors' protocols only require one-way anonymous communication and are private with respect to an adversary corrupting the server along with an arbitrary number of clients.5 Note that it is impossible to obtain such non-interactive protocols in the standard model, even if one settles for computational privacy.
- The authors want to design a protocol in which each client sends a small number of anonymous messages to the server, from which the server can recover the sum of all inputs without learning additional information about the inputs.
- The authors use anonymous channels to obtain a PIR protocol which allows a server to handle queries that may originate from many different clients using a nearly optimal amount of communication and computation.
- (The security of the protocol will be guaranteed as long as the total number of noise points sent by uncorrupted clients is at least n.) The server replies to each query with an answer sj = qx.
- Lemma 4.6 establishes the privacy of the protocol for an arbitrary number of clients, with the same amount of noise as that required for the privacy of a single client: Theorem 4.7 If the CR assumption (Definition 4.5) holds with parameters (F (k), c(k), t(k), n(k)), the above anonymous PIR protocol remains computationally private for an arbitrary number of clients, as long as the total amount of noise contributed by uncorrupted clients is at least n(k).

结论

- (A larger value of represents a more conservative assumption.) assuming two-way anonymous communication, there is a one-round PIR protocol involving a single server and multiple clients in which the amortized communication and computation per query are O(t) = O.
- (Ideally, the number of users is sufficiently large so that each user receives at most a single element of F for each database in the system.) To access the ith entry in a database x, a user first computes a set of queries as in the above PIR protocol, and fetches the answers by anonymously contacting the users that hold the answers to these queries.

相关工作

- A variant of the toy example presented above (for key agreement using anonymity) was suggested by Alpern and Schneider [2]. A similar idea was previously used by Winkler [55] for establishing secure channels in the game of Bridge. Our work, in contrast, achieves key agreement in the presence of malicious parties, a problem that was posed and left open in [2]. The related problem of obtaining key agreement from recipient anonymity, which hides the identity of the receiver rather than that of the sender, was considered in [48]. Pfitzmann and Waidner [49] use a variant of private anonymous communication as an intermediate step for obtaining highly resilient broadcast protocols. Finally, Anonymous communication has also been exploited in the context of practically oriented applications such as voting [13] and electronic cash [53].

基金

- Supported in part by IBM Faculty Award, Intel equipment grant, NSF Cybertrust grant No 0430254, Xerox Award and grant 2002354 from the U.S.-Israel Binational Science Foundation

引用论文

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