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We show that the SPKI/SDSI-to-PDS connection provides a framework for formalizing a variety of certificate-analysis problems

Model checking SPKI/SDSI

Journal of Computer Security, no. 3 (2004): 317-353

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Abstract

SPKI/SDSI is a framework for expressing naming and authorization issues that arise in a distributed-computing environment. In this paper, we establish a connection between SPKI/SDSI and a formalism known as pushdown systems (PDSs). We show that the SPKI/SDSI-to-PDS connection provides a framework for formalizing a variety of certificate-a...More

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Introduction
  • Systems with shared resources use access-control mechanisms for protection. There are two fundamental problems in access control: authorization and enforcement.
  • Consider again the PDS P = (P , Γ, ∆), where P = {p1, p2}, Γ = {γ1, · · · , γ6}, and ∆ contains the following transition rules: p2, γ4 → p2, γ1γ2 p1, γ5 → p2, γ4γ3 p1, γ6 → p1, Consider the automaton shown in Fig. 6, which accepts the set of configurations C = { p1, γ5 }.
Highlights
  • Systems with shared resources use access-control mechanisms for protection
  • In the case of certificate-chain discovery, we show that an operation that is used as a subroutine in algorithms for model checking pushdown systems provides a new algorithm for the problem
  • This section explains the connection between SPKI/SDSI and pushdown systems, and demonstrates how the authorization problem, as well as a variety of other certificate-set analysis problems, can be viewed as model-checking problems on pushdown systems
  • There are two reasons why Apost is of interest: (i) it can serve as a subroutine in the algorithm for Linear time logic model checking, which provides a way to answer a general class of certificate-set-analysis questions [25, Section 3.2.3], and in other kinds of pushdown systems modelchecking problems, it has been found that, in practice, post works faster than pre [25]
  • This section discusses applications of model checking to specific certificate-setanalysis problems; in particular, we show how model checking furnishes algorithms for the analysis problems listed in the introduction. (Here, we use the term “model checking” to mean both (i) the problem of checking whether a given pushdown systems satisfies a given Linear time logic formula, and the problem of answering simple forward and backward reachability queries; the latter can be stated in terms of set-former expressions that use the basic automaton-building operations pre∗ and post∗.) Given a set of certs C and a set of configurations X, we write pre [PC](X) as pre [C](X)
  • The SPKI/SDSI-to-pushdown systems connection presented in this paper provides an alternative semantics for SPKI/SDSI: The names of an SPKI/SDSI name space are identified with the configurations of the transition system defined by a pushdown systems
Results
  • This section explains the connection between SPKI/SDSI and PDSs, and demonstrates how the authorization problem, as well as a variety of other certificate-set analysis problems, can be viewed as model-checking problems on PDSs. Assume that the authors are given a set of certs C and a request r = (KP , TP ).
  • There are two reasons why Apost is of interest: (i) it can serve as a subroutine in the algorithm for LTL model checking, which provides a way to answer a general class of certificate-set-analysis questions [25, Section 3.2.3], and in other kinds of PDS modelchecking problems, it has been found that, in practice, post works faster than pre [25].
  • The authors will explain how to construct a certificate chain from such structures using the example from Section 2.2, for which the final configuration automaton is given in Fig. 9.
  • When the pre algorithm has been extended as described above, a certificate chain for request r can be obtained from the auxiliary structure associated with (Kowner[T ], , s) in the final configuration automaton.
  • (Here, the authors use the term “model checking” to mean both (i) the problem of checking whether a given PDS satisfies a given LTL formula, and the problem of answering simple forward and backward reachability queries; the latter can be stated in terms of set-former expressions that use the basic automaton-building operations pre∗ and post∗.) Given a set of certs C and a set of configurations X, the authors write pre [PC](X) as pre [C](X).
Conclusion
  • This section discusses how annotating the PDS and the configuration automaton with labels from a bounded idempotent semiring can answer several useful questions, such as, “How long does a specific authorization last?” and “What is the trust level associated with an authorization?”.10 It describes an alternative way to handle authorization specifications, which has certain advantages over previous proposals.
  • Referring back to the example from Section 2.2, for which the final automaton is given in Fig. 9, if a trust level drawn from {Z, L, M , H} were assigned to each certificate, the value that labels the transition (Kowner[H], , s) in the automaton constructed by the algorithm Apre represents the “trust level” of Alice’s authorization.
Tables
  • Table1: Kinds of arrows used in the paper
  • Table2: Semirings for trust and validity
  • Table3: A semiring for authorization
Download tables as Excel
Related work
  • A certificate-chain-discovery algorithm for SPKI/SDSI was first proposed by Clarke et al [12]. Their algorithm was based on the idea of computing the namereduction closure of the certificate set. A credential-chain-discovery algorithm for the role-based trust management language RT0 was presented by Li et al [23]. One feature that distinguishes our work from both of those papers is the use of automatonbased model-checking techniques from the theory of model checking pushdown systems [8,17]. In the present paper, we have shown that the techniques from the PDS model-checking literature solve not only the problem of discovering certificate chains, but also provide answers to a broad array of questions that one might wish to pose about a set of SPKI/SDSI certificates. One of the most striking differences between this approach and previous work on certificate-chain-discovery is that the PDS-based certificate-chain-discovery algorithms compute the actual closure of the certificate set, not just the name-reduction closure (e.g., see “Authorized access 3” in Section 4.4). In general, the closure of a certificate set is an infinite set; however, it is a regular set – a fact that we are not aware of anyone observing before in the authorization literature – and hence can be represented via a finite-state automaton.
Funding
  • *This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under grant CCR-9619219, by the Office of Naval Research under contracts N00014-01-1-0796 and N00014-01-1-0708, and by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation
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